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POLITICAL COJOtUffICATIONS Iff NIGERIA
ABSTRACT
This study of the Nigerian Political Communications examines the 
patterns of mass media ownership and their impact on the coverage 
of selected national issues - the census controversy, ethnic 
problems and the general elections of 1979 and 1983. The contents 
of 21 newspapers of variegated ownership pattern involving 
governments, partisan and private interests are analysed and "live" 
illustrations of stories are given. This is to demonstrate 
empirically the thesis argument that the criterion of ownership is 
the key factor which determines how the Nigerian mass media are 
used for moulding the citizens" perception of political reality. 
The thesis seeks to answer questions such as: (a) what role have 
the Nigerian mass media played in promoting and/or compounding 
the problems of national integration in the Nigerian society since 
independence? (b) what role should the Nigerian mass media play to 
promote national integration and political stability? <c> what 
changes are necessary and desirable with the present situation to 
allow the mass media perform such integrative and stabilizing 
functions? Located within a comparative political communication 
approach to the study of mass media and politics in developing 
countries, this thesis seeks to contribute to knowledge in the 
areas of the theory, methodology and practice of political 
communications in Africa - with Nigeria as a case study. The 
question of media ownership has remained central to the Nigerian 
political communications with the attendant intrigues, ethnic 
violence, character assassination, political vilification, personal 
vendetta, coups and counter coups, general violent political 
disagreement and perennial problems of political instability 
culminating in fragmentation and disintegration that threaten the 
continued existence of Nigeria. The thesis also highlights a host 
of other factors which work in collaboration with media ownership 
to influence the Nigerian political communications - ethnicity, 
economic position, religion, legal limitations, circulation, 
transportation, audience reach, freedom of the press or lack of it, 
linguistic barriers and literacy. The thesis argues, in conclusion, 
that as Nigeria approaches a third attempt at democratic rule in 
socio-economic conditions which are less propitious than on past 
occasions, there is a need for the Nigerian mass media to operate in 
a way which contributes to national integration. It questions the 
existing pattern which is elitist and urban in orientation, ignores 
the rural majority and divides the Nigerian people rather than 
unites them. To achieve integration through political
communications, the thesis suggests the need to restructure the 
media ownership pattern and to establish a Nigerian Media Advisory 
Council with some regulatory ppwers and authority to impose 
punitive sanctions on media prac^iioners and institutions for any 
professional misconduct.
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POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN NIGERIA 
INTRODUCTION 
The Focus of the Study
’In the final analysis the Nigerian tragedy has been  
bedevilled by a set of oppositions - generalized, 
stereotyped, not necessarily of the same order and 
may be imaginary, yet each widening the wound and 
reducing the hopes of healing it; North vs South, 
Islam vs Christianity, alleged feudalism vs assumed 
socialism, federal vs unitary preferences, traditional 
authority vs achieved elitism, haves vs have-nots, each 
with sinister undertones of tension, irreconciliability 
and threatened withdrawal. None was quite entirely 
accurate. Nevertheless each opposing set had 
sufficient seeds of truth within it to permit, and even 
fertilize the growth of feared fact from the 
semi-fiction of its existence.''
This thesis examines the anatomy of mass media bias in Nigerian 
political communications. It argues that ownership of the mass media in Nigeria 
tends to determine how they are used for political communications in the country. 
Of course, other factors such as ethnicity, religion, literacy, language of 
communication, legal limitations, political and socio-economic factors, among a 
host of others, are not ignored. The thesis maintains, however, that the criterion 
of ownership is not only the key factor which determines how the mass media are 
used for moulding the citizen’s perception of political reality in the country, but 
it is also a more precise means/of undersfam?ing°and investigating the role of the 
press in political stability or instability, national integration or disintegration.
By Africa standards, the Nigerian press is by far the oldest and 
richest in media uses, traditions, developments and diversities.2 Nigeria is the
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largest and most populous country in Black Africa. With an estimated population 
of about 125 million people in 1988, Nigeria, it is assumed, accounted for about 
one-fifth o f Africa’s 608.7 million.3 The first television station in Africa was 
established in Nigeria, the first African language newspaper was also in Nigeria, 
while the country also recorded the first political party newspaper and the first 
successful daily newspaper in the West African sub-continent.4
In a way, this thesis is also a contribution to the scanty data on 
political communications in Africa. As a leading country in the continent of 
Africa, Nigeria, in many respects, is not untypical, in its broad social, economic, 
cultural and political communication characteristics, of many developing African 
nations.5 For example, in Nigeria as in Africa as a whole, the spheres of politics, 
economics, community, and communications are not strongly differentiated, and 
the communications media are far from being autonomous. The problem of 
integration and the building of a consensus in African countries is largely a 
problem of developing patterns of political communications - which transcend, 
rather than coincide with, prevailing discontinuities and communal divisions. 
Although there are important exceptions subsequently noted, existing political 
communication processes serve to reinforce those divisions, whether they are 
tribal, regional, ethnic, religious, political, social, class, economic, 
educated-uneducated, or urban-rural, among others.
What are the positive and/or negative roles of ownership of mass 
media in political communications in Africa? What are the problems in applying 
Anglo-American theories o f political communications to Africa and can there be 
a distinctive theoretical model for explaining African political communications?
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Can one really say that the mass media are of any paramount importance in the 
political process of African countries? This thesis attempts to provide some 
answers.
In another sense, the thesis is also a contribution to ways of 
achieving a stable political communication order in Nigeria - 1992-and beyond. 
By analysing the factors which affect the press performance and competence in 
a Nigerian Federal set-up where there are centrifugal forces always and almost 
permanently at work and by making suggestions which might guide policy makers 
on the mass media coverage of national issues, especially on setting ’the agenda’ 
of political and election campaigns, the thesis seeks to contribute to an 
investigation of the underlying causes of political instability in Nigeria and how 
these can be minimised. This is particularly important since Nigeria now 
approaches a third attempt at democratic rule in socio-economic conditions which 
are less propitious than on • past occasions. The Nigerian mass media should 
be able to operate in a way which contributes to political stability and national 
integration in the post 1992 political dispensation and beyond.
Nigeria is a good example of an unstable country in Africa. The 
country has witnessed a series of coups, counter coups, civil war, ethnic riots, 
religious disturbances, and general violent political disagreements since it became 
independent in October 1960. Of the seven administrations the country has had, 
only two were civilian (Balewa and Shagari), the rest being military. Three heads 
of state/government (Balewa, Ironsi and Murtala Muhammed) have been  
assassinated. The military has been in power for about twenty-two years, while 
the civilians have ruled for about ten years only.
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These contradictions6 in the Nigerian political system are also 
exacerbated by inter-state rivalry between the current twenty-one states of the 
federation as well as by social, political, economic, educational and mass media 
inequalities. O f the 49 newspapers and periodicals in English and Nigerian 
languages in Nigeria at independence, only seven were published in the Northern 
Region7 and none was published in the rural areas.
The Nigerian press has a duty to ensure that the political objectives 
of the country.are achieved in accordance with its motto which is ’Unity and Faith, 
Peace and Progress’. In fact, Nigeria’s constitution provides for the obligations of 
the mass media on fundamental objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy 
- Fundamental Obligations of Government, the Government and the people, 
Political Objectives, Economic Objectives, Social Objectives, Educational 
Objectives, Foreign Policy Objectives and Directives on Nigerian Culture.8
However, as it will be demonstrated later in this thesis, and 
depending on the periods under consideration, the Nigerian mass media have 
been more negative than positive in the way they have covered political and 
national issues. The blatantly partisan, parochial, rebellious and reckless 
colouration of political communications through the Nigerian mass media has 
manifested itself in such issues as national election campaigns, national census, 
leadership of the country, political party formations, ethnic origins of contenders 
for political offices and religious issues among others. For example, the 
communal riots which occurred in Northern Nigeria during 1966, and which 
precipitated the drift towards the Nigerian civil war of 1967, were preceded by 
provocative journalism of an alarming kind. Tribal prejudices were exploited to
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the full, most notoriously in a series of anti-Ibo cartoons run by the Citizen, one 
of which showed Easterners eating their children.9
Successive Nigerian leaders (both civilian and military) have pointed 
accusing fingers at the Nigerian mass media in the way they are used for political 
communications. A  one time Nigerian Commissioner for Information reflecting 
on the fall o f the Nigerian First Republic lamented that whoever and whatever 
ruined the Republic did so with the connivance and active collaboration of the 
greater part of the Nigerian press. One of the problems Ironsi had was one of 
communication which plagued him throughout his tenure of office while Gowon 
once complained about the conspiracy of the Nigerian press to pull him down 
from the reins of power.*0
One issue that came up in the historic Aburi meeting of the 
Supreme Military Council was the role of the Nigerian press in provoking the 
crisis that culminated in the civil war. While Ojukwu maintained that the New  
Nigerian and the Nigerian Post were to be singled out for their nefarious role in 
the crisis, Gowon and Hassan insisted that the Outlook of Eastern Nigeria caused 
most of the trouble. In the end, all the members agreed that the Nigerian media 
in general, particularly the federal and state government’s information media, 
should desist from • inflammatory publications that would worsen the
situation in the country. A  military governor in Nigeria once remarked:
‘D o not blame soldiers for all the coups that had 
taken place. I want to say that both the military and 
the press took over power: the military using the gun 
and the press using the pen.’12
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In what ways can media ownership be made to CQntribute to a 
democratic political system through responsible and effective 
political communications? What impediments are likely to arise 
and how can they be contained? This thesis attempts some answers. 
On the whole, this thesis intends to contribute to knowledge in the 
areas of the theory, practice and methodology of political 
communications in Africa in general and in Nigeria in particular:
"If a third attempt at democratic 
government is to be successful, however, it 
must tailor democratic institutions to fit 
Nigeria"s unique heritage and to overcome 
the structural problems that have defeated 
democrat ic government in the past.... it must 
be a premise of a Third Republic that 
"institutional architecture is a key to 
democratic viability.""13
HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES OF DATA
The following hypotheses are formulated for the thesis:
1. The affiliation of mass media ownership was likely to 
have affected their editorial preferences with regard to the 
coverage of national issues and the campaigns of the various 
political parties, thus leading to unequal amount of coverage;
2. The political parties that controlled regional, state or 
federal power in Nigeria were likely to have used the mass media to 
influence the political thinking of their subjects through 
government ownership of such media; and
3. Political competition in Nigeria follows ethnic lines1,^  
exacerbates ethnic conflicts and the mass media houses/personnel
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were more likely to have been representatives of specific ethnic 
groups and to have used the media they owned and/or controlled to
enhance their ethnic groups' interests in the competition for power
, >5"and resources.
This study has followed three methods of research:
1. (Jtialitative archival and library research, to provide
data for; analyses of the historical, legal, political and
socio-economic background of mass media operation in Nigeria;
2. ‘ Semi-structured interviews with leading media
operators, politicians, reporters, newspaper publishers, mass
media owners and key government information ministry personnel, 
to tap data on the impact of media ownership on behaviour of mass 
media in political communications;
3. Quantitative method of the content-analysis of news
stories in the federal government-owned, state/regional 
government-owned, political party and private-owned newspapers, 
to examine the nature of the reported political world in them, the 
direction and quantity of news stories, the placement and emphasis 
given to various types of news stories; whether they were 
favourable, unfavourable or neutral and to capture the flow of news 
and to assess its completeness and cumulative impact. Attention 
paid to governmental and non-governmental activities, ethnic, 
political and other specific interests is also scrutinised. (For 
details, see the Tables and Appendices. >
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Qualitative, archival and library research was done in 
Britain. Materials on political communications particularly in 
Africa and Nigeria were collected and analysed from various books, 
periodicals, official government publications in libraries and 
centres for the study of communications, cultures and African 
affairs, most of which were more up-to-date than what is available 
in African libraries. In Nigeria, most of the archival and library 
research wasvdone in four field trips, two each in 1988 and 1989 
respectively, and one of which was funded by the Central Research 
Fund Committee of the University of London in 1989. The research 
was done in the Search Room of the National Archives of Ibadan, the 
Institute of African Studies, the libraries of the Department of 
Communication and Language Arts, the Department of Library, 
Archival and Information Studies, the University Main Library, all 
at the University of Ibadan, the News Documentation Rooms of the 
Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State, B.C.O.S., Ibadan, the 
libraries of the Department of Mass Communication, the Gandhi 
Memorial and Collection Library, University of Lagos, the Lagos 
State University, the News Documentation and Information Rooms of 
the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (F.R.C.N.) at Ikoyi, the 
Nigerian Television Authority (N.T.A.) and the Nigerian Institute of 
International Affairs, all in Lagos.
I conducted interviews, both in Britain and in Nigeria. 
Some politicians and former media men were easier interviewed in 
Britain than in Nigeria. They felt secure and relaxed in London, 
and some of them had left Nigeria for London as a result of the 
political situation in the country. The reporters, politicians, 
media executives and some of the electorate interviewed in Nigeria
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were able to throw light on the origins through the eye-witness 
accounts of the ethnic, political, tribal and religious 
implications of the Nigerian mass media for political 
communications. Interviews of personalities were always done in 
several sittings to enable cross-checking. It was the quality 
rather than quantity of information that was the focus of my 
attention in the interviews. These measures assisted in testing 
validity and Enhanced the thoroughness of this research effort.
' The content analysis of newspapers was also done both 
in Britain and Nigeria. The contents, editions and news stories of 
papers analysed at the British Newspaper Library at Col indale in 
London were compared, contrasted and cross-checked with the same 
contents, editions and news stories of the same papers in libraries 
in Nigerian universities and the mass media houses where the 
papers were published. This multi-level cross-checking of 
evidence of content-analysis tremendously assisted reliability 
testing. There were some local sources in indigenous languages 
such as Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba which were full of reliable "inside 
information" on political communications in Nigeria. These were 
made use of in the analysis and writing of this thesis after they 
had been translated into English. However, the final data analysis 
and writing up of the thesis were done in London.
The research also draws extensively on a host of other 
sources - internal press and party documents, press comments and 
controversies, reports of enquiries, official government 
directives and policy statements, government, press and party 
official publications, press, party and individual releases, House 
of Assembly Debates, government gazettes .records, published and
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unpublished, as well as the participant observations of the author 
who served as a Senior News Editor, analyst, reporter, 
investigator, researcher and current affairs officer with a 
Nigerian media organisation; followed the activities of the press, 
the political parties and their candidates closely and was based 
inside the newsroom and shuttling between it, the press centre and 
the headquarters of the Federal Electoral Commission, at various 
stages during the Second Republic's general elections.
' It should be noted that the collection of data and the 
conduct of interviews covering political communications in 
Nigeria is more difficult than in a liberal-democratic society. 
There are inevitably gaps in what it has proved possible to 
collect; and many of the interviews were conducted on an 
unattributable basis. Some incidents discussed in various parts 
of the thesis can not be fully documented but I have only cited such 
events where I have good reason to believe that they occured in the 
form described.
In all, 8 newspapers were examined in the First Republic, 
while 13 newspapers, 2 radio and television stations were examined 
in the Second Republic. < See the Tables and Appendices for an 
explanation of the selection. > The choices capture variations in 
patterns of ownership - federal, state, regional, party and private. 
We are also able'to compare and contrast the impact of ownership of 
the media on Nigerian political communications during the two 
Republics and this may help predict the future of Nigerian 
political communications. The Second Republic in Nigeria 
(1979-1983) marked the end of an epoch and the beginning of another. 
It was the period when Nigeria changed from her cabinet,
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par 1 iamentary Westminster political system to the U.S. style of 
presidential system of government. It also ushered in civilian 
administration, a second attempt at democratic rule, after thirteen 
years of military dictatorship and a proliferation of print and 
electronic media.
The 8 newspapers examined in the First Republic were 
the Nigerian Morning Post owned by the federal government, the 
Eastern Qutldok owned by the Eastern Nigeria regional government, 
the Daily * Sketch owned by the Western regional government, the 
Nigerian Citizen owned by the Northern regional government, the 
Daily Times which was independent, the West African Pilot, the 
Daily Express and the Nigerian Tribune, all of which were political 
party newspapers articulating the interest of the N.C.N.C. and A.G.
For the Second Republic, the 13 newspapers examined were 
the Daily Times and the New Nigerian, both of which belonged to the 
federal government, The Sketch, owned by the governments of Oyo, 
Ogun and Ondo states, The Observer, (Bendel state government), The 
Herald, (Kwara state government), The Standard. (Plateau state 
government), The Star, (Anambra state government), The Statesman. 
(Imo state government), The Tide, (Rivers state government), The 
Tribune, The Concord and The Satellite, all of which were owned by 
political parties and politicians - Chief Awolowo and the U.P.N., 
Chief Abiola and the N.P.N., and Chief Nwobodo and the N.P.P. 
respectively. The Punch which belonged to Chief Aboderin, The 
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (F.R.C.N.) and The Nigerian 
Television Authority (N.T.A.) which were owned by the Federal 
Government with branches in all the states of the federation and in 
Abuja, the new federal capital territory, and The Broadcasting
-21-
Corporation of Qyp State (B.C.Q.S.) which was.owned by the Oyo state 
government. The number of news stories, column-centimetres 
analysed, the time period, the issues and units of analysis are 
given in the body of this thesis (at the end of the chapter in which 
the analysis is reported).
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON THE SUBJECT
1. General Literature on Political Communications
This section analyses the implications of major existing studies on 
political communications for the study of African political communications in 
general and for understanding political communications in Nigeria in particular. 
Political communication has been a major focus of attention in political
and social theory. However, the, perspectives and problems that have 
informed the general studies o f the subject have been very largely on modern 
Western societies. Although Aristotle recognised many years ago that politics and 
communication go hand in hand because they are essential parts of human nature, 
political communication as a concept distinct from other political analysis of 
communication phenomena or communication analysis of political phenomena is 
relatively new.
Humans are, according to Aristotle’s Politics, ‘political beings’ and 
’he who is without a polis, by reason of his own nature and not of some accident, 
is either a poor sort of being [a beast] or a being higher than man [a god].’ And 
because nature makes nothing in vain, Aristotle continues, humans ’alone of the 
animals are furnished with the faculty of language’.16
Also, Bentley, as early as 1908, suggested that communication 
analysis could appropriately be applied to the study of politics because the raw 
materials of government ’is never found in one man by himself...It is a ’relation’ 
between men...the action of men with or upon each other’.17
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In the same vein, Lucian Pye pointed out about three decades ago, 
that there is a ’peculiarly intimate relationship between the political process and 
the communication process’.18 Karl Deutsch also suggested that a study of the 
nerves of the body politic - its decision-making processes - gives insight into the 
performance of its bones and muscles - the exercise of power.19
Earlier Studies:
By far the most common area of research in the past has been 
election studies. Although research along these lines prospered, theories of 
political communications never emerged. The classic voting studies defined 
political communication research for many years and for that period, political 
communication was composed of mass mediated messages about politics. Even 
besides the voting studies conducted by political scientists and sociologists, one 
other academic group which developed a notion of political communication - the 
journalism and mass communication researchers - focused primarily on press (and 
later electronic) coverage of explicitly political events such as election campaigns. 
Perhaps this was why Meadow in an essay review of political communication 
research in the 1980s questioned whether there are new findings about the 
relationship between media and politics and whether there is more to political 
communication than election studies. He identified what he sees as the major 
problems of current political communication research. These are the tendency of 
rehashing the same findings over and over again, the continuing ’journalismization’ 
of social science, the continuing focus on event-based research, particularly 
elections and the emphasis on crass empiricism at the expense o f theory. H e
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suggested that given the limited contribution of more election studies, it would 
appear that the time is ripe for political communication research to move in new 
directions, with an agenda oriented to the political institutions, processes, and 
ideological environments of the 1990s, not the 1940s.20
Early Works on Political Communications:
One significant early work to use political communication as 
a part of its title was Karl Deutsch’s The Nerves of Government: Models of 
Political Communication and Control. As the title implies, the work develops a 
series of models through which control in political systems is established. But 
Deutsch’s book was most applicable and most effective in theoretically explaining 
power relationships, but less significant in its ability to draw a full picture of the 
scope of political communications. For instance, in Nigeria as in Africa, the 
questions of the ownership of mass media and its usage for power relationships, 
the contents of communications, the methods of information dissemination, the 
structure and organisation of the political communication process, how the means 
of communication are related to one another and how the patterns of political 
communications affect the development of representative government have to be 
examined, explained and analysed. It must be mentioned, however, that with 
Deutsch’s work, political communication moved beyond evaluation of mass media 
in election cqmpaigns.
Research in comparative politics published about the same time as 
Deutsch’s work returned political scientists to a position of leadership in political 
communication research. But more important, for the first time whole political
systems (rather than discrete events, such as elections within those systems) were 
considered to be influenced by communications. O f major relevance was the work 
of the development and modernisation oriented political scientists summarised by 
Fagen, who in a volume titled Politics and Communication, sought to consider ’a 
communication approach to the study of comparative politics’.21 However, Fagen 
failed to consider the fuller implication of his definition because of his concern for 
macropolitical systems in a comparative framework. Key questions in the enquiry 
reveal the limits of the analysis. Fagen is concerned with communication 
processes in the selection of leaders, definition of the agenda, participation in 
decision-making, scope of permissible criticism, and socialisation. In other words, 
political communication analysis is essentially limited to participation and 
socialisation questions, particularly as related to questions of development.
Other recent works have also failed to take into account the analysis 
of the role of political processes in shaping the communications process; instead, 
they still maintain a narrow view of the scope of political communication. For 
example, in a volume explicitly titled Political Communication. Arora and Lasswell 
pay little attention to broad notions of political communication, instead 
considering it to be synonymous with the public language of politics as expressed 
in the elite press in the United States and India. This again is a mass media 
based notion of political communication.22 Also Chaffee, in a volume entitled 
Political Communication, reflects the problem by conceptualising political 
communication as a unidirectional discipline:
‘What is sought is a set of research paradigms
through which we can extend the depth and breadth 
of our understanding of the role of communication 
in the political process.23
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Blumler and Gurevitch25 have addressed the issue of a more
sophisticated notion of political communications. In their effort to
demonstrate the theoretical linkage of communication to politics, they
argue that if politics is about power, then this must be conveyed by
power wielders. If politics is about participation, then the desires
of citizens must be communicated to leaders. If politics is about
legitimacy, then regime norms must be symbolically expressed. And, if
2b
politics is about choice, then policy options must be circulated. In 
this way, politics and communication are linked.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
Mass Media; Mass media of communication comprise the 
press (Newspapers), magazines, comic booklets, Radio, Television, 
Cinema and other means of communication which reach large 
heterogeneous audiences and in which there is an impersonal 
medium between the sender and receiver. A mass medium is 
essentially a working group organised round some device for 
circulating the same message, at about the same time, to large 
numbers of people. The term mass media is also used to refer to the 
Institutions and techniques by which specialised groups employ 
technological devices to disseminate symbolic content to large, 
heterogeneous and widely dispersed audiences. It is that form of 
communication process which utilises mechanical electronic 
instruments and devices to create news and information, ideas and 
images and to transmit such messages simultaneously to a mass 
audience.
Political Stability: By this term we refer to persistence of
political patterns with some degree of civil order, legitimacy, 
efficiency and durability. It is also used to refer to the 
existence of a legitimate constitutional regime, the relative 
absence of violent civil conflict, the absence of structural change 
in the political system and the relative longevity of "government". 
In fact, a composite view from the relevant literature concludes 
that when one speaks of the "stability" of a certain democratic 
polity, one is referring to <a> the ability of the political system 
to persist; (b> the existence of a legitimate political system; and
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<c> the presence of effective decision-making by the political 
system.
Political Instability: By this I mean a condition in political
systems in which the institutionalised patterns of authority break 
down, and the expected compliance to political authorities is 
replaced by violence intended to change the personnel, policies, or 
sovereignty xof the authorities through injury to persons or 
property. <■
A Stable Democracy: Ve use this term to refer to a system,
characterised by constitutionalism, broad representation, freedom 
of opposition and governmental stability. It is also used to refer 
to a system characterised by a stable competitive party system, 
freedom of the press, political neutrality on the part of the 
military and police and relative absence of anomic groups. 
Political democracy is a political system which supplies regular 
constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. 
It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problems of 
societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which 
permits the largest to choose among alternative contenders for 
political office.
Political Parties: By this term we refer to organised groups of
individuals who work together to control the policies and 
personnel of the government. And by "recognised' parties, we mean 
those political parties registered by the Federal Electoral 
Commission (FEDECO), as in 1979-1983, or National Electoral
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Commission (NEC) as in 1990- , as eligible to present candidates and 
compete for political offices in the Elections of the Second and 
Third Republics in Nigeria.
Political Communication: By this term we refer to that subset of
communicatory activity considered political by virtue of the 
consequences, actual and potential, that it has for the functioning 
of the political system. It is also used as a process in which 
informational and persuasive messages are transmitted from the 
political institutions of society through the mass media to the 
citizenry to whom they are ultimately accountable. It is the role 
that communication plays in political institutions and process and 
the role politics plays in shaping communication processes.
National Newspaper: Defining "national'' newspaper in the Nigerian
context has been problematic, given the absence of universally 
respected indices. Data on circulation cannot be used to measure 
spread of circulation because much of the circulation data 
available are collected by the newspapers themselves or by 
advertising agencies which do not command general acceptance.
The convention, given the experience of other writers, 
has been either to assume a meaning or define "national" to include 
any or all of the following:
Circulation and offices in Lagos, the outgoing federal 
Capital (given the historical role of Lagos as centre of the earlier 
presses and the tendency to, because of this, now open office in 
Lagos); place of publication, circulation and presence in big 
cities, spread of correspondents; and, given the high mortality
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rate, those old enough to have been seen around for long enough in 
most parts of the country for their "national" claim to be well 
accepted.
STews Stories: We define this term for Newspapers as including
editorials, letters to the editor, features, grape vine, world 
sport-light, Datelines, Question time, Peoples" Parliament, as well 
as ordinaryN news reports, but excluding advertisements, 
obituaries/ cartoons, In Memoriam, public notices, puzzles, radio 
and television listings and similar announcements.
Communication Content: By this term we mean that body of meanings 
through symbols (verbal, musical, pictorial, plastic, gestural) 
which makes up the communication itself. In the classic sentence 
identifying the process of communication - "who says what, to whom, 
how, with what effect" - communication content is the what.
Content Analysis: By this term we refer to the research technique
for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the 
manifest content of communication.
Journalist: By this term we refer to a person whose primary
occupation is the gathering, writing and editing of materials 
which consist largely of the reporting or interpretation of 
current events. Anybody who deals with the dissemination of news 
or information on a large scale is a journalist.
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Fourth Estate of the Realm: By this term we refer to the newspaper 
press. The term goes back to the early days of the British 
Parliament, with its three estates of man; Lords Spiritual, Lords 
Temporal, and 'Commons'. 'The gallery in which the reporters sit 
has become a fourth estate of the "realm"', wrote Thomas Babington, 
Lord Macaulay.
Editorial; By this term we refer to an essay or article on the 
editorial page,' usually without a byline, that expresses the 
opinion of the editor, the newspaper, or editorial writer on an 
issue or event that is often controversial.
Mast Head; This is a box or table, usually on the editorial, listing 
top editors and offering other information about the paper: 
frequency of publication, place of publication and the like. The 
name of the paper, running across the top of page 1, is the 
nameplate or flag.
Good Government: We use this term in the same sense it was used in 
the Reports of the Constitution Drafting Committee in Nigeria as 
effective and popular government. Effectiveness was to be derived 
from the decisive action and authority of the President, while the 
provisions on citizen participation in governmental affairs were 
intended to make government reflect the popular will.
A Theory; We use this term to refer to a set of general statements 
which act as the premises for explanation. Theories are used to
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explain, to organise, systematise, predict, generate hypothesis, 
and coordinate existing knowledge in a particular area or field.
Bias: This concept is used in this study to explain the tendency of 
the newspapers to lean in favour of or towards a particular 
government, group, political party - or against them - by giving 
more or less coverage, in terms of quantity of stories, the majority 
of which occupy prominent positions in the papers and/or 
favourably or unfavourable to the particular political party, 
candidate, government or ethnic groups.
Ownership: The Advanced Learners" Dictionary of Current English
defines "ownership as "state of being an owner", "right of 
possessing", and an owner is a person who owns something or has a 
property.
Favourable Story: Any story about a political party directed to
any audience to get votes, or story in defence of a party"s policy or 
any story reporting about a member leaving party A to join party B 
(decamping), is entered under party B as a favourable story. 
Stories pointing to the success, progress, orderliness in a party 
depicting the programmes of such a party as being desirable are 
also favourable. Favourable stories in general reported cases of 
progress in the parties" campaigns strategies. Favourable stories 
showed the parties and their candidates in good light. Favourable 
stories also showed the presidential candidate as:
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Having the best programme that won Id benefit the 
majority of the people.
Having the ability to execute his programme - talking 
about his past achievements, honesty, experience and 
efficiency.
As a national leader who would unite the country. Any 
statement meant to preserve the loyalty of friends and 
win over foes.
Unfavourable Story: In this study, these are stories depicting any
of the parties as irresponsible, or pointing to weakness in 
ideology, leadership, etc. and reporting that many have decamped 
from such parties. An unfavourable story also refers to any 
derogatory article about a party or its candidate. Unfavourable 
stories in general reported issues like crises in the party, people 
decamping from the party, and also decrj&^the low and disheartening 
campaign tactics of political parties. In short, unfavourable 
stories showed the parties and candidates in a bad light. 
Unfavourable stories also portrayed the presidential candidate as:
Having the worst or an unrealistic programme.
Lacking the ability to execute his programme - talking 
of inexperience, ignorance, dishonesty, poor records 
and inefficiency.
As a tribalist, an elitist or a capitalist.
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Any statement meant to mobilise hatred against the
candidate and his party as well as to demoralise his
supporters.
Neutral Story: Any story which has no particular inclinations as
to whether it is favourable or unfavourable. Any item that is 
devoid of appeal for votes is a neutral story. For example, a story 
reporting at^out the plan of a political party to embark on a 
campaign tour." Neutral stories portrayed information about
parties, candidates, issues and events covered without the
occurrence of positive or negative references.
Prominence: In this study, this refers to the placement of the
story in the newspaper.
Special Stories: These are stories which appeared in the regular
columns such as: "Candido", "As I see it" in the New Nigerian;
"Political Round-Up" as in The Daily Times. Articles written by the 
columnists who write regularly for the newspapers as well as 
special interviews with the candidates are considered special 
stories.
Hypotheses: Research hypotheses are derived from the theory of the 
social investigator and generally state a specified relation 
between two or more variables. An example of a research hypothesis 
might be: "There is an inverse association between variables X and
Y". More specifically, "When job satisfaction decreases, labour
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turnover increases". The symbol H is used to identify research 
hypotheses.
Another kind of hypothesis is called the statistical hypothesis. 
This statistical hypothesis is usually constructed to enable the 
social researcher to evaluate his research hypothesis. Often the 
statistical hypothesis is stated in null form. Such an hypothesis 
might be 'Th^ ere is no association between variables X and Y". 
Hypotheses such' as this are referred to as null hypotheses. The 
symbol H0 is used to represent hypotheses of this type.
The Chi—Square Test: The Chi-square is a test of significance. It
tells us whether our observations differ from what is expected by 
chance, when chance is defined according to a particular set of 
rules.
Models: A model seeks to show the main elements of any structure
or process and the relationships between these elements. Deutsch 
notes the following main advantages of models in the social 
sciences. Firstly, they have an organizing function by ordering 
and relating systems to each other and by providing us with images 
of wholes that we might not otherwise perceive. An aspect of this 
is that a model gives a general picture of a range of different 
particular circumstances. Secondly, they help in explaining, by 
providing in a simplified way information which would otherwise be 
complicated or ambiguous. This gives the model a heuristic 
function since it can guide the student or researcher to key points 
of a process or system. Thirdly, the model may make it possible to
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predict outcomes or the course of events. It can at least be a basis 
for assigning probabilities to various alternative outcomes, and 
hence for formulating hypotheses in research. Some models claim 
only to describe the structure of a phenomenon. In this sense, a 
diagram of the components of a radio set could be described as 
"structural". Other models, which we call "functional", describe 
systems in terms of energy, forces and their direction, the 
relations between parts and the influence of one part on another.29
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ORGANISATION OF THE CHAPTERS
Political Communication in Nigeria is treated in this thesis in terms 
of the following organisation, structure and chapters. The thesis begins with an 
introduction which explains the focus of the study, research questions, hypotheses, 
sources and methods of data collections and analyses, overviews o f pertinent and 
relevant literature on the subject, definition of terms in order to give the reader 
a detailed overview and prepare him to grasp the general message of the project 
and the identification of its major ideas. A  list of notes and references which 
contains all citations to examples, documentation, quotations, sources for 
verification and possible additional reading on some areas of interest is located 
at the end of each chapter.
Chapter One examines theoretical models of political 
communications in general and their implications for political communications in 
Africa in general and in Nigeria in particular. Because of the circumstances of the 
African countries, the great variety of social, economic and political conditions and 
the changing nature of the African situations which limit the application of other 
theoretical models or that reduce their potential benefits to Africa, Chapter Two 
deals with political communications in Africa and the impact of ownership on 
mass media behaviour. Chapter Three is an historical background, while Chapter 
Four is an attempt to propose a theoretical model of Nigerian political 
communications based on the ownership of the mass media and the philosophy 
that guides their behaviour as a result of this model. This chapter also examines 
the nature of the Nigerian state and society, its political economy and
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development, its heterogeneity, its ethnic, linguistic,tribal, religious compositions, 
the origins, birth and development of its media, together with their involvement 
in partisan political activism. The press in Nigeria, as elsewhere, does not operate 
in a vacuum, but responds to its particular historical and socio-politico-economic 
environments. In order to understand the Nigerian political communications, 
therefore, we must understand the nature of the Nigerian social system, its 
constitutional engineering and how the press grew with political parties, 
governments and ethnic chauvinism. Chapter Four has been devoted to this task.
Chapter Five begins to relate the theoretical model o f ownership of 
Nigerian mass media and their behaviour on political communications to the 
empirical case studies of how the newspapers were actually used by their owners 
for political communications in the First and Second Republics. It examines how 
8 newspapers of variegated ownership pattern, involving government (federal and 
regional), political parties and private interests alike, covered national, ethnic and 
political issues during the republic. In a way it is a survey of political 
communication issues in Nigeria’s First Repubulic - electoral politics, census 
politics, ethnic politics, and the press tfscntribution to the fall of this republic.
Chapter Six is on the Nigerian press under the military regimes. 
Although the military is increasingly being regarded as an aberration in 
governance by social scientists, nevertheless it is a factor to be reckoned with in 
Nigerian politics. Even though political activities and constitution are suspended 
under the military, the way some recurring issues in Nigeria are tackled by the 
military leads one to think that Nigerian military rulers are politicians in khaki 
uniform.
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Chapters Seven and Eight continue to relate the theoretical model 
of ownership of Nigerian mass media and their impact on political 
communications to the empirical case studies of how the mass media were actually 
used for the coverage of the 1979 and 1983 general elections in Nigeria. They 
give qualitative and quanti&tf^nalyses of the development and content of 13 
newspapers, radio and television stations of variegated ownership pattern, 
involving governments (Federal and State), political parties and private interests 
alike, all o f which, it is hoped, capture enough of whatever editorial differences 
that might have been anticipated as a result of ownership. It is also hoped to 
establish the tendency of media to be biased in favour of and/or against particular 
registered political parties, governments, ethnic groups, and candidates in coverage 
of election campaigns, to play down programmes of ’small’ parties and lay greater 
emphasis on the ’big’ parties, to become willing instruments and megaphones of 
their owners - individuals, governments, politicians - in the positioning of news 
stories with blatant disregard for professional journalistic ethics and constitutional 
provision; to de-emphasise the interest of the public, especially the majority rural
CVyy
electorate and to give^ asymmetric amount of unfavourable and neutral news 
stories to political party programmes.
The Conclusion critically evaluates the other factors of the anatomy 
of press bias in Nigerian political communications. It examines the implications 
of such factors (in addition to the key factor of ownership and control) as ethnicity 
and religion, economy, literacy, legal limitations and press freedom, as well as 
linguistic barriers in information dissemination and political communications 
among a host of other factors. This section, which concludes the discussion and
closes the thesis, is also an amplification and a summary of findings on political 
communications in Nigeria in particular and in Africa in general. In the light of 
the discussions, the literature overviews, the interviews, the research experiences, 
participant observations and content analyses, this section also offers some 
concluding thoughts as representing and recapitulating the essence of this research 
proj ect and its attempted contributions to knowledge in the areas of the theory, 
methodology and practice of political communications and their implications for 
Nigeria’s Third Republic and subsequent years.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORETICAL MODELS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the relevant theoretical models o f political 
communications, political importance of the mass media, the utility of 
communication in politics, theories of the press and communication systems and 
their implications for the study of political communications in African countries.
1.1 Models of Political Communications
frfany different models of political communications have been 
offered from sociological to psychological, Marxist to non-Marxist, and normative 
to empirical.1 However, some have ignored the critical issues which are the main 
themes of my thesis. For instance, who controls or owns the mass media and in 
whose interest? Who has access to the media and on what terms? Whose version 
of the world (social reality) is presented? What variable factors limit or enlarge 
the power of the media in covering events and how effective are they in adhering 
to the ethics of journalism?
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Functionalism: The functional model analyses the consequences of
communications, particularly mass media, to the political system. It considers the 
role of communications and communication processes with respect to the selection 
o f leaders, the definition of the political agenda, participation in decision making, 
receptivity to criticism, and socialisation.
‘All of the functions performed in the political system 
- political socialization and recruitment, interest 
articulation, interest aggregation, political 
communication - my emphasis - rule-making, 
rule-application and rule-adjudication are performed 
by means of communication'2
But the functional approach has ignored questions such as who has 
power in society (rather than what are the implications o f the division of power), 
how are conflicts resolved, and who controls political information? In African 
countries, where the channels of communication are not only mostly short but also 
personal, political and governmental, power lies with ownership and control of the 
media. For instance, in an African village which has, say, one radio, the 
ownership of that radio is both a symbol and a tool of power. The owner is in a 
position to know what is happening in the capital, or in foreign capitals, or in the 
market, before others know it. Furthermore, he is in a position to share the 
experience of using the radio, or the information derived from the radio, with
5b
whomever he wishes. Similarly, the ownership of a newspaper by a government, 
a private individual, an ethnic group or a political advocate in an African country, 
is an altogether more potent fact of power and status than such ownership by such 
groups in a Western country.
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-Systems Approach?; The systems approach to communication explains 
the interaction among elements in the system. Communication is
linked to control in general. More specifically, as it relates to
political communication, communication is for social control.
Processes for describing patterns of social control, system
responsiveness, and other mechanistic social forces are described
through the systems approach. The most important contributions to
this approach have been made by Deutsch, although the work of
Easton has also been very influential. However, general systems
theory is hot without its limitations. Criticisms of the approach
range from the argument that systems theory routinizes,
trivializes and mechanizes complex social phenomena; and only
describes rather than explains social phenomena. Moreover, in
terms of its utility for capturing political variables, it neither
describes key political concepts such as power or socialization,
nor explains processes by which political goals are established.
1.2. The Utility of Communication in Politics
"Some kinds of communication on some kinds 
of issues, brought to the attention of some 
kinds of people under some kinds of 
conditions have some kinds of effects.*
The problem of examining the political role of the mass 
media in political communications and their effects on national 
issues, election campaigns in particular, is not confined to 
Nigeria. Anywhere in the world, the press has always been involved 
ir. politics, formation of public opinion, perception of images of 
csndidates for political offices, the definition of social reality 
ard social norms, the education, information, enlightenment and
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entertainment of the public, as well as . the presentation and 
clarification of issues, values, goals and changes in culture and 
society.
Great scholars have been concerned with the possible 
influence of mass media of communication on the formation of 
public opinion and attitudes, but there have been divergent and 
diametrically opposed views on the subject. The result of many 
disputes aboht the role of the press is arguably what the French 
call a "dialogue of the deaf", where nobody hears the other side"s 
argument.
The entire study of mass communication is 
based on the premise, that there are effects 
from the media, yet it seems to be the issue 
on which there is least certainty and least 
agreement".5
Aristotle and Plato , for instance, acknowledge the 
immense power of propaganda carried out on the face to face setting 
during their days. Some writers believe that the media are very 
powerful while others see the powers of the press as very limited. 
For example, politicians and journalists are agreed that the role 
of media is crucial, though they disagree about how effectively it 
is being played. Further tribute to this role is paid by the 
various social scientists who have made research into mass media 
and political communications a growth point in academic industry. 
Yet clear and specific descriptions, definitions and analysis of 
what the mass media actually contribute, or ought to contribute, to 
the political communication process are still inconclusive. In the 
words of C.R. Wright,
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It is customary to speak of "the influence 
of the press" in global terms, as if it were a 
single, indivisible pressure at work within 
society, but closer examination reveals 
t h a t  n e w s p a p e r s  are a c t u a l l y  
multi-functional institutions which make 
their presence felt in a variety of ways.7
Political Importance of the Mass Media:
Harold Lasswell, itemises three functions performed by 
the mass media -viz: surveillance of the world to report ongoing
events, interpretation of the meaning of events, and socialisation 
of individuals into their cultural settings8. Another attribute of
a
the media is the deliberate manipulation of the political process. 
The manner in which these functions are performed, it is argued, 
affects the lives of individuals, groups, and social organisations,
lo
as well as the course of domestic and international politics.
In short, the main argument of those who believe in the
omnipotent power of the mass media is that it is primarily through
the media that citizens monitor their political process, gain
information and insights on the functioning of government, its
leaders, and the problems confronting the nation in both domestic
ii
and international spheres. They also argue that there is no 
national election campaign outside the media and that the polls and 
the media, at least at election campaign time, cannot live without 
each other. By raising certain political questions in the public 
forum, the media can bring issues to heightened public 
consciousness, emphasise one political conflict at the expense of 
another, and influence the range and substance of national debate.
It is no exaggeration to say that the media can make or 
break presidential hopefuls. Not only may they determine who will
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receive massive electoral support, but th^ir ability to project 
advantageous or disadvantageous images for candidates and link 
them to suitable issues also may decide who will be elected 
eventually. Lang and Lang observed:
'The mass media force attention to certain 
issues. They build up public images of 
political figures. They are constantly 
presenting objects suggesting what 
individuals in the mass media should think 
about, know about, and have feelings 
; about"1.2
In relation to developing societies, the communication 
functions of the mass media are even more crucial. A developing 
society is in a more or less constant condition of crisis, faced 
with the possibility of disunity, with the need to mobilise its 
people for a war on poverty, disease, hunger, indiscipline, economic 
sabotage, smuggling, armed robbery, hooliganism, vandalism, 
brigandage, social injustice, and crippling attitudes and 
traditions, and with the need to ensure that its few resources, both 
human,physical, natural and material, are harnessed for achieving 
the goals of political stability, rapid industrialisation, rural 
development, freedom of the individual, greater economic equality, 
democratic political participation, and for solutions to other 
problems.
African political communications cannot adequately be
/ /Aexplained within the context of the Anglo-American press theories: 
For example, no thoroughly libertarian media systems are found in 
Africa. All national radio and television systems are owned by the 
government. Ownership is either outright, with supervision by
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such officials as the Minister of Information, or by government
**N
corporations. Government after government has decided it mast 
have the sensitive broadcasting tool in hand.
In the same vein, African nations cannot truly be 
classified as having an authoritarian press theory, although the 
press in some African countries has many elements of the 
authoritarian philosophy, which emphasises the existence of a 
privately owned but heavily controlled press.
The more' prevalent pattern in Africa, however, is for the 
government to own and operate the press.
Consequently, the Soviet Communist theory in some way 
better describes the African setting. Like U.S.S.R., many African 
nations have a wholly owned government and party press, with major 
policy decisions made by a single ruling party. Many nations also 
put major emphasis on the positive harnessing of media outlets for 
the goals of national development and social change. Another 
ingredient is the value placed on unity. In such a setting, the 
mass media become teachers of the masses.
But the Soviet Communist theory also is less than 
satisfactory to describe Africa. It is rooted in the ideology of 
Marx and Lenin and leaves out non-communist nations that also 
utilise the press as an agent of national development. Although 
Guinea, Somalia, and Congo endorse selected concepts of communism, 
Nigeria and most African nations with a wholly owned government 
press express little or no ideological affinity for communism. 
Their press theory is based on ownership, economics and practical 
choice, not Western concepts of political ideology. As noted 
earlier, the libertarian theory also seems inappropriate for the
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nations of the Third World. It is based on the historical evolution 
of democratic concepts in Western Europe, which derived from 
universal literacy and the weakening of traditional monarchies. 
The basic foundation of the libertarian theory is a financially 
independent press that can operate as a watchdog on government. 
This theory can only be an ideal in Africa because there is still 
massive illiteracy and a lack of private capital to support an 
independent press.
The final press theory offered in the 
(&
Siebert-Peterson-Schramm analysis, Social Responsibility, is 
based on media responsibilities and functions in a highly 
urbanised, industrial society. Robert Hutchins and the Commission 
of Freedom of the Press in the U.S. were concerned about 
maintaining the free marketplace of ideas in an age when 
prohibitive costs restricted media ownership to only a few 
individuals or giant corporations. The commission suggested a 
degree of government control to assure that all viewpoints would 
have access to the mass media. Such a press theory, dealing with 
the problems of the mass media in post-industrial society, seems 
to have little relevance for the developing nations of Africa, since 
there are other factors which dictate the "responsibility" of the 
mass media.
CQKCLUSIOff
The implication of some of these models and theories 
for political communications in Africa is that there is a major 
danger in categorising African nations on the basis of theories of 
the press conceived from the viewpoint of Western values and
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concepts. Although mass media in Africa may be operated according 
to principles deriving from some of the theories, nevertheless 
there are many circumstances of Africa which limit their 
application.
One circumstance is the absence of some of the 
conditions necessary for a developed mass communication system: 
the communication infrastructure; the professional skills; the 
production and cultural resources; the available audience. 
Another rdlated factor is the dependence on the developed world for 
what is missing in the way of technology, skills and cultural 
products. Thirdly, there is (variable) devotion of African 
societies to economic, political and social development as a 
primary national task,to which other institutions should submit.
"It is inappropriate to judge governments 
and press in Africa by the same criteria one 
would apply in the United Kingdom or the 
United States... .Africa is in a transitional 
state, experimenting with new forms of 
democracy and building new political 
structures 7
<
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CHAPTER TWO. 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
It seems logical to have a chapter of comparable studies on political 
communications in Africa before we analyse political communications in Nigeria. 
This will help to shape a general understanding of the political role of 
communications media in developing societies and provide in particular the 
necessary background for discussing and explaining the various ownership 
problems, issues, findings, analyses, recommendation and conclusion that are 
offered in this thesis. This chapter is devoted to the task of examining political 
communications in Africa in terms of the communications media, their models, 
their origin, struggle for independence, ownership and control, as well as the 
development and problems of political communications in different regions of the 
continent at different periods in history.1
Although communications media have been used for political
communications and public opinion formation in Africa from time immemorial,
it still remains a sad fact that among the developing regions of Asia, Latin
America and Africa, Africa is the continent with the least developed
communications media in general, and the lowest circulation of newspapers in
particular.2 This is as a result of many problems which are dealt with in the
subsequent sections of this Chapter. The communications media o f Africa consist
of the traditional communications media, the modern mass communication media, 
newspapers, radio, television and news agencies. But first, we examine 
the African Press Models and Political Communication.
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2.1 MODELS OF THE AFRICAN PRESS AND POLITICAL 
COMMUNICATION
Monographs on the functioning of mass media in given African 
countries consist, frequently tw0 parts. The first part deals with general 
information about a country or region, that is, it is concerned with its geography, 
culture, history, and economic and social conditions. The second part contains a 
proper analysis of mass media which is a full, or partial, realisation of Lasswell’s 
research directives: Who says what, in which channel, to whom, with what effect.3 
The ’who’ question includes the study of organisation and personnel, ’what’ refers 
to the content, ’channel’ to the study of different media, ’to whom’ points to the 
structure of the audience; and the ’with what effect?’ aspect has received attention 
in the studies of mass media impact and audience response.
Although this formula was put forward over forty years ago, it is still 
a guide-line of research and a very useful approach to the study of mass media 
of communication and their effects. In Africa generally the functions expected of 
the mass media, especially by most African leaders, are harnessing the press for 
nation-building, the press as an instrument of national unity, the need for 
’constructive’ criticism, and the press as an agent of mass education. This type of 
functional expectation has influenced the kind of African press models that have 
emerged in recent years.
Before independence, there were four distinctive ways of 
categorising the African press.
The first was the authoritarian (e.g. Ethiopia, Liberia, and 
Portuguese and Spanish Africa) in which the mass media were characteristically
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either instruments of government or non-political and highly deferential toward 
government. In the second category (Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, 
Tanganyika and Belgian Congo), one finds in varying degrees a very highly 
developed European press and radio networks, the virtual non-existence of an 
independent African-owned press; and newspapers and other literature addressed 
to Africans, but owned either by government or missionary societies, or by 
Europeans deferential to government policies. In the third category, missionary 
societies and colonial governments specifically developed the media, the former 
to spread their particular brand of the gospel, and the latter to further 
programmes of mass literacy and rural development, as well as to counter 
nationalist activity. In the fourth (e.g. the Sudan, British West Africa, and French 
tropical Africa), one finds variant forms in which the distinctive feature of the 
pattern is the early growth and overwhelming predominance of African-owned and 
edited newspapers.4
However, at least two developments have brought about a change 
in this earlier pattern. One has been the emergence of an independent press 
whose influence upon political developments and popular attitudes has been  
profound. The other has been the expansion in the public relations activities o f 
governments.
Hachten’s Model of the African Press
Today there is a basic authoritarian model for the African press.5 
William A. Hachten contends that the press systems of the African nations can be
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better organised by using the concepts of authoritarian, libertarian and 
neo-communist.
‘Under the neo-communist ideology, all instruments of mass 
communication are brought under direct government control and ownership so 
they may best serve government policy in a "revolutionary state"’, Hachten wrote. 
The neo-communist theory, of course, is government ownership and party control 
without the ideology of Marx or Lenin. But the purpose of the press remains the 
same. As Hachten put it, T h e media must serve government, which is 
inseparable from the party and its leader. The press should inform and work for 
national integration and inspire the people, but not criticise the government or the 
leadership’.6
Although he included libertarian as a classification, Hachten saw 
little use for the category in Africa:
T he western model of the newspaper as a 
profit-making enterprise, independent of government, 
and supplying the public with reliable and objective 
news and public information is seldom found, 
although many African journalists aspire to such a 
press. Economic and social factors - poverty, 
illiteracy, economic structure, Linguistic and ethnic 
diversity - have combined to inhibit such media 
development.7
However, Hachten said, the authoritarian classification has greater 
application in independent black Africa:
The non-governmental newspapers are usually 
permitted wide latitude to report the news, provide
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entertainment and pass along government 
information, as long as they do not directly challenge 
the government or its leadership. Some news media 
carry a good deal of news and even low level criticism 
of public officials. Yet always lurking behind the 
newsman is the potential restraint of government; the 
newspapers usually know how far to go’.8
Assessment
Hachten’s press model, although interesting, is too
simplistic. African press systems are either neo-communist or authoritarian under 
his classification and there is little opportunity for more descriptive differentiation. 
Like the four theories discussed earlier, Hachten’s is also tied to press ownership 
in determining the difference between neo-communist and authoritarian. It thus 
fails to recognise that wholly owned governmental press systems can be more 
authoritarian than neo-communistic. It also ignores other types of ownership 
common in Africa.
A better model with a double approach is proposed by Ralph L. 
Lowenstein. Press systems are classified on one level by ownership and on 
another by press philosophy.
LowensteiVs Model of the African Press
The model is a two-tier concept, which has more flexibility and 
descriptive quality than the earlier four theories or Hachten’s model. The first 
tier is classification of dominant press ownership in the country, using three 
categories:
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Private: Ownership by individuals or non-governmental corporations, supported 
primarily by advertising or subscription.
M ultiparty: Ownership by competitive political parties, subsidised by party or 
party members.
Government: Ownership by government or dominant government party,
subsidised primarily by government funds or government-collected license fees.9
The second tier involves categorising press philosophies:
Authoritarian: Negative government controls over the press to stifle criticism and 
thereby maintain ruling elites.
Social-Centralist: Positive government controls to harness the press for national 
economic and philosophical goals.
Libertarian: Absence of government controls, assuring a free market place of 
ideas and operation of self-righting process.
Socio-Libertarian: Minimal government controls to unclog channels of
communication and assure operational spirit of libertarian philosophy. All 
viewpoints, including those of the opposition, are heard.
-63-
Assessment
Lowenstein’s four press philosophies somewhat resemble 
Siebert-Peterson-Schramm’s four theories, but there are important differences. 
For one, the Soviet Communist theory has been renamed the social-centralist 
theory. In effect, this removes the ingredient of communist ideology as a 
philosophical base and recognises the fact that many Third World nations harness 
the press for national development on the basis of other considerations.
~fhe social responsibility theory has been renamedAsocial-libertarian 
concept by Lowenstein. The meaning is essentially the same but avoids the 
semantic problem of attempting to define a socially responsible press. As Merrill 
points out, it depends on who is doing the defining: government or publishers. 
In the Third World, the social-libertarian philosophy probably is best represented 
by nations that provide an opportunity, through minimum controls, for political 
parties to operate a press in opposition to the government in power.
By separating the element of ownership from the press philosophy, 
Lowenstein’s two-tier concept permits a different interpretation of authoritarian 
press systems. The Siebert-Peterson-Schramm concept was based on the premise 
that government controlled an essentially private press. In Africa, however, a 
nation may be authoritarian even though no privately owned press exists. The 
major criterion is not ownership, but how the government utilises its press system. 
In some African states, government ownership is a negative control because no 
attempt is made to harness the press for economic development. Government 
ownership and regulation are effective methods to suppress dissent, control the
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dissemination of information, and maintain the status quo: they may not be 
vehicles for social change.
By the same token, removal of ownership considerations makes it 
possible for nations with elements of a private press to be classified as having a 
social-centralist philosophy. Again, the emphasis is not necessarily on ownership,
Co
butAhow national leaders view the role and function of the press. If the press
(government or privately owned) is perceived as an integral part of national
developm ent,' its role is defined within that cultural framework. This is
particularly relevant when a private press operates under the watchful eyes o f a
military regime or a formalised one-party state.
It also is entirely possible, under Lowenstein’s two-tier model, that
different media in the country will reflect different ownership and philosophies.
The print media may be privately owned, operating under a social-libertarian 
h*
philosophy, the broadcasting services are government-owned and operate 
under the social-centralist philosophy.
Although the two-tier concept is not completely value-free in terms 
of Western judgements, it does offer a pragmatic and flexible system for classifying 
press systems in the African countries.
t/Ct Developmentalism
Out of the authoritarian concept in African nations that mass 
! communication media should be mobilised for national development came the 
notion of ’development journalism’ which has been applied in many parts of the 
continent. Development communication, or Development Support communication
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as it is sometimes called, states that the state should not be content to control the 
media in a negative sense, censoring or requiring self-censorship of the press, but 
the state should go beyond this to guide the media in publicising development 
tasks and achievements.
The main principles o^development communication m od el can be 
stated as follows:
*< Media should accept and carry out positive development tasks in line with
nationally established policy;
+ Freedom of the media should be open to restriction according to (1)
economic priorities and (2) development needs of African society;
< Media should give priority in their content to the national culture and 
language;
< Media should give priority in news and information to links with other 
African countries which are close geographically, culturally and politically;
« Journalists and other media workers have responsibilities as well as
freedoms in their information gathering and dissemination tasks;
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+ In the interest of development ends, the state has a right to intervene in, 
or restrict, media operations, and devices o f censorship, subsidy and direct 
control can be justified.10
A Critique
Whether it is called development support communications or 
developmental journalism, there is the distinct danger that this philosophy of 
African communications will take the form of ’government say-so’ journalism. 
Depending on one’s definition of this new concept, development journalism 
belongs either to the authoritarian or to the social responsibility theory of the 
press. It is just another example of new wine in old bottles. It is a relatively 
vague concept charged with political rhetoric. The obvious questions are: who 
determines national goals and indices of development? What are these goals and 
who benefits? Under the banner of development communication, African 
governments and politicians in most states now control the media for their own 
political goals. Also, under the aegis of development journalism, African elites 
have worked out a political communication strategy consistent with their power 
interest. By defining what people are fed as reality, most ruling African groups 
consolidate and perpetuate power in the name of development journalism. 
Indeed, in most of the developing African states, the media are manipulated by 
politicians to present only those facts and issues that are of interest to them.
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2.3 The Control of the Newspaper Press
One reason for concern about media ownership and control is 
expressed in the old adage that ’he who pays the piper calls the tune’ - or at any 
rate is less likely to have to listen to uncongenial and discordant tunes. Research 
evidence has shown that control and influence do go with ownership. The owner 
o f an enterprise controls the policies, management, organisation, recruitment, 
behaviour of the enterprise, and also influences whatever goes on in the 
establishment;
Government attempts to control and manipulate the media are 
universal because governments throughout the world believe media effects are 
important political forces. This belief is based on the assumption that institutions 
which control public information shape public knowledge and behaviour and 
thereby determine the support or opposition of citizens and officials to the 
government and its policies.
The methods by which governments control the communications 
media vary from one system to another. Generally, control may take the form of 
monitoring the appointment of media personnel, control over the financing of 
media enterprises, control over media content, shielding of sensitive governmental 
proceedings and the frequent use of treason and sedition laws and a host of other 
formal and informal techniques and processes by which government officials exert 
influence on the press-legislation, licensing, regulation, judicial rulings, the issuing 
or withholding of information, officials’ threats and pressures.
In Africa, government control of the press takes various forms such 
as: direct control through the ministry of information, government-organised
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corporation or a similar agency, restrictive legislation, laws, regulations and 
decrees, newsprint rationing, licensing of newspapers, postal and tariff regulations, 
excessive secrecy in the execution of public business, threats, open intimidation, 
bribery, censorship, proscription of newspapers, arrest and imprisonment of 
journalists, and a host of other methods of controlling the press!1 Politicians, 
businessmen, trades union leaders and other special interest groups also exert
to
control on the press. Let us examine briefly some of these control mechanisms.
Laws, Regulations, Legislation and Decrees
The broader the legislation, the more authority a government has 
over the press. Libel and sedition laws of a highly restrictive nature have been
to
reported in the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, Malawi, Mauritania, 
Somalia, Uganda and Zaire. Restrictive laws are also applied in Benin, Gambia, 
Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan, Rwanda, Swaziland and Burkina Fasso^among 
others.16 Malawi in 1973 passed a law making the publication of a false report 
punishable by life imprisonment. Nigeria has had about 25 of such restrictive 
legislations - sedition laws, Official Secrets Act, the Criminal Codes, Decrees 2, 
4 and 11, laws of obscenity, defamation, libel and a host o f other extra-legal and 
non-legal restrictive laws including emergency regulations to control the press.
cir\d.
Arrest, PhysicalAPsvchologicaL Harassment and Imprisonment of Journalists
Journalists have been murdered, arrested and jailed the world over. 
Africa has had its share of such incidents. The killing of journalists in Uganda 
and Equitorial Guinea resulted in most established newsmen leaving those
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countries. Beatings and other forms of man-handling have been the journalists’ 
lot in many African countries. Legislators, government officials, the police and 
soldiers have conducted a constantly running battle with journalists. Also, verbal 
and written threats, damage to printing and recording equipment, unannounced 
police searches, proscription of newspapers, suspension, banning and other forms 
of harassment have been experienced.
Between October 1968 and January 1969, Rajat Neogy, the editor 
of the influential Ugandan magazine, Transition, and Abubakar Mayanja, a local 
politician and constitutional lawyer, were imprisoned on charges of sedition 
because the editor published an article written by Mayanja, on the question of the 
Africanisation of the judiciary in Uganda. When later the two men were acquitted 
of the sedition charges against them by the Uganda High Court, they were 
promptly re-arrested and detained under the country’s emergency regulations and 
the magazine was banned.17 The editor of the Istiqlal party newspaper, La 
Nation Africaine. was imprisoned in 1965 and the newspaper banned by the 
Moroccan government because the paper criticized the^high-handedness of King 
Hassan. Almost at the same time, newspapers Le Progres. Actualites Africaines, 
and Presence Congolaise of Congo-Kinshasa were also seized by the government 
because they criticized the postponement of the country’s national elections.18 
The list could be extended.
In Nigeria, cases of media practitioners’ harassment and 
incarceration that are still fresh in memory include: Horatio Jackson of the 
Weekly Record, jailed for sedition for his article ’There is no Justice in Nigeria’; 
J.B. Davies of the Times of Nigeria, the controversial columnist, and Herbert
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Macaulay, who were members of a Delegation to London protesting 
against the Land Acquisition Ordinance and other objectionable legislation; Tai 
Solarin for his article ’The Beginning of the End’; the proscription of the 
Newswatch magazine by the Babangida military regime;; Mr. Minere Amakiri, 
chief correspondent of The Nigerian Observer, who was stripped, beaten up and 
his head shaved because of a story on the teachers’ strike published on a military 
Governor’s (D iete-Spiffs) 31st birthday in Rivers State during the Gowon military 
regime; the imprisonment of Mr. Thompson and Nduka Irabor of The Guardian 
for one year under decree 4 during the Buhari military regime; the little-known 
case of Segun Sowemimo, a journalist whose tragic death inspired the title of 
Wole Soyinka’s prison notes, The Man D ied: the mysterious and sudden death 
of D ele Giwa through a letter bomb during the Babangida military regime; and 
a host of other cases that cannot be mentioned here for lack of space and time. 
The sacking of Jonathan Ishaku, editor of the Plateau State government owned 
Nigerian Standard over the editorials published on the retirement of Dr. Ayagi 
and Chief Olasore, two Bank Chief Executives because of their different views 
from that of Babangida government on financial and economic matters, and the 
detention of Mohammed Haruna, Managing Director of the Federal Government 
owned New Nigerian Newspapers Limited for authorising the publication in the 
New Nigerian of an advertisement by the Council of Ulaama over the unjust, 
unfair and unconstitutional treatments being meted against Muslims under 
Babangida’s military administration, all deserve mentioning.19 In the published 
advertisement, the Council of Ulaama had enjoined Muslims to take steps to
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protect themselves saying that the government and the security agents, including 
the armed forces, had failed to protect them as citizens of Nigeria.
Censorship and Control of the Newsprint
Prior censorship of materials in newspapers and magazines is 
exercised in over 60 per cent of African countries. More prevalent than 
government censorship is self-censorship by African pressmen and women. 
Another area' of control is through the rationing of newsprint which is a very 
expensive item sometimes involving precious foreign exchange. Even where 
newsprint. i s  produced locally, the government still uses its supply against the 
press through exorbitant prices, hoarding or total denial.
Judicial Processes
In some African countries, the one area available to block, reverse 
or redress abuses of journalists by government officials has been the judicial arm 
of government. In fact, some newsmen have sued for damages and won as in the 
cases of many Nigerian pressmen: Amakiri, D ele Giwa, Tony Momoh and others 
- whose cases were fought in courts of law by lawyers such as Chief Gani
Fawehinmi. However, many of the African countries are thought not to have 
judges who are free from governmental control since judges are appointed by the 
ruling political party or military junta. On many occasions, judges in African 
courts complain that ’their hands are tied’ when giving judgements. As a result, 
many journalists in Africa have been in and out of jail repeatedly.
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2.4 Problems of Communications Media in Africa
From the foregoing historical analysis o f political communications 
in Africa, it is evident that communications media are fraught with many 
problems. Details of these are given in analysis of the anatomy of press bias in 
Nigeria political communications. Here we shall confine this section to those
general factors contributing to problems of communication in the whole of the
African continent today.
The first of these obstacles is linguistic in nature. Africa is the most 
multi-lingual area of the world if population is measured against languages. 
Nobody knows how many languages there are. A  fairly small area of Cameroon, 
for example, contains more than one hundred languages, almost all of them 
unwritten. Nigeria, the most populous nation in Black Africa, has over four 
hundred languages.20 As a result of the great number of ethnic groups and their 
different languages, difficulties in communication are created between various 
groups and the communications media have to resort to European languages. In 
fact, non-indigenous foreign languages have been adopted as the official media in 
nearly all African states.
When attention is focused on the problems of information, 
dissemination and political communications through African languages, a number 
of inter-related questions readily come to mind:
(1) How many are recognised African languages?
(2) How many of these languages are widely-spoken?
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(3) How many are written and how many have standard orthographies?
(4) How many have systematically developed meta-language and specialised 
vocabularies for effective information dissemination in various fields of 
human activity?
(5) How many have dictionaries, encyclopaedia and other reference sources 
that are suitable for information dissemination at various levels?
(6) How many are taught at the primary, secondary and tertiary educational 
levels in Africa?
(7) If they are being taught at all, how effectively, and with what instructional 
materials?
Although, *£hese and a host of other related questions provide additional frame 
of reference for a detailed discussion of the pragmatic and multi-dimensional 
issues involved and these are outside the scope of this thesis.21
It is clear from many surveys that linguistic fragmentation has major 
significance for the mass media - not simply because of the practical problems of 
polylingual production, but also because media language policies have important 
political implications. In fact, Goody has noted that a multiplicity of languages in 
a country might lead to an inefficient system of communication.22
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Added to the problem of language differences is the problem of the 
level of literacy which is still very low despite the wide educational and mass 
literacy campaigns undertaken by many African governments. This also affects 
the circulation o f the newspapers, with the resultant effect of the concentration 
of newspaper publication in urban centres and the neglect of the rural people who 
form the majority in the African setting.
Lack of good roads and efficient means of transportation also 
militate against effective communication in Africa. For instance, they make 
distribution of newspapers very difficult. It may be that the continent’s geography 
is a hindrance in this direction - vast deserts, wild rivers, jungles and bush paths. 
It is a sad fact that the African countries find it more difficult to communicate 
with one another than with the other parts of the continent. Dakar, for example, 
finds it easier to communicate with Paris than with close African neighbouring 
states. The African continent requires an efficient postal, transport and 
telecommunications system. Today African states still find themselves unable to 
communicate directly with one another. Messages have to be routed thousands 
of miles out of the way through Europe to reach an African capital only a few 
hundred miles up or down the coast.
Training in all fields of communication and especially journalistic 
training for newspaper production, radio and television news preparation and 
programming is another problem area. It is only when sufficient qualified, 
competent and able professional local skills are available that dependence on 
features, tapes, films and media personnel from abroad can be reduced, and the
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real education, political and socialisation ambitions for the communications media 
be realised.
Equally pernicious is the problem of dependence on foreign sources 
for news and feature materials. One of the dangers of this situation is that lack 
of African indigenous materials for the press, radio and television is a temptation 
to foreign propaganda and information services to flood the African media with 
their own material. This problem becomes more damaging in view of the alleged 
injustice being meted to developing countries as far as the ’free flow’ of news 
among nations is concerned. It is argued that the big Western news agencies, 
journalists, correspondents, and reporters have a virtual monopoly on news 
dissemination and fail to provide the world with a realistic picture of what is really 
happening in the Third World. Instead, these agencies and Western media 
practitioners lay emphasis on negative news - poverty, famine, illiteracy, riots, 
revolutions, volcano, eruptions, antics of national leaders, wars, national disasters, 
kidnappings, assassination, etc. The question is: what about the good things that 
are going on in Third World countries - socio-politico-economic development, 
bridge building, highway construction, new schools and progress being made in the 
area of health services, housing, education, industrialisation and the like?
It must be noted, however, that although there is some truth in 
these indictments of the Western press, these indictments are equally true of 
African or Third World countries. For instance, it is true that there is an 
unevenness in news flow within individual African countries themselves, that some 
of the African states are highly restrictive and secretive societies whose leaders go
to great lengths to keep correspondents at arms’ lengths, that sources in these
countries are hard to reach, meetings are closed, leaders are secretive 
and touchy and some African journalists and media collude with 
outsiders against the interest of their own countries.
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The economic problem is another major obstacle 
confronting the communications media in Africa and' their 
audiences or receivers. There are difficulties in establishing 
newspapers, radio and television stations. They are capital 
intensive. Even when these problems are partially solved, the 
question is: how many people can patronise the newspapers? Only a 
small fraction of the population of the African continent can 
afford to btty a newspaper, a radio or television set when the 
struggle to get three square meals a day still continues unabated. 
Such an abject poverty means that a man, if he can read, must go 
without a meal to buy a newspaper or there must be accumulated 
savings to buy an inexpensive transistor radio. The list is 
eqdless. Poverty is endemic throughout the continent.
Press and Politics in Vest Africa
Vest Africa has a lively tradition of newspaper 
development. Also, the political press in the region has had a long 
and remarkable history that is worth documenting in brief. The 
impetus for publication has been, from the beginning, a political 
one.
By 1900, 63 newspapers had appeared in all four
territories of Vest Africa <34 in Sierra Leone, 19 in the Gold Coast, 
9 in Nigeria and one in Gambia).
Many factors accounted for this. First, Vest Africa, 
because of its climate regarded as "the white man's grave", never 
had many white settlements. Both the plantations (mainly cocoa) 
and the trade between the interior and the coast (the development 
of which was stimulated by the needs of the European market)
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remained in African hands. This was the situation in which the African 
middle class was formed, a class that was also interested in the development of
an internal market and in accumulation of capital.
Secondly, the return of numbers of freed slaves from America and 
the West Indies to settle in Liberia, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone assisted 
tremendously press development in West Africa. English-speaking, and in many 
cases well educated, they brought their experience of political struggle in the 
Americas, technical knowledge, and a certain amount of capital.
The Royal Gazette and Sierra Leone Advertiser published in 1801, 
The Roval Gold Coast Gazette published from 1822, and the Liberia Herald 
started in 1826, are usually mentioned among the first titles. These papers set 
themselves ambitious political goals: from the struggle against slavery to
complaints about and criticisms of British colonisers.
In the Gold Coast it was the political protest that soon became the
a7
dominant theme, mainly directed at colonial administration. J.H. Brew started 
The Gold Cost Times in 1874, and in 1880 at Cape Coast The Western Echo. 
together with Timothy Laing and J.E. Casely Hayford. The names of these three 
editors are still remembered in Ghana today as the originators of a tradition of 
political satire that enlivened the country’s press for many years to come.
By 1880, Lagos too had its organ of protest, voicing grievances, 
though still in a more sedate and cautious manner than its Gold Coast and 
Liberian contemporaries. Richard Beale Blaize was editor of The Lagos Times 
and Gold Coast Advertiser, which appeared from November 1880 twice monthly 
for a period of two years. The first Nigerian Newspaper, Iwe Irohin fun awon ara 
Egba ati Yoruba (the newspaper for the Egba people and Yorubas) had appeared
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in 1859, Established b ^ leveren d  Henry Townsend, the paper was the
first African language newspaper in Africa.
The great achievement of the 19th century press in West Africa was 
in fact that it gave a voice to a subject people, through its literate elite, and 
established a tradition of political criticism and debate which served both to keep 
the colonial administration alive to public opinion*-.
The first political party paper belongs to Lagos, Nigeria. 
Established in 1925 by Herbert Macaulay, Father of the Nigerian Nationalism, 
The Lagos Daily News served as the organ of Macaulay’s National Democratic 
Party. The paper was also the first successful daily newspaper in West Africa. 
Lagos, Nigeria, also recorded a major landmark in the development of the press 
in West Africa in particular, and in Africa in general, with the appearance on the 
morning of 22 November, 1937, of the West African Pilot, a new daily launched 
by Nnamdi Azikiwe. Azikiwe later became not only the continent’s greatest 
newspaperman, but also one of its most dynamic nationalists. As Ronald Segal 
observes in his profile of Zik:
‘It was by his journalism....that Azikiwe gave a new  
impetus to Nigerian nationalism. He started a chain 
of newspapers, the most important of which was the 
West African Pilot, and revolutionised West African 
journalism by the daring and directness of his 
editorial and news coverage. Concentrating on racial 
injustices and the need for positive action to 
emancipate Africa, he energetically spread his 
message throughout the territory, nursing circulation 
by provincial news coverage and by efficient 
distribution, and establishing four provincial dailies, in 
Ibadan, Onitsha, Port Harcourt and Kano’.29
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CHAPTER 3  
H TSTOnR ICAT BACKGROUND TO THE 
NIGERIAN POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS
Introduction
An historical background provides one of the most 
relevant perspectives on the genesis and development of political 
communications in Nigeria. This chapter focuses on a general 
introduction to the country emphasising aspects of Nigeria's 
history which are relevant to the thesis: its socio-economic
structure, topography, climatic conditions, press and 
communication development. What is needed is a detailed 
examination of the historic problem areas of Nigerian politics, how 
the press has influenced politics, and vice versa in the immediate 
past, the development of the Nigerian .politics and the press, the 
relationship between the press and political parties, the political 
economy of Nigeria, tribal conflict, economic and social 
background, political and constitutional developments and their•—J * J- J.
relevance to Nigerian political communications.
3.1. The Beginning of Modern Nigeria
Nigeria has been described as an 'artificial creation' 
and even a child of British colonialism.1
But it is pertinent to mention that prior to colonial 
subjugation, the contemporary Nigerian formation was composed of 
state systems classified and described variously as empires,
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kingdtoms, chief doms, city states and village republics. These 
pre-colonial communities were varied in territorial size, in 
productive, distributive and exchange organizations, and in 
degrees of autonomy from and dependence upon, one another. The 
territories and influence of some of these systems, such as the 
Sokoto Caliphate and the Yoruba and Benin empires, extended beyond 
the boundaries of the present Nigerian state.
At first the British were foreign merchants trading in 
territories in which ‘'Nigerians" were sovereign and at Bonny and 
Old Calabar for example, the white traders paid custom dues for the 
right of trading in the domains of coastal potentates. With the 
efforts to replace the Slave Trade with legitimate commerce, the 
pattern began to alter. Trade expanded inland and the successful 
exploration of the River Niger in 1832 provided a water-way by 
which the interior could be penetrated from the Niger Delta but the 
early efforts sponsored by
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philanthropists were doomed to failure owing to the high incidence 
of death from malaria. Success was achieved by 1857 when, with the 
use of quinine, Dr Baikie and his men were able to go up the Niger 
and establish a trading post at Lokoja (now in Kwara state). For my 
purpose, however, the role of missionaries at that time is even 
more crucial.
Instigated by the yearnings of the liberated slaves who 
were returning from Sierra Leone to resettle at Badagry (Lagos 
state) and Abeokuta (Ogun state) the Methodists first came in 1842 
and the Christian Missionary Society followed closely in 1843; the 
latter established a mission in Abeokuta in 1846 under the 
leadership of Reverends Henry Townsend and Ajayi Crowther (later, 
first African bishop). Bowen brought in the Baptist Mission in 
1850. In Eastern Nigeria, the Church of Scotland was established in 
Old Calabar in 1846; the CMS opened its Onitsha station in 1857 and 
the Roman Catholic church was established also in Onitsha in 1885 
although it had long had a foothold in Lagos among the Brazilian 
(emaneipado) community there. In general, the Missionaries were 
enlightened enough to conceive their missions not in the narrow 
evangelical terms of saving souls but in the broad tradition of 
David Livingstone, of helping the indigenous people to develop 
their resources, bringing knowledge to the ignorant and medical 
care to the sick. The founding of the first Press and newspaper in 
Nigeria by the Reverend Henry Townsend at Abeokuta in 1859 was in 
keeping with the progressive missionary thinking at the time.
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3.2 Constitutional and Political Development
In 1922, the colonial authorities fashioned out a 
constitution which introduced the principle of direct election 
into the Nigerian legislative council and franchise limited to 
Lagos and Calabar, provided for by the constitution, which itself 
was called the Clifford Constitution, named after Sir Hugh 
Clifford, the Governor at the time. The granting of franchise led 
to the formation of Nigerian National Democratic Party and others 
later. The year 1946 marked the introduction of the ''Richards 
Constitution/ also named after the man who was the Governor of 
Nigeria at the time, Sir Arthur Richards. It also marked the 
beginning of regionalism, which was to create many difficulties, 
subsequently, for Nigerian politics and political leaders. The 
amalgamation of 1914 was described by the late Sardauna of Sokoto 
and former Premier of Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, as "the 
mistake of 1914".2 Political and constitutional developments in 
Nigeria encouraged aggressive ethnicity and regionalism, 
culminating in the threats of regions to secede from the Nigerian 
state,
In 1950, the Northern Region threatened to secede from 
Nigeria if it was not granted an equal number of representatives in 
the Central Legislature to the Southern Regions. In 1953, the 
Western delegation during constitutional conferences threatened 
to opt out of Nigeria if Lagos the capital territory and the colony 
were not merged with the Western Region.3 The Eastern Region was 
also reported by the State House Diary* to have threatened to 
secede after the federal elections of 1964, a threat that was later 
to be put into a concrete reality and practice in 1967 with the move
- 87 -
to es-tablish "a Biafra Republic", which eventually led to the three- 
year civil war in Nigeria.
The 1946 constitution provided for the establishment of 
regional assemblies in the three regions of Vest, East and North, 
into which Nigeria had been divided in 1938 but in the North and 
Vest, besides the assemblies, there was to be a House of Chiefs. 
Though the 1946 arrangement was supposed to last for nine years, it 
only survived for three. By 1949, dissatisfaction with the 
Richards Constitution was so widespread that changes were felt to 
be Imperative. These changes were effected in 1951 with the 
"MacF'herson Constitution" which itself was described as "a 
wretched compromise between federalism and unitar ism"! In fact,
it was not an easy task for colonial rulers to administer Nigeria 
on the basis of any theoretical formula. Certain strategies like 
"Indirect Rule" were obviously practical necessities.
In 1954, the Lyttleton Constitution was introduced. 
This declared Nigeria to be a federation, provided for greater 
regional autonomy, the removal of powers of intervention by the 
central government and recognised to a limited extent the freedom 
of regional governments for their internal administration.
There were constitutional conferences in Lagos and 
London in 1957 and 1958 respectively and with the Nigerian 
Independence Act of 1960 passed by the British parliament, Nigeria 
was proclaimed an independent and sovereign nation within the 
Commonwealth as from October 1, 1960. A constitution, the 1960 
constitution, was also enacted for its governance, Vith the 
independence proclamation, the legal status and name of the 
country were changed from the "Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria"
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to "Nigeria”. On 1st October, 1963, Nigeria decided to become a 
Republic by abolishing the monarchy and replacing it by a 
republican constitution. The Queen thus ceased to be the Queen or 
sovereign of Nigeria with her functions transferred to the 
President of the Republic. Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe became the first 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria while Alhaji Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa who had become Nigeria's Prime Minister with the 
1959 elections, now, in 1963, remained the functional head of 
government. A fourth Region, the mid-Vest, was also carved out of 
Western Nigeria.
But the Republic lasted only for about two years when 
it became engulfed by crises - census exercises of 1962 and 1963, 
federal elections of 1964, the location of the iron and steel 
complex, the revenue allocation formula, the Western Region's 
election crisis of 1965 and a host of other recurring issues in 
Nigerian government and politics.
The political process deteriorated into increasingly 
violent wrangles fuelled by the mass media between the different 
ethnic/regional factions, the Hausa/Fulani in the north, Ibo in the 
east and Yoruba in the west. Following a bloody coup in January 
1966 the army intervened, and set up Major-General Ironsi as 
national leader. His regime lasted just six months, when among a 
host of other reasons, his attempt to impose unitary rule on the 
federation provoked a counter coup from which the then Lt.Col. 
Gowon (now a General) emerged as the new leader. Gowon 
restructured the administrative patterns by dividing the country 
into twelve states out of the former four regions. The 
intensification of ethnic rivalries during the following year
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culm inated in July 1967 in the secession of the eastern region and
»
the "Biafran" civil war, which dragged on for three years. After 
some -useful post-war reconstruction, rehabilitation and 
reconciliation measures, the Gowon Government began to drift into 
inefficiency and inaction. Allegations of corruption against his 
lieutenants in government, and his apparently nonchalant reactions 
to these allegations, only helped to worsen the situation. The 
first places to be seized by coup makers and their anchormen were 
radio stations.
In July 1975, a bloodless coup removed Gowon and 
General Murtala Ramat Muhammed replaced him as Head of State. 
Muhammed carried out significant reforms of the public services, 
struggled to wipe out corruption and other social vices from 
Nigeria, brought forward a positive programme for return to 
civilian government, restructured the country by dividing it into 
nineteen states out of the former twelve, and took a host of other 
bold steps to administer Nigeria. In the words of Ishichei,
'There was an energetic inquiry into corruption and 
inefficiency, which led to many dismissals and compulsory 
retirements, and confiscation of ill-gotten assets. On the 
whole, the measures were popular, though it is possible, 
perhaps likely, that some men's careers were wrecked by 
secret enmities and unjust accusations while much greater 
culprits sometimes remained unscathed.’9
General Muhammed was killed in an abortive coup led by 
Lt.Col. Dimka on 13 February 1976. General Olusegum Obasanjo 
succeeded him and carried on the "Murtala Muhammed policies" 
almost to the letter. He implemented the transition to civilian 
rule thus marking the birth of Nigeria's Second Republic in 1979.
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Alhaji Shehu Uthman Aliyu Shagari assumed office as the first 
executive President of Nigeria under a new presidential 
constitution, but by the time he started his second presidential 
term in office, Alhaji Shagari's administration was overthrown by a 
military coup of Major-General Muhammadu Buhari on 31st December 
1983, Corruption and national economic failure were cited as parts 
of the justifications for the takeover.
Buhari regime decided to bring to book all those who 
led the country to such a battered economic state. The 
administration also aimed to face up to the reality of diminished 
oil revenues by drastically cutting import levels and tackled 
corruption by extending the death penalty to a further 17 
categories of crime, and launching a media campaign exhorting 
Nigerians to wage a "War against Indiscipline (WAI>M. Repressive 
measures were brought in to stifle the growing tide of criticism 
from the press, trade unions and professional associations who 
protested at the soaring inflation, the scarcity of essential 
goods, and growing unemployment. After 20 months it became clear 
that the experiment in self sufficiency was causing economic 
devastation, and on 27 August 1985 Maj-Gen Buhari was removed from 
office in a bloodless coup. According to the new regime led by 
Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, the army was forced to intervene 
because Nigerians have since been under a regime that continued 
with those trends for which the military took over power in 1983, 
adding that events indicated that most of the reasons which 
justified the military takeover of government from the civilians 
still persisted.
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Major General, later General Ibrahim Badamosi 
Babangida took some steps to make himself popular immediately he 
took over power from Buhari. He released some politicians detained 
under Buhari regime, set up a political bureau to regulate national 
debates on political future for Nigeria, threw open the debate on 
IMF loan, declared that he was for the protection of human rights 
and repealed Decree 4 under which two journalists had been 
imprisoned for one year by the Buhari regime.
In the words of Babangida:
"As we do not intend to lead a country where 
individuals are under the fear of 
expressing themselves, the Public Officers 
Protection Against False Accusation Decree 
4 of 1984 is hereby repealed. And finally, 
those who have been in detention under this 
decree are hereby unconditionally released. 
The responsibility of the media to 
disseminate information shall be exercised 
without undue hindrance. In that process, 
those responsible are expected to be 
forthright and to have the nation's interest 
as the primary consideration/’
3.3 Nigeria's Land and People
Nigeria, an heterogeneous nation, a multi-lingual 
society with diverse cultures, values and religious beliefs, has a 
land area of 356,669 square miles <923,768 square kilometres).
The highest land is along the eastern border, with the 
Jos Plateau in the centre of the country the only relief from 
extensive lowland. The climate varies from arid and semi-arid in 
the north to equatorial monsoon conditions in the south. There are 
21 states in the Federation, excluding the Federal Capital
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Territory of Abuja. The country has over two hundred ethnic groups 
and over four hundred languages.
Population:
With an estimated population of about 125 million 
people, Nigeria, it is assumed, accounted for about one-fifth of 
Africa's 608.7 million people. Although, Nigeria is the most
populous country in Africa, there is no definitive estimate of the 
size of the population. Of the three censuses taken since 
independence* two (held in 1962 and 1973) have been annulled as 
showing unacceptable results in terms of ethnic or regional 
breakdown, and all have provoked controversy and dispute. 
National population estimates are based on the 1963 census. Growth 
rates are high, at about 4 per cent a year as a result of high birth 
rates and immigration from poorer surrounding countries. The 
Babangida military government has launched a population policy in 
an attempt to check the annual growth rate. A census head count 
has also been planned for 1991.
3.4 Socio-economic development:
The development of oil production during the 1960s and 
1970s brought about a rapid transformation of Nigeria from an 
agriculture-based economy to a major oil exporter. At the time of 
independence, agriculture was the most important sector of the 
economy in terms of production, employment and foreign exchange 
earnings. Since the rise of the oil industry, however, agriculture 
has suffered a relative decline. The percentage of workers 
employed in agriculture (though still representing more than half
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of the labour force) has diminished, with a drift away from the land 
to the urban centres. The failure of agricultural production to 
keep pace with population growth has not only reduced the volume 
of crops available for export but, in recent years has made it 
necessary to import quantities of foodstuffs.
Past government attempts to encourage agriculture have 
taken the form of campaigns such as "Operation Feed The Nation” 
COFN) launched in 1976 and the "National Accelerated Food 
Programme" but, in terms of investment capital, agriculture has 
been generally neglected and industrialisation and 
infrastructural projects have taken priority. The "Green 
Revolution" programme initiated in 1980 focused on nine 
agricultural development projects (ADPs) which have World Bank 
backing and aim to improve local infrastructure, teach new farming 
techniques and provide subsidised inputs; and on eleven River 
Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs)schemes designed to provide 
irrigation facilities.
The very little improvement in the Nigerian economy 
from the agricultural sector since independence has been 
attributed to a number of factors - the inadequacy or total lack of 
farm credit, shortage of qualified manpower; the absence of 
effective storage facilities; poor condition or sometimes absence 
of feeder roads and other transport facilities; the problems caused 
by disease, pests and desertification; the constant labour shortage 
in the rural areas caused by increasing rural-urban migration, the 
lack of modern technological equipment and skilled trained 
personnel among others.
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Nigeria"s climate and fertile ground are suited to a 
wide variety of crops. Commercial crops are cocoa (mostly grown in 
the west), oil palm (concentrated in the east), rubber (mid-west- 
Bendel) and groundnuts and cotton in the north. However, these 
resources have not been harnessed and exploited for the benefit of 
the Nigerian people. As a result, the demand for these products 
outweighs their supply thus making the prices of essential 
commodities to skyrocket. In fact, many Nigerians find it 
difficult to feed themselves. Much of the domestic food output is 
traded on a subsistence basis outside the framework of the cash 
economy. The principal food crops are yams, cassava, maize, guinea 
corn, sorghum, rice, and millet. Livestock raising is confined 
largely to the north. These foodstuffs are not available thus
t-r J
causing incessant agitation.
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TABLE 1
THE 21 STATES OF THE FEDERATION
STATE CAPITAL AREA 
( i n  sq  
km)
POPULATION
(1 9 6 3
c e n s u s )
1987
E s t i m a t e s
1988
E s t i m a t e s
kwa
bom
Uyo 7 , 0 8 1 2 , 5 3 3 , 4 4 0 4 , 6 9 1 , 9 0 0 5 , 0 7 7 , 5 4 0
nambra Enugu 1 7 , 6 7 5 3 , 5 9 6 , 6 1 8 7 , 6 4 7 , 2 0 0 7 , 8 7 9 , 9 0 0
a u c h i B a u ch i 6 4 , 6 0 5 2 , 4 3 2 , 2 9 6 5 , 1 6 9 , 5 0 0 5 , 3 2 6 , 8 0 0
e n d e l B e n in 3 5 , 5 0 0 2 , 4 6 0 , 9 6 2 5 , 2 3 2 , 5 0 0 5 , 3 9 6 , 7 0 0
enue Makurdi 4 5 , 1 7 4 2 , 4 2 7 , 0 1 7 5 , 1 6 0 , 4 0 0 5 , 3 1 7 , 5 0 0
o r  no M a id u g u r i 1 1 6 , 4 0 0 2 , 9 9 7 , 4 9 8 6 , 3 7 3 , 3 0 0 6 , 5 6 7 , 2 0 0
r o s s
i v e r
C a la b a r 2 0 , 1 5 6 9 4 4 , 6 9 1 2 , 3 0 6 , 4 0 0 2 , 5 0 5 , 7 6 6
o n g o l a Y o la 9 1 , 3 9 0 2 , 6 0 5 , 2 6 3 5 , 5 3 9 , 5 0 0 5 , 7 0 8 , 2 0 0
mo O werri 1 1 , 8 5 0 3 , 6 7 2 , 6 5 4 7 , 8 0 8 , 9 0 0 8 , 0 4 6 , 5 0 0
aduna Kaduna 4 6 , 0 5 3 1 , 6 5 3 , 3 0 2 3 , 4 9 2 , 8 0 0 3 , 6 8 9 , 8 5 0
f
ano Kano 4 3 , 2 8 5 5 , 7 7 4 , 8 4 0 1 1 , 9 2 7 , 5 0 0 1 2 , 3 5 1 , 1 0 0
a t s i n a K a t s in a 2 4 , 1 9 2 2 , 4 4 5 , 0 0 4 5 , 2 2 1 , 1 0 0 5 , 3 8 9 , 9 5 0
wara I l o r i n 6 6 , 8 6 9 1 , 7 0 6 , 4 6 4 3 , 5 7 5 , 0 0 0 3 , 6 8 5 , 1 0 0
k gos I k e j  a 3 , 3 4 5 1 , 4 4 3 , 5 6 8 4 , 3 7 0 , 6 0 0 4 , 5 6 9 , 4 0 0
Lger Minna 6 5 , 0 3 7 1 , 0 7 9 , 7 5 0 2 , 1 4 4 , 9 0 0 2 , 2 1 4 , 7 0 0
gun A beokuta 1 6 , 7 6 2 1 , 5 5 0 , 9 6 6 3 , 2 9 7 , 6 0 0 3 , 3 9 7 , 9 0 0
pdo Akure 2 0 , 9 5 9 2 , 7 2 9 , 6 9 0 5 , 8 0 4 , 0 0 0 5 , 9 8 0 , 7 0 0
r°
Ibadan 3 7 , 7 0 5 5 , 2 0 8 , 8 8 4 1 1 , 0 7 5 , 3 0 0 1 1 , 4 1 2 , 3 0 0
L ateau J o s 5 8 , 0 3 0 2 , 0 1 3 , 4 9 7 4 , 2 5 4 , 9 0 0 4 , 3 8 5 , 1 0 0
Lvers P o r t
H a r c o u r t
2 1 , 8 5 0 1 , 7 1 9 , 9 2 5 2 , 6 5 6 , 9 0 0 3 , 7 6 8 , 1 0 0
>koto So k o to 1 0 2 , 5 3 5 4 , 5 3 8 , 7 8 7 9 , 6 5 0 , 5 0 0 9 , 9 4 4 , 1 0 0
C. T. Abuj a 7 , 3 1 5 1 3 5 , 9 3 9 5 1 7 , 3 0 0 5 2 3 , 9 0 0
)TAL 9 2 3 , 7 6 8 5 5 , 6 7 0 , 0 5 5 1 1 8 /? f8 ,0 0 0 1 2 4 / 7 0 , 3 9 9
puree: Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, Nigeria- 
5 Figures were supplied by the Federal Department of Surveys, Lagos*
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Nigeria"s National Development plans have not been fully
coordinated even on paper, and far less so in actual organisation 
and implementation. Even more basic, neither the planning process 
nor the resultant plan shows evidence of any serious attempt to 
make the economic targets and policies represent national goals in 
more than the vaguest sense. Successive Nigerian governments so 
far (both civilian and military) have had no detailed set of socio­
political goals and, at best, a vague and ill-defined commitment to 
national economic welfare (as opposed to that of the narrow 
political class which has dominated Nigerian governmental and 
para-governmental structures mainly for its own power, prestige, 
and enrichment). Only recently, University students, workers, 
market women and many unemployed people demonstrated against the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the Babangida military 
regime. Some people lost their lives in the fracas while 
Universities were closed for many months. The peoples'" argument is 
that all the measures being introduced to revamp the economy are 
making life more unbearable for them while the rulers (both 
military and civilian) continue to wallow in affluence, conspicuous 
consumption and maximum enjoyment. All these affect political 
communications, national integration and political stability.
3.5 The Development of Mass Media of Communication
The print media: the newspaper press
I stated earlier that the first newspaper in Nigeria 
was Iwe Irohin but with the appearance of the Lagos Times and Gold 
Coast Advertiser in 1880, the era of the Lagos newspaper began and
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its Motto in 1890, 'Be Just and Fear Mot' might well sum up the 
attitude of the press up to 1900. The Press was essentially the 
watchdog of the people vis-a-vis the Colonial Administration. 
This was also the era of the rise of the private printing presses, 
African and Missionary, which gave assistance and support to the 
publishing editors by undertaking their printing. Moreover, the 
Churches propagated their points of view also through their own 
journals - In Leisure Hours (CMS), African Church Gleaner (both 
appeared in 1917) and The Nigerian Methodist (1925).
With the grant of the franchise in Lagos in 1922, a new 
impetus was given to the promotion of newspaper enterprises; 
electioneering provided a powerful incentive. The Lagos Daily Mews 
(1925) which under Herbert Macaulay became the organ of the 
Nigerian National Democratic Party, was characterized by long- 
winded and high-sounding phraseology but it was unmistakably 
critical of the Administration. On the other hand, the Nigerian 
Daily Times which emerged in 1926 became the first well established 
daily newspaper in Lagos but was distinctly conservative. In 
attempts to reach the masses, bilingual Daily Telegraph and 
vernacular papers, Eleti Qfe (1925), Eko Akete (1925), Eko Igbehin 
(1925) and Akede Eko (1927) joined the ranks. This period also saw 
the emergence of some professional and trade journals which proved 
to be short-lived.
In the 1930s new style journalism arrived, ushered in by 
the demise of the ponderous Daily News in 1936, The Service (1933) 
represented the young intellectuals challenging the dominance of 
Lagos politics by Herbert Macaulay and his Nigerian National 
Democratic Party and The Comet (1933) was an independent weekly
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through which Duse Mohamed Ali injected objectivity and Egyptian 
nationalist ideas into the Lagos and Nigerian politics. Even in the 
Frovinces, especially as Calabar also had the franchise, the scene 
was far from quiescent; Nigerian Observer (1929) supported by the 
Enitona Press in Port Harcourt; Nigerian Echo (1932) at Aba; Vest 
African Advertiser <1935) at Calabar. Be it noted also that 
editorship of newspapers began passing into the hands of 
professionals. The biggest impact during this period, however, 
was made by the arrival on the scene of Nnamdi Azikiwe who 
launched the/Vest African Pilot as a daily newspaper in November 
1937.
The era of the mass appeal had come: politics still 
dominated the newspaper but sports and other activities were also 
being reported, and in exciting terras, stressing the human aspect. 
The third-class clerk was as newsworthy as the upper-middle class 
politician or administrator and both could have their photographs 
in the paper. The Zik Group of Newspapers was soon formed and the 
provinces penetrated by its chain development; Eastern Nigeria 
Guardian (1940) at Port Harcourt; Nigerian Spokesman (1943) at 
Onitsha; Daily Comet (1945), the first newspaper in the North at 
Kano; Northern Nigeria Advocate (1949) at Jos. Others joined in 
wooing the masses; the reappearance of the Service as the Daily 
Service in 1938 as the organ of the Nigerian Youth Movement must be 
mentioned as also the development in the North with the emergence 
of the Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo in 1939 leading to the founding of the 
Nigerian Citizen in 1948, both by the Gaskiya Corporation, a 
Government-sponsored organization. In the Vestern Provinces, the 
Nigerian Tribune, founded by Obafemi Awolowo in 1949, followed the
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Defender of the Zik Group which had reached the Vest in 1945 via 
Varri and Lagos. Inevitably the Zik Group was unpopular with the 
powers-that-be but when their reporters were barred from the 
meetings of the Legislative Council for six weeks in 1946 for 
allegedly contravening the Wireless Telegraph Law, their retort 
was to launch an appeal for help against Government persecution, 
and donations poured . i n .The Press which had emerged successfully 
from the trials of the Second World War, during which a Vest 
African Press delegation which included Zik himself went to 
Britain, was by 1945 well entrenched and its coverage was 
practically the whole country.
The next development came from the Government. By 1940 
the need to disseminate correct information about the war effort 
led to the establishment of an Information Office. This was 
transformed into a Public Relations Office in 1944, which more 
correctly reflected the role of the office. It placed its facilities 
at the disposal of the Nigerian Press and these were used 
especially in the Provinces; its Press Conferences and official 
hand-outs proved to be valuable sources of news and its free issue 
of photographs helped the newspapers. Indeed, the newspapers 
themselves appreciated these services, judged by editorials in the 
Daily Service and the Pilot calling for the permanent 
establishment and expansion of the Public Relations Office. Thus, 
Government aided the general development of the Press at a dritical 
period by establishing its own information services between 1950 
and 1957 when the Federal Ministry of Information emerged.
In the First and Second Republics including the military 
interregna, 1960-1990, Nigeria witnessed the establishment of more
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newspapers by Federal government, regional and/or state 
governments, political parties and politicians, religious groups, 
professional associations, other pressure groups and private 
individuals. This trend has continued with the country preparing 
for a return to another civilian rule - the Third Republic - in 1992. 
Each of the 21 states in the country now has its own newspaper.
The electronic media: radio and television
Broadcasting was introduced to Nigeria in 1932. The 
establishment of broadcasting in Nigeria was the result of the 
determination of the British colonial authorities to link the 
colonies with the ''mother country" - Britairf. The first broadcast 
received in Nigeria was the relay of the BBC Empire Day Broadcast 
in 1932. The inauguration of the BBC Empire Service in that year 
actually led to the beginning of broadcasting operations in 
Nigeria. By 1944, there were Radio Distribution Stations in Ibadan, 
Lagos, Kaduna, Enugu, Calabar and Port Harcourt. Since then, 
broadcasting has had a most remarkable history. In fact, within 
five years of the RDS operation, stations had been opened in Kano, 
Abeokuta, Ijebu-Qde, Jos and Zaria among other places.
Between 1935 and 1950, the BBC's monitoring station at 
Lagos was developed into an extensive Radio Distribution Service 
<RDS> to serve the principal population centres in the country. It 
was a commercial operation owned by the government, serviced by 
the Post and Telegraphs (P&T) Department and managed under 
contract by the overseas Rediffusion Limited. In 1951, it was named 
the Nigerian Broadcasting Service. An Act of the Nigerian 
Parliament No. 39 of 1956 converted the Nigerian Broadcasting
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Service into a corporation and re-christened the Nigerian 
Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) in 1957 and the earlier Rediffusion 
stations were -upgraded to serve as broadcasting houses, and it is 
this NBC that is now known today as the Federal Radio Corporation 
of Nigeria (FRCN). Before this, there were NBC or '"Radio Nigeria" 
based in Lagos; Eastern Nigerian Broadcasting Service (ENBS) in 
Enugu; Western Nigerian Broadcasting Service (WNBS) in Ibadan; and 
the Broadcasting Company of Northern Nigeria (BCNN) in Kaduna, 
The regionalization of Radio broadcasting was first started in 
Ibadan in 1959> then followed by the one in Enugu the following 
2/ear, and finally, in 1962, the BCNN in Kaduna was established.
The FRCN came into being by the military decree of 1978 
which centralized the control over radio, Among the corporation's 
objectives were:
(1) sensitivity to local and national issues;
(2) timely and adequate response to the above issues; 
and
(3) impartial sense of responsibi 1 ity (underlined mine) to 
the public?
Today many of the 21 states of the Nigerian federation have their 
own radio stations while the FRCN has a station each, in all the 
states of the federation and in Abuja, the new federal capital 
territory for the country. The FRCN 1983 Executive Diary lists the 
following further objectives as guiding principles of the policies 
of the corporation in an effort to make it a truly National Radio 
Organ isat ion:
1 The provision of efficient broadcasting services to the
entire people of the Federation of Nigeria, based on national
objectives and aspirations and to external audiences in 
accordance with Nigerians foreign policy.
The provision of a professional and comprehensive coverage 
of Nigerian culture, to promote cultural growth through 
research and to disseminate the results of such research 
works for the benefit of the public.
The positive contribution to the development of the Nigerian 
society and to promote National unity by ensuring a balanced 
presentation of views from all parts of the country.
To ensure the prompt delivery of accurate information to the
people,
To provide opportunities for the free, enlightened and 
responsible discussion of important issues and to provide a 
useful two-way contact between the public and those in 
authority.
The provision of special broadcasting services in the field 
of Education and in all other areas where the national policy 
calls for special attention.
To promote orderly and meaningful development of 
Broadcasting in the country through:
a. Technical improvements
b. The training of appropriate professional staff, and
c. Programme and staff exchanges, with other Broadcasting 
Organizations in the country, where possible.
To promote research into various aspects of the 
communications media and their effects on Nigerian society 
which will include: Audience research, the investigation of
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fresh methods of productions and the true indigenisation of 
the broadcasting media.
9. To make every Nigerian feel proud of being a Nigerian.
Source: FRCN 1983 Executive Diary.
Television:
As for television, the first and oldest television 
station was officially commissioned in the then Western Region on 
31st October, 1959. It was the first Television Station in Black 
Africa hence/ it was tagged "First in Africa”. At the official 
opening the then Premier of the Region, Chief Obafemi Awolowo said 
that the venture was initiated because his government was 
convinced that television could play a major role in increasing 
both the pace and standard of education which was regarded as the 
key to progress in all other fields. He further said that the aim of 
his government was to bring information about Nigeria and the 
outside world into the people's home so that they might benefit 
from the knowledge. Chief Awolowo declared:
"Television will serve as teacher and 
entertainer and as a stimulus to us all to 
transform Nigeria into a modern and 
prosperous nation."10
Since then, the television scene has witnessed a 
phenomenal development. The 'First, in Africa' was followed in 1960 
by the second oldest television in Nigeria established by the 
former Eastern Nigeria regional government and was called Eastern 
Nigerian Television Service (ENTV) which was based in Enugu, now
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capital of Anambra State. On March 15, 1962, the Radio-Television 
of Kaduna (RTK) established by northern regional government, 
became the third television station in the country. In 1973 the 
Nigerian Television in Jos, Plateau State, was established and it 
became the first television station in Nigeria to transmit totally 
in colour in 1975. Decree No.24 of 1977 promulgated by the military 
led to the establishment of the Nigerian Television Authority 
(NTA>,
Other television stations established are NTV Sokoto 
C1976), NTV Kano (1976), NTV Aba <1976), NTV Benin (about 1976), NTV 
Port Harcourt (1977) and NTV Ilorin also in 1977. Between 1975 and 
1979 the NTA established stations in the following places: Bauchi, 
Yola, Maiduguri, Minna, Markurdi, Calabar, ARure, Abeokuta and Ikeja 
which took off only in September, 1981. The Nigerian Television 
Authority (NTA) now has stations in each of the 21 states of the 
federation as well as in Abuja, the new federal capital territory, 
while some states also have their own television stations.
By the NTA Decree No. 24, Nigeria had six zonal 
headquarters, each with a Board for the administration of 
television services, with the following duties:
1. It shall be the duty of the Authority to provide a 
public service in the interest of Nigeria, independent 
and impartial television broadcasting for general 
reception within Nigeria;
2, The Authority shall ensure that services which it 
provides, when considered as a whole, reflect the unity 
of Nigeria as a Federation and at the same time give 
adequate expression of the culture, characteristics and
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affairs of each State, Zone or other part of the 
Federation;
3. The Authority shall, to the exclusion of any other 
broadcasting authority or any person in Nigeria, be 
responsible for television broadcasting in Nigeria.
Source; NTA Decree No.24, 19'77.
In addition to the administration of the zones, 
programmes are expected to give "due regard to the distinctive 
culture, interests and tastes of the people of the zone on the one 
hand and the fulfilment of national needs on the other..." At the 
National level, the NTA is also guided by a policy on programmes 
which is specified in Section 9 of the 1977 Decree in which sub­
section Cl) states:
<a) that nothing is included in the programmes which is
likely to encourage or incite to crime or to lead to 
disorder or to be offensive to public feeling, or to 
contain any offensive representation of, or reference 
to a living person;
<b> that the programmes maintain a proper balance in their
subject matter and a generally high standard of 
quality;
(c> that any news given in the programme <in whatever form)
is presented with accuracy, impartiality and 
objectivity;
(d> that due impartiality is preserved in respect of
matters of political or industrial controversy or 
relating to current public policy; and.
- 106 -
<e> that subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), no 
matter designed to serve the interests of any political 
party is included in the programmes.
The Buhari regime took some steps to reduce the number 
of electronic media stations in ITigeria by closing some of them 
down and merging others together. An attempt was made in October, 
1984 with the establishment of a committee on the rationalisation 
of the electronic media. At the inauguration of the committee, the 
then Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major-General Tunde 
Idiagbon, spoke on the urgent need to reduce radio and television 
services in XTiveria. He added that the Government wanted to cutt—j
down costs, offer better services, discourage '’mushroom" stations, 
and in their places, re-equip those in Lagos, Enugu, Ibadcm, Abuja 
and Kaduna, General Idiagbon recalled that:
"...some politicians in an attempt to win 
votes engaged in an un p 1an ne d 
establishment of radio and television 
stations all over the country ... some 
became megaphones of political parties in 
power, suppressing or grossly distorting 
information to suit the whims and caprices 
of the politicians.. .,J1
However, this plan did not materialize because the regime was 
overthrown a year later (August 1985).
3.6 Conclusion
From the above historical account of ITigeria, it is 
clear that the country's political communications are bound to 
have been affected by the political, economic, social, historical, 
constitutional and communication development. It is safe,
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therefore, to conclude that the unsteady and unstable situations of 
Nigeria have longstanding effects on its political communications. 
There has been little change in the socio-politico-economic 
development agenda of the country since Independence. The same 
experiences, the. same models of development, struggles for power, 
ethnic chauvinism, mass media wars and inequalities seem to be 
repeating themselves. Nigeria emerged from its colonial tutelage 
with political trauma which was caused by the historical 
experience of the nature of nationalists3 struggle in the creation 
of the nation state. In place of a united, strong and virile nation, 
the new state was plagued by regionalism instead of patriotic 
nationalism. Despite all efforts to create a stable democratic 
political community and transform the country into a strong 
regional and global force, the Nigerian society today is still 
beset with ethnic, religious, social, political, economic and 
communication problems in addition to poverty, under-development, 
ignorance, illiteracy, disease and technological dependency.12 
All these have serious implications for Nigerian political 
commun icat ions.
The history of political communications in Nigeria is 
interwoven with the history of colonialism, Christian missionary 
society, political development, socio-economic structure, 
ownership of newspapers and other mass media of communications. 
During the colonial period, amalgamation, indirect rule, regional 
pattern of government, and a host of other colonial methods of 
administering the country affected Nigerian political 
communications. The major political parties and their newspaper 
spokesmen evolved from these patterns hence the political in­
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fighting and strife that have rent Nigeria in recent years stem 
essentially from the unresolved regional,.tribal, ethnic, as well as 
power rivalries. Nigeria has never been a.truly united nation.13 In 
the words of Lugard:
"...The local press, inspired by a ... mis­
directed education, is ... doing much 
grievous harm ... by ... its invective against 
all Government action.’*4
An English journalist who visited Nigeria in 1945 was 
so alarmed' by reports of mounting disaffection, that he wrote of 'a 
revolutionary native press which quite seriously threatens the 
stability of this part of the Empire.1-5
In the course of an address delivered to the Legislative 
Council in 1945, the Governor of Nigeria had some trenchant 
.comments to make on journalistic indiscipline in the territory 
under his charge:
’’Our Press is free - free to abuse, to
sabotage effort, to kill enthusiasm, to
impute bad motives and dishonesty, to
poison the springs of goodwill and foul the 
well of trust, to impregnate the body 
politic with envy, hatred and malice - in 
short, free to do the Devil's work.'15
Socio-economic development also affects Nigerian 
political communications. Since 1859, the history of Nigerian mass
media has been one of a rise and then rapid fall in the number of
newspapers and other mass media of communications. The factors 
responsible for the high rate of failure and mortality have been 
partly economic in nature. Capital is indispensable to the growth
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of mass media industry. Readership, listenership and viewership 
are limited. Organizational eff iciency * is low, infrastructural, 
training and other facilities are inadequate. Power is a source of 
wealth in Nigeria. The acquisition of power is facilitated by the 
use of mass media through different patterns of ownership. The 
primary motivation for owning mass media has been political rather 
than commercial.
Inequalities in Nigerian society were (and still are) 
very great. They seem to reflect a clear distinction between an 
elite comprising politicians, top civil servants, business tycoons, 
military men, government officials in uniform (police, customs, 
etc), government advisers, top managers, chief executives of 
companies and the masses, the rural poor, the wretched of the earth. 
Federalism, in the Nigerian context, has degenerated into a fight 
-for spoils. The rural areas are neglected. In the words of 
Olatubosun:
"The failure of the development plans to pay 
adequate attention to education, social 
amenities and job opportunities in the 
rural areas is further proof of the 
continuation of the dichotomy between the 
rural and urban sectors by the Nigerian 
local elites who have now replaced the 
colonial administrators who created it..’*7
Many of these issues exacerbate ethnic antagonisms 
which have existed (are existing and will continue to exist) for 
long. They also encourage corruption which has been (is and will 
continue to be) rampant in Nigeria.
Corruption of the elite in Nigeria is facilitated, and 
even encouraged, by popular attitudes toward the acquisition and
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ostentatious display of private wealth. As Dudley has observed, 
there is "some ambivalence about corruption amongst Nigerians". In 
many cases, it seems that public attitudes are shaped more by the 
use made of wealth than by how it is acquired. Where a "big man" 
flaunts his corruptly acquired wealth, but simultaneously 
distributes some benefits and favours to his family and community, 
he is unlikely to be condemned. Condemnation from "outsiders" is 
likely to be interpreted as symptomatic of jealousy or envy rather 
than indicative of a disinterested devotion to the public 
interest d9'
Political and economic factors have combined to 
produce an environment characterised by sharp inequalities 
between the urban centres and the countryside, by "public squalor 
and private affluence" and by apparently chronic political 
„ instability. Nigeria has been afflicted by sporadic outbreaks of 
communal violence as well as by the slaughter of civil war and 
attempted secession. The corruption, regional and ethnic bias 
associated with the civilian politicians of the immediate post­
independence years contributed to the increasing readiness of the 
military to intervene in dramatic fashion. Successive military 
regimes have proclaimed their disinterested concern for the 
interests of the nation and their detestation of the narrow, self- 
serving and factional squabbles of politicians.
If politics in Nigeria is frequently associated with 
corruption, patronage and the pursuit of spoils, the purportedly 
non-political military rulers of Nigeria have, with one brief 
exception, largely been tarred with the same brush!9
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Nigerian political communications system accurately 
reflects these socio-politico-economic conditions, At 
independence, there were mass media owned and controlled by 
federal, regional governments, political parties, politicians and 
private individuals. Even in the Second Republic and under various 
military regimes, in addition to private and political party 
ownership of newspapers, each state had its own ministry of 
information, radio broadcasting facility, television broadcasting 
facility, and official or government newspaper. All these media 
were manipulated by their owners to their own political advantage 
against- both their local rivals and their political counterparts 
nationally.20
Social divisions run deep in Nigeria and any 
polarisation of opinion around a key issue, or exacerbation of 
mistrust, tends to conjure up the spectre of communal violence. 
There is a considerable amount of heated dispute in Nigerian 
politics. Much of this is conducted through the mass media, where 
the political atmosphere is reflected quite clearly2.1 A Nigerian 
politician or government who has no access to, or is not reported 
by, any news medium is at a grave disadvantage. Nigerian mass 
media report socio-politico-economic activities; they are also in 
every sense, political institutions of central importance to the 
functioning of Nigerian political system.
Nigeria has a pluralist mass media system. It is 
nevertheless a fractured kind of pluralism which reflects the 
political situation and in turn helps, to a large extent, to define 
and create the situation it reports. The mass media of Nigeria have 
political backers and are therefore, given a political role which
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emphasizes the expression of opinion and places far less 
importance on the reporting of facts. Everyone wants to be heard, 
each party or politician wants a platform and each government in 
the country wants a mouthpiece.
My purpose is not to rewrite the Nigerian history. It 
is only to highlight the trends in the development of Nigerian 
political communications which I hope to support with my proposal 
of a theoretical model for political communications in the country. 
To catalogue shortcomings is one thing; to offer remedies, another. 
In the subsequent chapter, I have sought to analyse the theory, 
practice and methodology of Nigerian political communications by 
looking into some supportive evidences from the colonial, the 
independence, the First and Second Republics era in Nigeria. Such 
efforts seek to provide raw materials from which the ideas and 
ideals of a new system of political communications can be 
fashioned for Nigeria and from which the mass media, so vital to 
the survival of the Nigerian state can be owned and used more 
responsibly and more effectively.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
-A. T H E O R E T I C / A I L ,  M O D E L  ODE^ I R O n L  X T  I C A L  
C O M M U W  I C A T  I D E T ;  IN NIGERIA ^
Introduct ion
This chapter continues the discussion by proposing a 
theoretical model of the Nigerian political communications based 
on ownership of mass media in the country since the pre­
independence era and by seeking to support it through an analysis 
of mass media coverage of selected recurring issues in post­
colonial Nigeria.
4.1 A Theoretical Model of Political Communications in Nigeria
The existing models of the Nigerian political 
communications give a false picture of what happens in the country 
especially during election periods, debates on sensitive national 
issues or a controversy that affects the interests of politicians, 
ethnic groups or states within the federation. I propose that the 
Nigerian political communications can be understood in terras of 
the ownership of mass media. This is partly because such a 
proposal has the power to explain and reveal abundantly the 
structure of political communications in the country. In another 
sense, the model tends to support the observed trends which have 
continued to affect media behaviour since the pre-independence 
era. So far, political communications in Nigeria have tended to 
correlate with the partisan orientation of the owners and/or 
controllers of the mass media, be they governments, political 
parties, politicians, religious groups or private individuals.1
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Davison suggests that political communications 
generally focus on the way governments, parties and pressure 
groups make use of the media.2
My model is based on a two-tier concept of mass media 
ownership and philosophy. The first tier which I call "Market-cum- 
State Ownership Model" is a classification of dominant mass media 
ownerships in Nigeria with a sub-division into mixed party and 
non-party sub-models, government monopoly and control, political 
party and politician as well as private non-party non-governmental 
ownership sub-models.
The second tier involves categorizing mass media 
philosophy in Nigeria into Authoritarian, Authoritarian- 
Government promotional, Partisan-Libertarian and socio- 
C ommer c ia 1-L ibert ar ian.
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Market—cum—state ownership model -x
Based on ownership of mass media and consumers access 
to different media contents, that is, the possibility of choosing 
between various media most suitable in respect of their world 
views, politics and other interests, the model means a large 
variety of mass media - newspapers, dailies, weeklies, monthlies, 
radio and television stations, which are owned by the states,
N-
governments, political parties, politicians, religious 
organizations, trade unions, foreign or domestic capitals, 
university circles and private individuals among a host of others.
The Nigerian media adequately fits into this model from 
colonial to post-colonial periods. During the colonial period, 
there were colonial government media opposed vehemently by the 
nationalist and political party newspapers. There was also in 
addition an independent foreign-owned newspaper represented by 
the Daily Times at that time. In the same vein, during the First 
Republic, there were regional government media which waged wars of 
words against one another on the one hand, and against the federal 
government media and political party newspapers on the other. In 
fact, there was an officially recognised leader of opposition to 
the federal government in the person of Chief Awolowo and his party 
organs. Even under the military, there were media owned by each 
state of the federation in addition to the federal government media 
and trade union papers such as "Nigerian Opinion", an organ of a 
group of intellectuals connected with the country"s premier 
university, the University of Ibadan. The Second Republic also 
witnessed media1 that fit into the mixed party and non-party sub­
model of the main market-cum-state ownership model.
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The government monopoly and control sub-model is 
characterized not only by complete nationalization of mass media; 
the government (and/or the party, if it exists) also controls and 
directs the media owned by it. It is also characterized by the 
scale of resources available to it and by the fact that it is not 
organized along rational business lines. Government media tend to 
be propaganda organs of the political parties in power. Whatever a 
government-owned medium does, it has to bear in mind the fact that 
it belongs to the government and must be careful about 
broadcasting or publishing news and matters that could embarrass 
the government.
At times it has to give prominence to some matters 
which it does not consider important and to play down some that it 
considers important - all because such matters affect the 
government. In a way, a government-owned medium cannot afford to 
be really independent in its management, opinions and its choice of 
materials.
Government functionaries themselves believe that 
government-owned media must toe the line of the government.
In a letter Ho. SP/S.240/174 of February 25, 1974, and 
signed by Mr B. Pelu of office of the Military Governor, Ibadan, the 
Secretary to the Military Government and Head of Service (Western 
State) said he was unhappy with the Sketch over a publication 
concerning the position of the Premier Hotel which is also owned by 
the Government. He warned that "as a government-sponsored paper, 
the Sketch must be very careful in its reporting of Government 
activities."3
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Government ownership of mass media is problematic because 
the Government of the day will be using the funds of the general 
public to protect and advance the interest of the group which is 
for the time being in power. It could also put across only the 
views of one group to the detriment of the rest of the country.
Mass media organs owned by governments will encounter 
serious difficulties in getting profits. And we know a newspaper 
for instance derives its revenues basically from sales and 
advertisements. But a government newspaper may not address itself 
to this issue, because it is not only subsidized by government 
indefinitely, but also the workers in it will get their pay whether 
or not the paper sells.
Government ownership of mass media organisations tend 
to paralyse the independent management of such organisations. For 
instance, the Board of Directors of the Iligerian media houses owned 
by government are simply an extension of their sponsors. They have 
to report each development to their "masters" especially when it 
affects their politics, policies and personalities. These Boards 
are very powerful. They authorise capital expenditure and debate 
media personnel emoluments. In many cases, the management is at 
their mercy if it really wants to move ahead.
In fact, personnel management in the media has been 
greatly affected by government ownership. Postings and 
promotions are determined by the owner-government. Three
consequences flow from this:-
(1) motivation suffers as not the right persons always get 
appointed or promoted;
<2> lack of autonomy kills initiative; and
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<3) content of broadcasts, programmes and editorials are 
also unduly influenced.
An illustration can be given here to buttress or 
corroborate my argument. In the report of an enquiry into the 
affairs of the Sketch in 1971, the commission wrote:
M...the greatest misfortune of the Sketch 
x Publishing Company especially during the 
period covered by our terms of reference is 
that there was too much interference from 
the office of the Military Governor in the 
day-to-day running of the Company. The 
interference made the Board lamentably 
inept and impotent to the extent that it 
became a mere appendage to the Managing 
Director."'
By owning and controlling media, the government 
intends to go to the people with its own ideas, its own 
explanations, its own plans and projects. It is also aimed at 
propelling Government "s own image especially since non­
governmental papers revelled in discomfiting the Government.
This necessity becomes all the clearer from the 
following words of Increase Coker in an attempt to explain some of 
the reasons behind the government ownership of the press:
"One newspaper group, for example, started 
off bang from their maiden issue with an 
onslaught on everything the Government 
ever did. In season and out of season, it 
ridiculed the Government and encouraged 
the people by every journalistic artifice to 
make a laughing-stock of their own freely 
elected representatives. Wo allowance was 
made for honest mistakes and the severely 
limited experience of the new rulers as 
compared with other advanced countries...
The fact was that the emphasis, even among 
friendly newspapers, was generally placed 
on things which the Government ought to 
have done but was not doing.15
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Tlie political party and politician ownership sub-model 
is self-explanatory. As the name implies, this refers to 
newspapers owned by political parties and/or politicians. They 
are usually partisan in all ramifications - coverage of news, 
political events and issues, editorial policies - and they usually 
appeal to a readership of party militants and loyalists.
The private non-party non-governmental ownership sub­
model refers to the press owned by private individuals not 
controlled by a government or a party. It is usually for commercial 
purposes or for other reasons which affect the interests of the 
owners. A private medium could be able to maintain an independent 
stand, and give coverage to all sides of an issue.
It is not obliged to support any Government; it is ready 
and quick at all times to do whatever it thinks would bring it more 
readers and more revenue; and the private owner is checked in the 
process of publishing information since he has to obey certain 
laws of the newspaper industry.
It is pertinent to mention that the model I have 
outlined does not completely solve the problem of understanding 
the Nigerian political communications. I am aware for example, 
that the criterion of ownership may not be completely sufficient 
for a full characterization of the Nigerian mass media into 
government (state and federal), political parties, politicians and 
private ownerships of mass media. In fact, the patterns may 
overlap in some cases. Also, I am aware for example that a 
government medium may become a party medium if the government is 
run by a party; and vice versa, a party medium may become a
government medium if that party controls the government. In the
sarnie vein, state or government ownership or subsidy does not
always mean that a medium is an official spokesman for the
government, even though a state/government subsidy restrains 
media in expressing opposition views. Yet, the fact that a paper is 
not state-owned does not make it impossible for the state or 
government to influence the paper's contents. At the same time, the 
private individual owner or publisher may be a politician 
indirectly trying to carve a political niche for himself in Nigeria. 
So. in this case, a more important point may be the interlocking of 
media ownership and political ambition. For instance, the
privately-owned National Concord used to be an ardent supporter of 
the National Party of Nigeria and until its publisher, Chief Abiola, 
left the party over a presidential nomination row in 1982, the 
National Concord newspaper had fulfilled the pledge in its flag 
editorial that it would support the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) 
"in and out” of government. A major focus of attack for the paper's 
vitriolic pens used to be the Unity Part]/ of Nigeria <UPN>. 
Moreover, after the Concord's publisher, Chief M.K.O, Abiola, left 
the NPN, the newspaper became anti-NPN overnight, stressing again 
the role of ownership in editorial direction and political 
commun ications.
In a discussion of the Ex—British African Media, Jeremy 
Tunstall seems to support my position on the influence of mass 
media ownership on political communications. In his celebrated 
work, the renowned Scholar stated that even before 1960, the owners 
of some newspapers wanted their west African papers to reduce 
political tensions, to avoid attacking those in power in general or
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individual leaders in particular. In the same vein, African 
nationalist newspapers were knocked into line by fines, temporary 
suspensions or the arrest of editors; other useful weapons were 
colonial government advertising and the ability to stop newsprint 
supplies. Also, the news agency which is a section of the Ministry 
of Information, largely shapes what the newspapers can say; the 
newspapers often are government, or government party, owned as 
well. Tunsfall added that since the media are government 
controlled, the politicians in practice decide the goals of the 
media - and, like politicians anywhere, they approach the media 
with their own political problems and preferences in mind. He 
concluded:
"However the media are formally owned in Black Africa, 
the government inevitably controls them. This has been 
quite clear even in a country like Kenya where private 
□wnershipwas allowed to continue for a decade after 
the one-party principle was established.*'
These arguments reinforce rather than pull down the 
strength of my model. Whatever happens, it cannot be denied that 
ownership of mass media affects the Migerian political 
communications, although, the degree of effects may vary; and that 
the existence of varied patterns of ownership gives ample scope 
for studying the media behaviour on coverage of national issues 
and sensitive political events.
It has been argued against the use of models that they 
tend to trap their originators and users within rather limited 
confines which they then become eager to defend against attack.7 A 
similar risk is that a model, or even a succession of models, can 
tend to perpetuate some initial questionable, but fundamental,
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assumptions about the components of a model or the processes at 
work. An example in the field of communication is the tendency to 
represent communication as a one-directional process in which a 
'"sender" deliberately tries to influence a "receiver". Such a 
representation tends to deny the circularity, negotiability and 
openness of much communication.
However, it should at least be remembered that there 
are some risks in using models, even for heuristic purposes. They 
are inevitably incomplete, oversimplified and involve some 
concealed assumptions. There is certainly no model that is 
suitable for all purposes and all levels of analysis and it is 
important to choose the correct model for the purpose one has in 
mind. This is exactly what I have tried to do. I have proposed this 
model of ownership for the purpose of analysing mass media 
behaviour in the Nigerian political communications against the 
background of the peculiar circumstances of the country at 
different periods in history. The model presented is not so sacred 
that it cannot easily be given a somewhat different shape and 
formulation, but at the same time, it helps a great deal in 
understanding political communications in Nigeria.
4.2 Nigerian Media Philosophy
Based on the above model, the second tier of my proposal 
involves categorizing the Nigerian media philosophies into the 
Authoritarian, Authoritarian-Government promotional, Partisan- 
Libertarian and Socio-Commercial-Libertarian.
The first, Authoritarian, fits the mixed party and non- 
party sub-model in which there are government controls over the
media to stifle criticism and thereby maintain ruling elites on one 
hand, and the absence of government controls, assuring a free 
market place of idea and operation of self-righting process on the 
other hand. The second, Authoritarian-Government promotional fits 
the Government monopoly and control sub-model in which the media 
are owned and controlled by the state and governments. The main 
purposes of the media, under this philosophy, are to serve the 
state, promote, support and advance the policies of the government 
in power. The idea is that the political party and the private 
commercial newspapers are not adequately and responsibly 
publicising government policies, programmes and activities, hence 
it is necessary for the government to establish, own and control 
government media to do the job. There is also the belief that 
government has the responsibility to serve and protect the public 
interest through its media, while private media which are out to 
make profit would seek to exploit the public. In a way, the 
government in power equates the public interest with its own 
interests and uses the media to zealously pursue that goal in order 
to keep itself in power.
The third philosophy, Partisan-Libertarian, is for the 
political party and politician ownership sub-model in which 
competing political parties and politicians establish newspapers 
as their mouthpieces but at the same time assure a free market 
place of political ideas devoid of governmental control. The 
fourth philosophy, Socio-Commercial-Libertarian, is for the 
private non-party non-governmental ownership sub-model in which 
private individuals establish newspapers for purely commercial 
reasons, namely, to make profits which would enable them to stay in
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business. But at the same time, efforts are made to ensure that all 
viewpoints, including those of the opposing private and/or public 
media, are heard. Private newspapers also try to provide the public 
services of news, commentary, advertising, entertainment and a 
forum for public debate.
Again, these philosophies may overlap depending on the 
circumstances or time periods. For instance, a political party
X
newspaper with Partisan-Libertarian orientation may become 
government-owned and controlled if that party comes to power and 
at the same time, it may try to combine authoritarian-government 
promotional philosophy with Partisan-Libertarian philosophy. The 
same thing can happen to other categories but they do indicate the 
type of philosophies that guide the Higerian political 
communications.
As a matter of fact it can be argued that the "uses and 
gratifications" approach which examines the reasons individuals 
select particular mass media of communication and content within 
those media would have a strong support for my model. Researchers 
using this approach believe that people have particular uses for 
media of communication content (i.e. information or entertainment) 
and receive particular gratifications from that content. This 
approach assumes that audiences actively search for self-defined 
gratifications from media of communication content, i.e. different 
receivers of political information are motivated by different 
expectations of it, develop different orientations toward it, and 
nay therefore, be perceived as playing different roles in the 
political communication system. Investigating such orientations 
to political communication
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FIGURE V
A DIAGRAMMATIC PRESENTATION OF A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR POLITICAL
COMMUNICATIONS IN NIGERIA
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in Britain, Blumler identified four examples of the "uses and gratifications" theory 
that might be applicable to the political communications system of other 
competitive democracies.8
They include: the "monitor" looking for information about political 
developments relevant to his own circumstances and seeking information about 
features of the political environment, such as party policies, current issues and the 
qualities of political leaders; the "spectator", looking for excitement and other 
affective gratifications; the "liberal citizen", looking for help in making up his mind 
between posited alternatives and seeking guidance in deciding how to vote; and 
the "partisan", seeking a reinforcement of his existing beliefs and loyalties.
4.3 Nigerian Ownership of Mass Media
Prior to January 1977, foreigners had ownership in many kinds of 
mass media of communications used in Nigeria. But with the promulgation of the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, all media institutions, except book 
printing, book publishing, publishing of periodicals and the mass media related 
business of pulp and paper milling were to be owned exclusively by Nigerians.9 
In each of these four exempted areas, foreigners are allowed 40 per cent 
ownership. In this ownership requirement, Nigeria falls in line with several other 
nations around the world, 14 of them in Africa south of the Sahara, including 
Ghana, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania and Zaire.10
The existence of this law has been regarded as a boon and a 
challenge to individual Nigerian businessmen to invest, in the development of the 
mass media. But in my judgement, the law is also a doom to Nigeria for many
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reasons. First, it excludes foreign capitals which could have provided an effective 
neutral service the type of which was provided by the Daily Times under the 
ow/nership of the British concern, a subsidiary of the International Publishing 
Company IPC. Secondly, the law encourages the establishment of many more 
private political newspapers some of which continue to compound Nigerian ethnic 
problems in the way they cover national issues. Thirdly, the law does not give 
ow/nership diversification to the broadcast media. U p till today all the radio and 
television stations in Nigeria are still owned by the government. The point I am 
stressing here is that the existence of this law and ownership requirement of mass 
media in Nigeria is one more example of how the various groups are encouraged 
(directly or indirectly, consciously and/or unconsciously) to use the media to mould 
people’s view of reality in Nigerian political communications in a direction that is 
consistent with the political interests of those who own and control the media.
In order to fully understand not only why this happens but also how 
those who control the media are prepared to go in this direction, I review a few 
basic points about politics, governments, and elite groups.
We are usually told that politics has to do with the struggle for the 
distribution of society’s valued things. Some of these valued things include wealth, 
income, services, education, power, positions and influence. What we are not 
always told, however, is that there is also politics as the struggle for who decides 
both what these valued things should be and how they should be distributed or 
shared out. The struggle for " who decides" is the bigger struggle because it is th is  
that determines how the struggle for distribution should be carried out. Thus, we 
have two separate but inter-connected forms of aspects o f politics: the politics of
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allocation (ie. the struggle for distribution); and the politics of domination (ie. the 
struggle for "who decides"). Those who are in power use their control of the 
media to portray the existing pattern of distribution as legitimate while those out 
of power, if they control any media, tend to use^same to discredit the existing 
pattern of distribution. But ownership and control of the media is not only one 
of the high stakes in the politics of domination, it is also a potent instrument for 
establishing domination or challenging an established domination. In this sense 
both the incumbent elite groups and their counterparts who are out of power find 
in the media an important resource for waging the most fundamental political 
struggle in the Nigerian society.
Leadership groups want to be able to mould the "political world 
view" of their citizens. They, as it were, want their ideas to be the ruling ideas 
of their age and society. They are better able to achieve this if, among other 
things, they have monopoly control of the mass media in their society. And 
challengers to this leadership group will necessarily attempt to prevent the ideas 
of the rulership from being the ruling ideas. Again they cannot succeed in this bid 
if they do not own or control some parts of the mass media, unless they have faith 
in the use of force.
The mass media in Nigeria have come to be one of the most 
important instruments through which those in power seek to influence the political 
thinking of their subjects and persuade them to see the government as legitimately 
serving the public interest and therefore deserving of public support. They do this 
in a number of ways:
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(1) They deliberately distort the information they disseminate to their 
audience, the citizens;
(2) they knowingly exclude some vital pieces of information, especially 
if those pieces are likely to lead the citizens into drawing a 
conclusion that the leadership does not favour;
(3) they can remain simply quiet over some crucial issues where the 
population is thirsting for information;
and
(4) they seek to divert the people’s attention from very important issues 
by crowding the peoples’ mind with trivialities.
They can couple these with trying to prevent opposition elite groups from 
acquiring control of some mass media for fear that those media could be used to 
neutralize the government’s political control efforts.
Besides all these, other interests of a party or ethnic nature may also 
use their ownership and control of the media to champion their own narrow 
interests while discrediting those of their opponents. Whether such ethnic/party 
interests are pro-government or anti-government depends on what side of the 
divide they find themselves. All told, there are a variety of self-serving political 
interests which the ownership and control of the media can be used to serve in 
Nigeria.
But there are public interest political goals which the media can be 
used to serve. Such goals include the following: information to the public, public 
enlightenment, social criticism and exposing governmental arbitrariness, national 
integration and political education. But the more the media are used to serve the
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narrow self-serving group of interests, the less able they can be used to serve the 
other group o f public interests. For instance, if those who own or who control the 
media .use them to champion . ethnic and party interests, then the capacity of 
the media to promote national interest goals will suffer; if they use the media to 
build legitimacy for those in power (the government) then the media cannot 
perform well as instruments for social criticism. If the media are used to distort 
information in order to uphold a preferred view of reality, then the ability of the 
media to provide the public with accurate information for intelligent decisions will 
suffer. If the media are used to make people think what the government wants 
them to think, then the media will blunt the edge of the people’s political 
consciousness.
However, the proliferation of government and party owned media 
is not the best arrangement for promoting the public interest. Party and 
government owned media have the major weakness that it is easy not to take 
them seriously because of their inherent bias even when they are saying the most 
serious things. This is why we should be moving in the direction of non-partisan 
independent mass media. These kinds of media have a greater legitimate claim 
for promoting the public interest. This is one reason why a government which 
aims at total political domination will see those kinds of media as a bigger threat 
than the government and party owned media.
Nevertheless, the ability of independent and non-partisan mass 
media to promote the public interest should not be taken for granted. After all, 
their owners have their own narrow self-serving interests to advance. However, 
their role as articulators of alternative political world views, as social critics and
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as symbols of society’s readiness to check political arbitrariness may be a major 
political asset. The effects of all these are examined in post-colonial Nigeria, but 
first the pre-colonial and the colonial periods.
4.4 Political Communications in the Pre-Colonial Nigeria
In all the pre-colonial Nigerian Societies, political communication 
was exclusively interpersonal directly and/or indirectly with religion as the principal 
linkages and contents in the network of relationships between kinsmen, the rulers 
and the ruled. Political authority structures in pre-colonial Nigeria evolved around 
three major ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Ibo in the east, and 
the Yoruba in the west. Islamic religion was (and still is) central to Hausa-Fulani 
politics and communication, while African traditional religious worships of cults 
and oracle organisations were common to both the Ibo and the Yoruba political 
communication systems. Other aspects of religion used included divinations, 
mythology, witchcraft, juju and cult societies. At all levels, political 
communication used more of informal than formal mechanisms. It was also 
characterised by all kinds of traditional methods of communications, face-to-face 
communications and there was . absence of modern mass media and
professional communicators. For instance, a village head who was a member of 
the Council of Chiefs, might act as a leading politician and a communicator to his 
community.
This structure in varying degrees constituted the pattern of political 
communication in all the pre-colonial societies in Nigeria - both among the Hausa- 
Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba as well as the minority ethnic groups.
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Traditional communications media vary from one Nigerian society 
to another. But generally, the following appear to have cut across all the pre­
colonial Nigerian societies. They are: traditional leaders, the town crier or 
gongman, traditional religious groups, the age grade interpersonal networks, 
talking drum, hornman, visual symbols and colours, minstrel, poets and reciters, 
story tellers, drama, including dance, songs, mime and puppetry# '
A  Town crier or gongman usually hails from the household of the 
local chief or headman and is charged with the responsibility of delivering 
messages orally to elders, and the community. H e is limited to what he is 
mandated to announce. He is an important communication link between 
traditional rulers, community leaders and the rest of the people in the locality. 
The town crier moves about on foot using the wooden gongs or the steel and has 
no authority to indulge in unilateral or frivolous pronouncements.
Traditional religious groups are authentic communication channels 
in Nigeria and they use palm fronds to summon members for important meetings.
Traditional leaders such as local chiefs and village group leaders, native doctors,
... . . , important
midwives, teachers and parents play an /• communication role for purposes
of passing the word, for good governance and overall development o f the Nigerian
society.
The age grade bodies are the organisations or interpersonal 
networks of various age groupings in the community. Communication messages 
to age grade groups are often received as a command and they carry the stamp 
of sanctions for non-compliance.
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Talking drums are used as veritable channels of communication, 
such as call signals (most radio stations have adopted this), inter-village 
communication, official messages from the traditional ruler or council of Elders.
The Hornman is a communicator who uses a horn for call signals 
and belongs to voluntary associations active in the neighbourhood. He is used in 
a special but limited way. The hornman is guided by the sources o f his message.
Messages transmitted through visual symbols and colours are mainly 
moral and artistic. The impact of this channel is great.The/^nstrel is a 
communicator who operates through song often accompanied by local instruments. 
H e seeks his audience in a homogenous group. The song has in general a 
hearing on particular situations; grief, pain, happiness, jubilation, etc.
Poets and Reciters are^very popular and adaptable channel of 
communication. Through this channel are transmitted moral, social and 
educational messages. It is currently popular in radio transmissions.
Story tellers are communicators who specialise in messages of 
educational, historical or entertainment value usually loaded with morals. Drama, 
including dance, songs, mime, and puppetry also convey educational, moral and 
social messages. This is convenient vehicle for the integration of a variety of 
traditional media and is capable of carrying this advantage to all types of modern 
media.
Social structures or social groups are forums such as market place, 
chiefs courts, assemblies of elders, religious institutions, voluntary ward groups 
and cooperatives. They generate a tremendous amount of interaction as 
traditional communications media. They are also communal and mould control
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mechanisms: norms, mores and values for communication in the Nigerian society. 
For example, among the Yorubas of Akure in Western Nigeria the palace 
messengers are the Omode-Owas. The "chief messenger" also serves as the palace 
liaison officer, providing a channel by which the views o f the people may be 
expressed to the king. Other messengers are sent by the chief on "news beats" to 
herald dates of traditional ceremonies, warnings o f epidemics and dates for 
cultivation and harvesting.
In Yorubaland the village announcer or "gbohun-gbohun" post is, in 
most cases, an hereditary position. For example, in an Ijebu village, an announcer 
trains his children for the post, teaching them about the Oba’s area of influence, 
the most productive ways to deliver the news, and the technique of using the gong.
In Benin, the Avbiogbe or chief town crier is the eldest among a 
group of 21 traditional chiefs in the kingdom. His special assignment is to collect 
the king’s taxes and he assigns his colleagues to cover and disseminate the news 
of the kingdom. H e is so important that it is illegal to insult or obstruct him; any 
misdemeanour on his part or on that of his colleagues result in instant dismissal 
and other punishment.
The village announcer in the Eziokpor village of Bendel State has 
been described as "the telephone line between the village chief and the villagers." 
Eziokpor’s village gongman enriches the skeletal messages which the chief gives 
him with songs and riddles. His news is generally "broadcast" in the early morning 
and again in late evening. Occasionally, at noon, he may announce important 
news breaks such as the death of a : key villager.
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In the little village of Ashipa-Ilawo near Abeokuta in Ogun State, 
the village announcer is known as the Ashipa and has the status of a chief. 
Although he does not rule the village and is responsible to the most senior chief, 
the Ashipa’s credibility is unquestioned. H e strikes the gong often before his 
announcements and also plays the Gbedu drum to emphasize the importance of 
certain messages.
The Mai Shela, the village announcer of Hausa, is a legendary figure 
generally believed to have been appointed by Allah, but he is selected by the 
Sarki or ruler of the village. Revered and respected as a holy man, his body is 
inviolate and his announcements undoubted. The culmination of his yearly 
responsibilities is his prediction and announcement of the date and time for the 
sighting of the religious Ramadan moon.
The tradition of the village announcer has survived in the city of 
Ibadan despite the city’s rapid growth, the presence of mass communication, and 
the rising literacy rate. The announcer is still an important servant of the 
Olubadan and is a familiar figure in the market squares in his traditional black 
"danshiki" and matching gong and cap. Among his many sacred duties are 
announcements of the royal proclamation of the celebration days for the religious 
festivals of the Egungun and the Sango.
These capsule descriptions of village announcers in various 
communities demonstrate that the gongman occupies an important position in the 
diffusion of messages within the belief systems of the rural audiences of Nigeria. 
He is not only respected and revered, but is perceived as authoritative and 
credible, and it is important that his role in the communication of rural change be
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recognised by those in charge of reaching the village audiences by more "modern" 
means.
4.5 Political Communications in Colonial Nigeria
Media ownership in colonial Nigeria was dominated by missionaries, 
colonial administrators, nationalists, political parties, politicians and private foreign 
organisations.
During the colonial period, the press served as a medium of 
sustained public debate and political protest, an uncompromising advocate of 
administrative and political reforms, and a seething critic of the excesses of the 
colonial order. By its political activities, the press not only stimulated the 
emergence of nationalist movements but also played a prominent role in the 
constitutional development of modern Nigeria. During the period of nationalism, 
the press served as political recruiters and mobilisers. First, the party papers 
served as vehicles for changing political consciousness, and through them, the 
ideas of nationalism were propagated. Secondly, the press generally recruited 
people to political movements. Thirdly, they contributed to party organisation. 
Fourthly, the press encouraged the penetration of political activities into the 
provinces. In fact, the press was among the major weapons used by the 
nationalist leadership to gain and consolidate political power and government 
control.
In the campaigns for the 1923 elections, newspapers were identified 
to have fallen into three groups; the Pro-NNDP, exemplified by the Record, anti-
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N N D P exemplified by the Spectator and the uncommitted or neutral newspapers 
exem plified by the Advocate.
Coming down to the 1959 elections the newspapers were religiously 
committed to various political parties. For instance, the Tribune and the Daily 
Service were the campaigning forums for the Action Group, the Pilot was 
committed to the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) while Dr 
Kingsley Mbadiwe’s the Telegraph founded in 1958 was purposely to fight the 
federal elections of 1959 on the platform of his breakaway party the Democratic 
Partyof Nigeria from the NCNC.
The European Christian missionaries were the pioneers of 
newspaper ownership. As noted earlier, the Iwe Irohin was the first to be 
established by Reverend Townsend. In fact, for his part in Abeokuta, Rev. 
Townsend registered many ’firsts’ of which the appearance of the Iwe Irohin was 
the fourth. H e was the first official representative of the Anglican Communion, 
through the Church Missionary Society of Great Britain, to preach the gospel and 
convert Africans in this country to Christianity. He had arrived at Badagry in 
1842 and had moved on to settle at Abeokuta a short while after. H e pioneered 
the first attempt to provide a script, for the Yorub'a' language in 1848, 
six years after the arrival of the Mission at Abeokuta. Six years later in 1854, he 
broke another pioneering ground by setting up the first printing press. Iwe Irohin 
contained items of information on such matters as building of churches, 
celebration of Christian festivals, church meetings, the movement of church 
officials to and from district or parish, news of ordinations, baptisms, 
confirmations, deaths and births. These were meant to inform church workers in
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the various outposts about the position of things at headquarters and in the 
organisation as a whole. It proved a very useful service in those days when 
mutual hostility amongst some natives and difficulties o f communication, made 
conditions uncertain and life and property unsafe.
The Iwe Irohin was published fortnightly in English and Yoruba, 
each language claiming four of its eight pages. Each page was divided into 
columns and measured six inches wide by eight inches deep. At the time of its 
appearance it was estimated that about 3,000 Yorubas could read their native 
language. The Iwe Irohin arrived in time to help other factors which prepared the 
people for the publication of the first Yoruba Bible in 1862. Both newspaper and 
Bible, in cooperation with the earliest schools established by the missionaries, 
contributed largely to the promotion of literacy among the people.
After the first few months the Iwe Irohin broadened out its news 
coverage to include subjects other than church matters. News stories about 
Abeokuta and district were particularly prominent in its pages, but items from the 
surrounding districts of Yorubaland as well as Lagos Colony were also 
accommodated. The following subjects were covered by the news and editorial 
columns with varying degrees of prominence: commercial news about producer 
prices of palm-oil, etc.; announcements from local Chiefs and from the 
Government of Lagos Colony; news of the movement of Government and 
commercial representatives, including the arrival and departure of Governors or 
their deputies from Lagos; agricultural and craft exhibition and progress made by 
mission schools. A  study of the issues between 1860 and 1865 reveals that the Iwe 
Irohin even carried advertisements from local firms and Government agencies.
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It shows that it was a vigorous critic of the evils of slave trade, an ardent advocate 
of the diversion of trade and commerce from human beings to produce and 
merchandise. It was a faithful reporter and commentator on the political 
developments of the times, including the punitive expeditions and inter-tribal wars 
which plagued the surrounding Yoruba country.
In its issue of December 18, 1865, the Editor o f Iwe Irohin 
announced that as from the following month two separate editions of the paper 
would be published. An English edition was henceforth to appear on the fourth 
day of each month, and Yoruba edition on the 20th day. Before now its 
fortnightly edition had frequently included a four-page English ’supplement’.
In the last three years of its existence, the political circumstances of 
Abeokuta and the Egbas generally were as unsettled and explosive as never since 
1859. The Egbas, as reprisal against the Europeans whom they accused of aiding 
and abetting the people of Ibadan in their bid to by-pass the Egba commercial 
middlemanship and deal direct with Lagos Colony, expelled all Europeans from 
Abeokuta in 1867. It is believed that it was in the ensuing confusion and 
disorganisation of the Mission that the Iwe Irohin ceased publication in that year, 
after nearly eight years of existence.
The Lagos Weekly Record, a remarkably anti-colonial paper, was 
started by the Liberian, John Payne Jackson, in 1891. Its major target was the 
colonial Government, and its editorials constantly bordered on the seditious. It 
supported most pre-World War I protest movements in Lagos, charging its 
readers to resist colonial government oppression. Its attacks against Governor 
Lugard were extremely personal. The Lagos Weekly Record appeared and
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disappeared between 1891 and 1930. This forty-year period represents the longest 
life lived by any single Nigerian newspaper ever since the first one - Iwe Irohin - 
appeared in 1859.
That the Record continued a virile existence during this period 
stands out as one of its greatest distinctions. But there are other features of its 
life which give the Record a special place of honour and merit in the Nigerian 
Press. One of these is its fearless nationalism. Another is its conscious and 
consistent policy of Pan-Africanism. The Record shares the first feature with such 
papers as James Bright Davies’ Times of Nigeria and Herbert Macaulay’s Lagos 
Daily News. It shares the second feature with some of the earlier newspapers, 
such as the Lagos Times, the Lagos Observer and the Lagos Standard.
Background to these features is found in the origins of its founder, 
Mr John Jackson. He was of Liberian origin and education and was greatly 
influenced by such Pan-Africanist thinkers as Dr Blyden (his fellow Liberian) and 
Dr W Du Bois of America. The Record therefore saw the up-and-coming Nigeria 
not in isolation as a West African country, but within the broader context of an 
African renaissance and as part of the movement for the emancipation of the 
Negro race. The background and character of the two Jacksons left their stamp 
on the editorial pages of the Record. Thus it played a leading part in 
disseminating the earliest nationalist sentiments which found part of their 
expression in the break-away of the ’African’ churches from the established 
European Christian Missions. The Record also lent unqualified and consistent 
support to movements such as the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Rights Protection 
Society. Africanist leaders, such as Dr Blyden and Herbert Macaulay, were
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accorded a respectable amount of space in the Record for the propagation of 
their views and advocacies.
Next to African nationalism and Negro freedom crusading comes the 
attitude of the Lagos Weekly Record towards the local colonial administration. 
It made history by its courageous and uncompromising opposition to such 
Government measures as the land acquisition laws and their application, the 
Lagos Water Rate Regulations, the Seditious Offences Ordinance and the 
treatment meted out to traditional rulers in Lagos and elsewhere in Nigeria by the 
Colonial Government.
The colonial administrators became increasingly concerned about 
the power of the press to mobilise public opinion against alien rule. The 
agitational politics and criticisms of the colonial order by the nationalist 
newspapers led to negative reactions from the colonial government. For example, 
when in 1895 the colonial Governor proposed a house and land tax on the 
inhabitants of Lagos, the press took the government to task and whipped up local 
sentiments against the proposal. In response, over 5,000 Lagos citizens marched 
to the Government House in protest and as a result the tax measure was never 
enforced.11
The first reaction of the colonial authorities to curb the excesses of 
the anti-government press was the enactment of the 1903 Newspaper Ordinance 
which provided for registration of names, addresses of proprietor, publisher, editor
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and printer; swearing to an affidavit, paying a deposit of £250; providing two 
sureties and entering into a bond before any one could publish a newspaper.12
One effect o f the ordinance was to discourage people with limited 
resources from venturing into journalism. The ordinance was revised in 1909 and 
its sweeping nature proved a useful weapon in suppressing nationalist agitations.
Sedition ordinance
In September 1908 Herbert Macaulay published a pamphlet which 
denounced the colonial administration for not respecting the wishes of the ruled. 
Governor Macgregor used the occasion of that publication to request a sedition 
law:
"...which would allow reasonable freedom of 
discussion of government policy but which would give 
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  p o w e r  t o  p u n i s h  
publications...designed to influence an excitable and 
ignorant populace the bulk of whom are absolutely 
under the control of Headman and Chiefs who 
themselves have only recently emerged from 
barbarism and are still actuated by the old traditions 
of their race."13
In 1909 the Seditions Offence Ordinance based on the Indian Penal 
Code was enacted. Its definition of a seditious publication against the Crown or 
government established by law included "all malicious endeavours to promote or 
tendency to promote hatred or contempt, disaffection, disloyalty or feelings of 
enmity".14 This law was harsher and more vigorously enforced in Nigeria than 
in England. Professor B.O. Nwabueze provides this explanation:
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"...because of the very excitability of illiterate peasants 
and the bitter emotions which imperialism is apt to 
generate in the minds of colonial peoples, it was 
thought unnecessary that words alleged to be 
seditious should have a tendency to provoke violence, 
as is the case in English law.1’15
When Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard was appointed Governor in 1912, the 
newspapers scrutinized his policy in a manner that provoked him beyond 
endurance. In a letter to his wife, dated October 16, 1913, Lugard referred to 
Nigerian newspapers as "scurrilous and local yellow press which exercised 
monstrous freedom". H e described the journalists as "mission educated young 
men who live in the villages interfering with the native councils and acting as 
correspondents for the mendacious native press."16
Lugard’s retaliation for the scrutiny was the enforcement of the 1909 
law of sedition by which J.B. Davies, editor of Times of Nigeria, was prosecuted 
and convicted twice; Herbert Macaulay and Dr Caulcrick, proprietors, and J.A. 
Olushola, editor of the Lagos Daily News, were all convicted in 1928 for 
publishing a false rumour which led to public demonstrations against Macaulay’s 
political enemies.17
Lord Lugard was very wary of newspapers. As Governor of Nigeria 
in 1917, he framed a law which gave him authority to appoint a censor of the 
Press whenever an emergency arose or he thought was about to arise. Lugard 
wrote into this legislation the power to seize the printing presses, confiscation of 
any newspapers printed and the imposition of a bond of £250 on publishers. 
Though London was upset when it learned of this action several weeks later when 
the mail ship from West Africa arrived and ordered him not to enforce such laws,
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Lugard ignored these instructions. When the Colonial Office in London pressed 
him, he claimed that their original messages had been lost.18
But not all the newspapers were against the colonial government. 
The Nigerian Daily Times which started in 1926 and was owned by African and 
European members of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce but later purchased by 
the Daily Mirror Group of London in 1947, could not write anything critical about 
the Nigerian colonial government or expatriate officials unless definite instructions 
came from the very top.
Assessing the place of the Times amongst contemporary newspaper 
of the early 1930s, Chief Awolowo wrote:
"The Nigerian Daily Times was technically the best 
paper then in circulation but it was, on a strictly 
professional assessment, an unpardonably dull 
journalistic and literary product; a veritable stagnant 
pool of stale, colourlessness; and a musty-reservoir of 
articles which lacked animation, pungency and 
nationalist flavour. In contents and style the Nigerian 
Daily Telegraph under the editorship of Mr Ernest 
Ikoli and the Lagos Daily News were the very 
antithesis of the Nigerian Daily Times, and therefore 
much better. But most of the time, the Telegraph 
was printed in types so battered that only a long- 
suffering person could bear the ordeal of reading 
more than the short, bracing and thunderous 
editorial. The Lagos Daily News had ceased in 1934 
to answer to the name of a daily paper. It published 
only when Herbert Macaulay... could afford to buy 
newsprint and ink and persuade his irregularly paid 
and half-starved compositors to work."19
Chief Awolowo was a reporter under the Times in 1934.
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Technical improvement is one of the important contributions o f the 
Times to the progress of the Press. But this improvement was made possible by 
another prerequisite contribution, namely, advanced capitalization. For the first 
time in the country’s Press a comparatively large capital was invested in a single 
newspaper. This brought with it more skilled and better paid expatriate 
technicians and more efficient machinery, both from abroad. Technically, this 
m eant an improvement in the physical appearance of the newspaper* better lay­
out; in other words, better typography and mechanical typesetting, better printing.
Managerially, it m eant a much more detailed and knowledgeable 
attention paid to the commercial or business aspects of the industry. Better 
quantity and quality of transport; in other words, better organization of sales and 
distribution throughout the country, greater circulation giving rise to better 
satisfaction of advertisers and greater patronage from them.
Third cqm e. the training and status of the journalist. With more 
money, Nigerians of higher educational qualifications were employed for training. 
Much greater opportunity or scope is afforded the young journalist by the foreign 
financed newspaper for the acquisition and development of skills.
Journalists were paid higher wages. Freelancers received some 
money compensation for their writing, as against the former years when they 
wrote free of charge mostly with a view to seeing their names in print. Higher 
wages and payment for published articles and illustrations also meant that only the 
best were accepted; therefore the journalists were induced to improve themselves 
and their output.
- 149 -
Because the Daily Times was unattached to any political group, the 
staff lacked the missionary or crusading spirit which motivated journalists in the 
indigenous papers. But it compensated for this by constituting itself into a force 
for the encouragement of social and professional comradeship amongst the rank 
and file of journalists who used to be estranged from one another by the political 
antagonisms of their principals or employers.
Fourthly, a wider range of reader-interests than ever before was 
catered for. The news and features service which increases the sources of public 
information and entertainment were made possible by the availability of much 
greater capital and the recruitment of men with higher skills from abroad and 
locally.
Also, the arrival and early advance of the Times marked the 
beginning of the end of the editor-printer or editor-proprietor, at any rate as a 
dominant feature of ownership and control of the Press. Its set-up showed a clear 
division of functions as between those who own the paper and those who produce 
it. Further, within the latter group there appeared a still clearer division of labour 
as between Editor and his staff as well as the production manager and his 
assistants.
As regards newspaper style and variety of reader interests, the 
Times was also one step forward in the march of Nigerian journalism.
It would be possible in this place to cite many more titles of the 
colonial newspapers used for political communications in colonial Nigeria as well 
as the names of their editors, owners and publishers, but this is not the purpose 
of this section. I have only tried to focus on those chosen to demonstrate the
- 150-
varied example of ownership patterns of religious, partisan, government and 
private colonial media. The subsequent chapters discuss the use of the media by 
the owners for political communications in the first and second Nigerian republics.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to construct a theoretical model as a point 
of departure for investigating and discussing the impact of mass media ownership 
on political communications in Nigeria. It proposed a market-cum-state model 
of varying degrees of mixed party and non-party, government monopoly and 
control, political party and politician as well as private non-party, non­
governmental ownership sub-models. These are governed by media philosophies 
of Authoritarian- Authoritarian-Government promotional, Partisan-
Libertarian and Socio-Commercial-Libertarian orientations. The pros and cons 
of the model were also examined.
The reasons for owning mass media vary from one government to 
another and from individuals to individuals. Some people and groups establish 
media for altruism, power, profit, and influence or a combination of some or all 
the four. For instance, some owners see media ownership as profit making, as
ci
3 political mouthpiece^jgovernment propaganda organ or as something designed to 
give them fame, status, to provide a base for influencing public opinion and 
therefore, for creating opportunity for influencing political authority or a political 
set-up, as a business enterprise and as a public service. During the colonial era, 
government ownership of media was a reaction to the use of the media by the 
settlers’ community; government perception of the press as too powerful to be left
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to people who might misuse it; and government desire to use the media to 
provide services where the lack of profit potential would discourage private 
enterprise.
All told, it must be remembered that the model categories may 
overlap and some owners’ use of mass media may not be guided by any model or 
philosophic guidelines but rather by reactions to Nigerian daily problems of 
stability, survival, ethnic interests, and national recurring issues in Nigerian 
government and politics.
Yet, it was noted that under colonialism, increasingly anybody who 
had anything to say turned to the newspapers to express their views. It was not 
merely the British administration or other White imports that came under attack. 
The rivalries of local chieftaincies and political arguments were aired and it was 
this period that saw what was to become a feature of the press in many parts of 
West Africa, particularly Nigeria - tribalism in print.
We have seen how the nationalist newspapers attacked the colonial 
order, how the colonial government reacted by promulgating all kinds of 
obnoxious anti-press laws and how the party papers were used not only to 
campaign for elections, but also to attack one anothers’ political opponents. Each 
paper responded to socio-politico-economic issues in different ways depending on 
their ownership structures - the Iwe Irohin. the Lagos Weekly Record, and the 
Nigerian Times to mention just a few.
The next chapter continues the discussion by looking at specific 
media reactions to sensitive national issues and political events in Nigeria’s First 
Republic.
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CHAPTER 5
NIGERIAN POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE
FIRST REPUBLIC
5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the ownership patterns of the mass media in 
Nigeriaa’s First Republic and how these affected their coverage of national issues. 
At independence, Nigeria was a federation comprising a federal government and 
three regional governments in the East, North and West o f the country. A  fourth 
regional government, the mid-Western region, was created when the country 
became a republic in 1963.
The fact that the various governments, political parties and 
politicians which owned many of the newspapers and electronic media in the 
country at independence and under the republican status were local in outlook 
and based on affinity with specific ethnic groups had serious implications for the 
Nigerian press which was so vigorous during the struggle for independence.
The very process of decolonization in Nigeria had led to tensions 
among groups who competed for power not only to protect their group interests 
against possible invasion by other groups in the competitive process, but also to 
take over the reins of power from the colonial government and control the 
dispensation of allocatable resources and patronage. In fact, the momentum given 
to regionalism encouraged aggressive ethnicity both of which coincided very often, 
to create ethno-regionalism.1
- 155-
Each of the regions had a dominant political party with 
loyal newspapers and mass media. The Eastern Region was dominated 
by tlhe Ibo with their party the National Council of Nigerian 
Citiz;ens (NCNC), formerly, the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameiroons. The region and its party had the Vest African Pilot, the 
Niger-ian Outlook and the Eastern Nigerian Television <ENTV) to 
serve its interests.
The NCNC was formed in 1944 mainly to fill the gap left 
by t!he weakness of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) which 
resulted from internal dissension in the movement. It was a 
prodtuct of cj series of rallies and meetings organised by the 
Nigerian Union of Students and members of the defunct NYM in the 
bid t;o get an effective political leadership for the national cause 
in the march towards independence. At its formation in 1944, Dr A.B. 
Olonun-Nimbe was one of its leaders; Herbert Macaulay was its 
President and Dr Azikiwe, Secretary. The NCNC generally aimed at 
providing a medium of expression in order to secure political 
freedom and to win political independence for Nigeria as early as 
possible. At independence, however, the NCNC became identified 
with the Eastern Region of Nigeria under the leadership of Nnamdi 
Azikiwe.
The Northern Region was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani 
and came under the jurisdiction of the Northern People's Congress 
(NPC). It had the Nigerian Citizen and the Radio Kaduna Television 
(RKTV) as its organs. The NPC which emerged in 1949 was an off­
shoot of a cultural organisation - Jamiyar Hutanen Arewa, formed 
by Dr R.B. Dikko. Its motto was 'one North, one People, one Destiny".
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The NPC was formed to avoid southerners dominating the politics of 
the coiuntry when the colonial administration ended.
The Yo.ruba held political power in the Western Region 
under the Action Group (AG) which was later engulfed by crisis in 
1962. The regional mouthpieces included the Nigerian Tribune, the 
Daily Sketch and a radio television station - (WNBS-WNTV).
The AG was an off-shoot of the Egbe-Omo-Oduduwa 
established in 1945. The AG was launched at Owo in April 1951 with 
the aim among others of organising all Western Regional 
nationalists under its umbrella. It was formed by Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo so as to meet the need for a well organised political party 
first in the West and later in the whole country. Other leaders of 
the party were Chief Bode Thomas, Chief S.L. Akintola, Chief 
Shomibare, Mr Rewane, and Chief Ogun among others.
Chief Awolowo"s failure to become the Prime Minister 
can legitimately be regarded as the original source of the Action 
Group crisis of 1962 and the accompanying treason trial. With the 
decision of Awolowo to move from the West to the federal 
legislature as leader of opposition, there was disagreement within 
the AG over who should succeed him as Premier. Against Awolowo "s 
wish, Chief Akintola became premier and soon after he began to take 
control of decision making in Western Regional government - with 
the least possible consultation with Awolowo. Within two years of 
Akintola"s take over of the premiership, dissension within the AG 
became public knowledge with the political supporters and the
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newspapers which Awolowo controlled seriously criticising the policies of the 
Western Regional government. By t IJay 1962 the rift had progressively got worse 
and led to a riot in the Western House of Assembly. The Prime Minister, Alhaji 
Tafawa Balewa, instructed the police to clear the legislative chamber and lock it.
A  state of emergency was declared by the federal government. The 
governor, premier, ministers, president of the House of Chiefs, Speaker of the 
House o f Assembly and the Superintendent-General of Local Government Police 
were relieved of their posts. Dr Majekodunmi was appointed administrator for 
Western Region with considerable powers. A  commission of inquiry into the 
financial and investment policies of six Western regional government statutory 
corporations including their relations with political parties was set up by the 
federall government.
The commission, headed by Justice Coker found that the Action 
Group received N1.3 million overdraft with the National Bank and that the party 
benefitted from NIPC investment in corporations that published pro-Action Group 
newspapers. On Awolowo, the commission reported:
"His scheme was to build around him with money, an 
empire financially formidable both in Nigeria and 
abroad, an empire in which dominance would be 
maintained by him, by the power of money which he 
had given out."2
Akintola was vindicated by the commission. The treason trial in 
which it was alleged that Awolowo and others planned to overthrow the 
government also found him and twenty other members of his party excluding the
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D eputy Leader, Akintola, guilty and sentenced them to varying terms of 
imprisonment. Awolowo earned ten years imprisonment.
Before all these, Akintola and Rosiji (General Secretary of the AG) 
had been  expelled from the party. With their supporters they formed a new  
political party, the United Peoples Party which later merged with a wing of the 
NCNC in the West to form the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP).3 
With the support of the Federal Government both through the administrator of 
the Western Region and other channels, when the Western House of Assembly 
reconvened on 8 April, 1963, Akintola won a vote of confidence and resumed his 
leadership of the region till 15 , January, 1966 when the military intervened 
in Nigerian Government and politics.4
Apart from other personal issues which some writers have raised to 
the status of ideological differences,5 the disagreement between Awolowo and 
Akintola centred primarily over the federal prime minister’s idea of strengthening 
national unity through the formation of a coalition government to be formed by 
all the three major political parties. Akintola, strongly supported the proposition 
while Awolowo was opposed to it. After the federal elections of 1959, the NPC  
emerged with 148 seats, NCNC/NEPU alliance with 89 and the AG  with 75 in the 
312 member House of Representatives.6 Even though the two southern political 
parties had enough number of seats to have formed a coalition government, the 
NCNC found it more expedient to join the NPC in a coalition with Tafawa 
Balewa Deputy Leader of the NPC as Prime Minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
President of the NCNC as President of the Senate and later, Governor-General 
(in 1963 with Nigeria becoming a Republic, Zik became President). Awolowo led
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the opposition in the federal legislature. The federal government was directly in 
control o f the Morning Post, the Nigerian Radio-Television Station (NBC-TV) and 
other media indirectly.
Petty jealousies afflicted these media. Their owners and editors 
could not perceive issues beyond the confines of party ideologies, ethnic or 
regional boundaries. Because none of the three major political parties had a firm 
footing in any region other than its home base, even though each had a 
considerable following in the other regions, the media could not promote national 
goals. Since the media were toeing party, ethnic and individual ownership lines 
in their coverage of events and the opinions they reflected, it became difficult, if 
not impossible, for the federal government in particular, to get its activities 
adequately covered by all media. This led to different governments,
parties, politicians and individuals getting involved in media industry, a trend 
which has persisted till today.
5.2 Government Monopoly and Control of Mass Media in the First Republic 
The Federal Government Press:
The federal government set up the Nigerian Broadcasting 
Corporation and the National Press which published the Morning Post and Sunday 
Post. I have earlier discussed the development of the NBC, but the story of the 
Morning Post and Sunday Post is outlined below. (See Chapter 3 for the N.B.C.)
In March 1961 the Nigerian Press Limited, publishers of the two 
newspapers, was incorporated under the Companies Act, with all the share-capital 
owned by the Government of the Federation. The Press was to be part of the
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Government’s public relations and publicity organisation. The board of directors 
of the new company were to operate under the general surveillance o f the Federal 
Ministry of Information.
As was popularly understood, two considerations motivated the 
Federal Government in sponsoring the venture. Firstly, the idea was to improve 
the technical and journalistic standards of the indigenous Nigerian Press with a 
view to meeting the challenge of the non-indigenous section at the latter’s own 
level. From 1937 to 1948, leadership of the Press in the strictly journalistic field 
was securely in the hands of the indigenous section, which also controlled and 
dictated the political and cultural aspects. Between 1948 and 1960 leadership in 
the technical, financial and journalistic fields was taken over by foreigners when 
the Daily Mirror Group of London took over control of the Daily Times. The 
indigenous Press raised intermittent alarms. They conducted a sustained 
campaign of blackmail and denigration against the ’invasion’ of overseas Press 
barons. But all this availed nothing, especially so in view of the liberal attitude 
of the Government. Rather, the new arrivals waxed from strength to strength. 
Technically and journalistically they were certainly the leaders in the 1950s.
The second important consideration which gave rise to the Nigerian 
National Press, publisher of the Morning Post and Sunday Post, was the necessity 
for the Government to go to the people with its own ideas. It was to give the 
government a voice against the other media. Money was no object. It bought not 
only the best equipment but the best editorial staff it could find. But it was never
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a success. It rapidly lost £300,000, but being government-owned that was o f little 
consequence. In the words of Osindero:
"Towards the end of 1960 the feeling began to grow 
in government circles that the Federal Government 
was at a disadvantage in not having a national 
newspaper of its own..."7
The other reasons why certain leaders of the Federal Government, 
chief among whom were the Prime Minister and the Federal Minister of Finance, 
wanted a Federal Government paper was that they were highly annoyed by the 
strong and rather constant criticism of policies and personal behaviour which they 
had experienced during the first months of independence. They had accepted 
certain rules of the game vis a vis the press - of not directly closing the opposition 
paper, for example, or threatening foreign-owned firms with nationalisation. 
Therefore, a government-owned newspaper was the most obvious way of 
answering critics and hitting out at political opponents.
The Morning Post was always full of praises for the then federal 
government even when such praises were inappropriate. The Morning Post 
became defunct in early 1973. Its circulation had fallen fe§3I£and the Federal 
Government was running it at a greater deficit; the Nigerian audience of the 
Morning Post had eventually revolted against reading Federal Government 
bulletins and press releases that overtly contained only pro-government news that 
became characteristic of the contents of the Morning Post. The Post ’died’ 
because it took its audience for a ride. It failed to recognise that it had a 
nationally-based audience, hence an element of objectivity in news content was
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essential in presenting all sides of controversial issues that were quite sensitive 
when the nation was faced with a series of crises of identity and legitimacy. The 
paper itself commented on its 10th anniversary that:
"...inspired and sustained journalistic bombardments 
unleashed on the government during the first months 
of independence by units of the mass media created 
disintegrating forces that caused disaster for the first 
republic."8
The Regional Government Press
The Eastern regional government converted the weekly Eastern
i
Outlook into a daily newspaper and renamed it the Nigerian Outlook in 1960. the 
weekly Eastern Outlook and Cameroon Star had been launched since 1949 at 
Enugu by the Public Relations Department of the Government. It was the 
Eastern version of the Western News (Ibadan) and Nigeria Review (Lagos). On 
the approach of independence and the separation of Southern Cameroons from 
the Federation of Nigeria, the words Cameroon Star were dropped from the 
paper’s name. It was taken over by the Eastern Nigeria Information Service, a 
corporation established for the purpose by the Government of Eastern Nigeria in 
the early fifties. On attainment of national independence the paper was converted 
into a daily under the new name of Nigerian Outlook.
The Nigerian Outlook became the Biafran Sun, a lively but 
irregularly produced paper of the Ojukwu government, during the Nigerian civil 
war; after the war, the new East Central State announced in mid-1970 that it 
would launch a new daily, Renaissance. The Renaissance was eventually
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established and it replaced the Nigerian Outlook. Today, the paper is called the 
Daily Star.
The Northern regional government was in control of the Nigerian 
Citizen which had been established earlier by the Gaskiya Corporation. The 
Citizen was renamed New Nigerian in 1966. In the Western region, the 
government established the Daily Sketch.
The history of the Sketch Press Limited goes back to 1963 when the 
then government of the Western region conceived the idea of running a 
newspaper
"to inform and educate the people of Western 
Nigeria on the activities and achievements of the 
Government, so that the Government might carry the 
people with it in all its undertakings."9
The Sketch with its headquarters in Ibadan and branches all over 
Nigeria publishes the Daily Sketch. Sunday Sketch. Gboungboun. Evening Sketch. 
The Entertainer and the Sketch Annual. It made its appearance in the newspaper 
market on March 31, 1964, when its maiden issue came out. On November 18, 
1965, the Sketch Publishing Company Limited was formally incorporated under 
the Company’s Act (Cap 37) of Nigeria.
The Sketch Press Limited, formerly owned by the government o f the 
then Western Region of Nigeria, has now become the property of the three states 
of Oyo, Ogun and Ondo, following the creation of more states in the country in 
1967 and 1976 respectively. After the creation of more states, the Governments 
of the three states appointed a ’State Implementation Committee’ (SIC) to
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deliberate on all matters affecting their states including those that should normally 
have been referred to their various executive councils.
The committee was also to ensure the smooth take-off of the newly 
created states by effectively arranging the equitable distribution of personnel and 
assets.
After a series of meetings and careful consideration, the SIC 
decided that the Sketch Publishing Company should be left as a joint venture in 
order to save the new states from investing their scarce resources on the 
establishment of new publishing companies. This was how the Sketch remained 
and still remains the property of the three states of Oyo, Ogun and Ondo. 
Political Party Press.
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe established the West African Pilot in 1937 but 
it survived into the period of independence, the first republic, the first, second 
and third coming of the military. It ceased publication in 1978. The trend of 
popular feeling when the West African Pilot was launched is summarized by a 
political opponent to its publisher, Chief Obafemi Awolowo:
"As there was no effective vehicle for the vigorous 
ventilation of suppressed grievances, a journalistic 
vacuum was thus created which Dr Azikiwe very 
cleverly exploited and usefully filled when he returned 
to the country in 1937 to establish the West African 
Pilot which, whatever its literary defects, was a fire- 
eating paper of the highest order, ranking in this 
regard with the Nigerian Daily Telegraph under Ikoli, 
and the Lagos Daily News, but much better 
produced."
As a result, the Chief noted, the Pilot:
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"was naturally very popular, the very -thing the youth 
of the country had been waiting for. Newspapermen 
in the employ of the West African Pilot were better 
paid and they assumed a new status in society. Civil 
servants, teachers and mercantile employees resigned 
good and pensionable posts to lend a hand in the 
new journalistic awakening. Some of these 
enthusiasts were eventually disappointed and 
disillusioned on other grounds but the fact of a 
journalistic revival or revolution was widely 
recognized and acknowledged."10
From the start, Zik spread banner headlines across his pages, 
introduced photographs, and simplified his text^ Daily Mirror style^with one 
sentence per paragraph. A  W oman’s Page was started, a Gossip Column, book  
reviews and short stories. Within three years the paper was selling 12,000 copies 
daily, an unheard of circulation on the West Coast.
Though the Pilot strove for national distribution, lack of transport 
and communications facilities made the task nearly hopeless. In any case, Zik was 
very well aware of the importance of local issues to a popular newspaper, and 
Zik’s Press Ltd. therefore embarked on the creation of a chain of newspapers, 
embracing the main centres of all the three regions of Nigeria. In 1940, he 
established the Eastern Nigerian Guardian at Port Harcourt; in 1943, the Nigerian 
Spokesman at Onitsha, also in the East, and the Southern Nigeria Defender at 
Warri, in what is now Bendel State. In 1944 he acquired The Comet on A li’s 
death, converted it into a daily, and in 1949 transferred it to Kano as the first 
daily paper in Northern Nigeria. In the same year he founded a second Northern 
daily at Jos, but this had later to revert to weekly publication. At one time there
i
i
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were six daily newspapers in the chain, covering all the main centres of the largest, 
most sprawling and socially disunited country in Africa - Nigeria.
There are many qualities which distinguish the West African Pilot 
from other newspapers be they government, political party or private owned. 
First was the ownership, which was a limited liability company, the Zik’s Press Ltd. 
Next comes the distinction of being the first Nigerian-owned newspaper to lead 
a healthy virile life over the years, without once going out of print for lack of 
financial resources.
In this connection it should be pointed out that whereas advertising 
patronage from foreign firms sustained the Nigerian Daily Times, the Pilot lived 
chiefly on sales of newspapers (circulation). That explains why the Pilot survived 
the withdrawal of advertising from Nigerian-owned newspapers by the expatriate 
firms as reprisal for the 1938 cocoa crop hold-up by the producers who responded 
to the instigation of the indigenous Press. Again in 1945-46 the Pilot survived the 
withdrawal of official advertisements by the Colonial Government as reprisal for 
the highly critical attitude of the newspaper.
The third contribution of the Pilot and a very important one at that, 
was the training ground which it afforded to young aspiring Nigerians. To begin 
with, Dr Azikiwe himself was a trained journalist. While operating as university 
lecturer in Anthropology and Political Science in America, he found time during 
the long vacations to pursue studies in journalism in other colleges. Not only did 
I he obtain his professional diploma in journalism, but he worked from time to time 
as City Reporter or Sub-Editor for several American provincial newspapers. In 
addition to these, he acquired West African experience in the Gold Coast (now
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Ghana) where he was Editor-in-Chief o f the African Morning Post for three years 
before he came over to Nigeria to launch the Pilot. In the ten years o f active 
leadership of the editorial and commercial operations of the Pilot. Zik can be said 
to have trained well over fifty Nigerians and other Africans who were later to be 
found in almost all newspaper offices which matter in Nigeria.
The Nigerian Tribune was started in 1947 by Chief Awolowo, who 
owned it until 1951 when the Action Group took the paper over. Together with 
the Daily Service, it formed the Amalgamated Press of Nigeria. The Service and 
the Tribune commanded a public made up of the supporters of the NYM, people 
opposed to Azikiwe’s politics and newspapers, a large section of the Yoruba elite 
in Lagos, their followers in the West, and many of the followers of Yoruba 
traditional leaders. Their editorial staffs and financial supporters were chief 
among the organisers of the AG. But the Service was converted into the Daily 
Express in 1960. By 1958 the Amalgamated Press had obtained control of a 
company - Allied Press Ltd - publishing a string of small provincial dailies, so that 
it now grouped a whole network of papers covering all regions. Among the 
group’s publications were The MidWest Echo. Benin, The Middle Belt Herald. 
Jos, and The Northern Star. Kano, in the North, and The Eastern Observer. 
Onitsha, and Cor Advocate. Uyo. Like their counterparts in the Zik Press 
Limited, all these newspapers have vanished, exceptyj'the Nigerian Tribune.
Table 2 shows the ownership structure of Nigeria’s major 
newspapers in the First Republic.
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OWNERSHIP ORIENTATIONS OF
TABLE 2 
NIGERIA'S MAJOR NEWSPAPERS IN THE FIRST REPUBLIC
NEWSPAPERS
MIXED PARTY GOVERNMENT 
AND NON- MONOPOLY/ 
PARTY CONTROL
POLITICAL
PARTY/
POLITICIAN
PRIVATE
NON-PARTY
NON-GOVERN­
MENTAL
OWNER
POLITICAL
AFFILIATION READERSHIP CIRCULATION
Citizen * * Northern
Nigeria
Government
tf.P.C.’ North (including 
IBO Community)
8,100
Express * * A.G./Over 
seas Group 
Thomson
A. G . Lagos, West 
Mid-West, North 
(Yoruba)
52,220
Outlook * * Eastern
Nigeria
Government
N.C.N.C. Eastern Region 21,100
Pilot * Dr. N. 
Azikiwe
Unofficial
N.C.N.C.
Sometimes 
National 
N.C.N.C. (Ibo)
23,100
Post * * Federal
Government
N.P.C. Sometimes
National
35,390
Sketch * * Western
Nigeria
Government
N.N.D.P. Government 
Offices & NNDP 
Western Region 
(Yoruba)
2,000
Times * IPC Independent National 108,960
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5.3 Media and Political Communications in Nigeria’s First Republic: Survey of 
Issues
Nigeria had all the types of mass media represented by the market- 
cum-state model in the First Republic. There were mixed party and non-party 
media, government-owned and controlled media, political party newspaper and 
the press of private concerns. The impact of ownership on these media was 
largely reflected in their coverage of national issues of paramount importance such 
as census, election campaigns, regional crises, ethnic and group interests among 
a host of others. The leading political party newspapers were locked not only in 
a vicious combat, but also all the media including those of the various levels of 
governmental administration provided remarkable examples of over-zealous, 
irresponsible partisanship and recklessness. The seeds of mutual distrust, running 
battles and unending confrontations between regional media and the federal 
media on one hand and between different regional media and political party 
newspapers on the other hand, all of which were sown during the colonial, 
independence and first republic periods, are still germinating today.
5.4 The Press and the Politics of Census Controversy
The census crisis was of crucial importance in the sequence of 
political crises that engulfed the First Republic. It sparked a bitter inter-ethnic 
feud and polarized the political leadership along ethno-regional frontlines. 
Furthermore, it not only set the stage for the controversial 1964 federal elections 
and the attendant constitutional stalemate but also contributed to the violent 
collapse of the First Republic. A  meaningful analysis of press behaviour on the
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I crisis, however, requires an understanding of the importance of census in Nigeria’s 
domestic and international politics and the relationship between the press and the 
political system defined in terms of the structure of ownership which links the 
mass media with the Nigerian political system. As shown earlier, the structure of 
media ownership was one dominantly controlled by political parties, partisan 
federal and regional governments. With one exception, the Daily Times, the 
sampled newspapers were either owned partly  or wholJ^d controlled by or 
closely associated with and/or enjoyed financial subsidies from the dominant 
political parties and their governments. As I have tried to show in my analysis, 
this ownership structure has been the key factor determining the behaviour of 
mass media in Nigerian political communications.
The importance of accurate population figures has hardly been  
widely acknowledged in Nigeria. The manner in which the country has conducted 
its census in the past and the population figures claimed each time have never 
earned the respect of most people, groups and institutions. The controversy that 
has usually arisen about the reliability of the figures has made them suspect 
abroad, even though the rest of the world, for lack of any alternatives, has had to 
quote and use the official Nigerian figures.
There has been suspicion and criticism in Nigeria since regular 
census counts began in 1911. But the severest attacks were reserved for the May 
1962 census figures, which were described by the Chief Federal Census Officer as 
false and inflated, and of which the Federal Minister of Economic Developm ent 
said:
"It is useless to give out any figures to the public 
under the present circumstances... The fact is that
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there have been inaccuracies and under no 
circumstances will I release false figures. I shall do 
my duty and if in the end we cannot arrive at any 
reasonably accurate figures, as the Census Officer has 
suggested, there can be no alternative but to do the 
whole thing again."11
In the end, no true and acceptable figures were produced and, 
following a meeting between the Prime Minister of Nigeria and the three Regional 
Premiers, the census figures were nullified and another count ordered for 
November 1963. But the results of this touched off an even fiercer controversy. 
Even when, in March 1964, the Prime Minister, who was also chairman of the 
1963 National Census Board, declared in the House of Representatives that he 
had accepted the 1963 census report and preliminary figures and that this 
acceptance was final, a flood of protest was evoked. The Eastern Nigerian 
Government challenged even in the Federal Supreme Court the accuracy of the 
figures and the right of the Prime Minister to accept them.
The history of census in Nigeria has been o n e  of mutual distrust, 
suspicion, and vehement criticism. The count has been highly politicized. 
Nigeria has never had a generally accepted census result. Three decades after 
independence, the goal of an accurate ascertainment of the Nigerian population 
for the purpose of economic and social planning still remains problematic and 
elusive. This is attested to by the fact that after independence, between 1962 and 
1973, three national census exercises were conducted. When the figures obtained 
were not nullified as a result of a prolonged and acrimonious controversy (1962 
and 1973) they were reluctantly accepted (1963) with a considerable degree of
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scepticism and inter-ethnic feelings of bitterness. Another census head count is 
being planned in Nigeria for 1991.
It is realised that an acceptable census result is o f paramount 
importance for Nigeria’s socio-politico-economic development. As the Nigerian 
Federal Minister of Economic Development put it as far back as 1962:
"It is our duty as a nation to see to it that we produce 
population census results which have been thoroughly 
conducted, verified and appraised, and therefore 
acceptable, without any shadow of doubt, to all 
governments of the world and to all international 
bodies such as the United Nations and its agencies, 
the World Bank, etc... The impressions of the 
manner in which a country conducts its affairs are 
one of the factors which earn for it the respect or 
disrespect of the rest of the world."12
Today, it is still difficult to say how many Nigerians^are in Nigeria? 
What is still being used for development purposes is an estimation or a projection 
of what is likely to be the population of Nigeria. Issues such as revenue 
allocation, state creation, taxation, posting of government functionaries, 
appointment, promotion and the sharing of the perquisites of the ’national cake’ 
are still being dangerously tied to the census. This has made census a highly 
sensitive and controversial issue. The Newspaper Press has not been left out of 
this controversy.
One of the political issues that arise from census figures in Nigeria 
has always been that it determines the relative numerical strength of each region 
or state in the federal legislature. Another issue is the revenue which each 
region/state collects from the central distributable pool.
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This situation derived from the nature o f the political formula of 
federal representation and the system of federal revenue allocation which became 
operative at independence. In the First Republic, the tripartite regional structures 
were central in the federal political life in that federal political representation and 
allocation of revenues were on regional basis. These, in turn, were respectively 
based wholly and partly on the 1953 census figures. Thus, the North, which was 
credited with over one-half of the total population, had over one-half - 174 - of 
the 312 federal legislative seats delimited on the basis of these figures. The East 
and the West were each allotted 73 and 62 seats and Lagos, three.13 It was 
hoped by the southern political leaders that the 1962-63 census would alter the 
balance in their favour and remove the foundation for Northern power at the 
federal level.
The political importance of census in domestic politics also derived 
from the system of federal revenue allocation which was partly based also on 
census figures. At independence, the regional governments were financially 
weaker than and depended on the Federal Government for a substantial 
proportion of their revenues. The extent of this financial dependence, as shown 
in Table 3, was such that the North derived between 68.0 and 79.0 per cent of its 
revenues from federal statutory payments in the six-year period between 1959/60 
and 1964/65. Similarly, the East derived between 61.8 and 64.5 per cent of its 
revenues from federal contributions while those of the West ranged between 69.0 
and 80.8 per cent during the same period.
This meant an annual average federal contribution of 71.6 per cent 
for the North, 63.7 per cent for the East, and 74.5 per cent for the West
j
Ii
f.
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respectively. The factor of population was, in addition to three others, a key 
determining principle used in making allocations particularly from the 
Distributable Pool. The latter was a federal coffer into which 30 per cent of 
revenues collected by the Federal Government from general import duties and 30 
per cent of those from mining rents and royalties were paid. Allocations from the 
Pool were in a fixed ratio of 40/95 to the North, 24/95 to the West, and 31/95 to 
the East. The bracketed figures in Table 3 show the Pool’s differential 
contributions to regional revenues. Thus, while the North derived between 30.3 
and 41.7 per cent of its total revenues from the Pool, that of the East ranged 
between 30.1 and 39.6 per cent and the West had between 14.2 and 33.7 per cent. 
This meant an annual average contribution of 2 ,1 .1  to the North, 36.0 per cent to 
the East, and 21.1 per cent to the West.14
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF REGIONAL REVENUES FROM FEDERAL STATUTORY 
PAYMENTS AND THE DISTRIBUTABLE POOL, 1959-1965
Year North West East
1959-60 68.6 (30.3) 78.2 (14.2) 63.1 (30.1)
1960-61 79.0 (39.6) 80.8 (21.0) 64.5 (39.6)
1961-62 76.1 (39.9) 70.9 (23.7) 64.1 (36.1)
1962-63 68.8 (41.7) 69.0 (23.6) 64.2 (36.7)
1963-64 68.8 (37.4) 74.0 (23.6) 61.8 (37.4)
1964-65 68.0 73.8 64.3
Source: O . Teriba, "Nigerian Revenue Allocation Experience 1952-1965: A  Study 
in Intergovernmental Fiscal and Financial Relations," Nigerian Journal of 
Economics and Social Studies 8 (November 1966), p. 375. The bracketed figures 
are derivations from the Distributable Pool and calculated from p.373.
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It was under this atmosphere that a two week nationwide population 
count began on May 13, 1962.
The conducting of censuses is on the concurrent legislative list, 
which means that the Federal and all the Regional governments have joint 
responsibility for it.15 A  federal census office was therefore created in Lagos in 
1961, separate and distinct from the Federal flffice of Statistics, and under the 
charge of the Federal Chief Census Officer. The Chief Federal Statistician and 
the Federal Office of Statistics were answerable to him for the census of the 
federal capital, Lagos.
Each regional Ministry of Economic Planning had its own census
-S’
office under the control of a Regional Census Officer (the Chief Statitician or
5*
Senior Statitician of the Region). The funds were, however, provided by theA
Federal Government. The Central Census Office co-ordinated federal and 
regional activities. Regular preliminary meetings of the Chief Census Officer with 
regional officials were held, from time to time, in Lagos and the regional 
headquarters in rotation, to plan the conduct of the census and to agree on the 
uniform data required and the techniques to be used. Within this broad 
framework, each Regional Census Office (and the Federal Office of Statistics in 
Lagos) planned and organised the census in its own area, processed and analysed 
the figures, and sent the results to the Central Census Office.
In the regions, Census supervisors and enumerators were specially 
trained. Propaganda campaigns were undertaken by census officers and leading 
politicians. Pamphlets and posters were printed and distributed to educate the 
community. Talks were broadcast on national and regional radio networks, and
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in many Nigerian languages, by public officials and ministers. Mass education 
programmes were officially sponsored and encouraged. Schools, colleges, 
universities, and churches were all associated with the census plans and their 
eventual execution.
The well orchestrated pre-enumeration publicity campaign and drive 
which began in late March, soon turned into a political campaign that over­
emphasized the links between population figures and the provision of amenities 
and political representation.
This politicised and created a number of problems which ultimately 
destroyed the purpose of the entire exercise. For as counting began, the Nigerian 
people resorted to a number of dishonest acts to boost the population of their 
communities and indirectly their regions for economic and political advantages. 
These acts, which were connived at or encouraged by the politicians, ranged from 
double counting to census migrations and successive discovery of ’isolated and 
forgotten’ villagers. The nationwide enumeration was completed amidst wide- 
ranging irregularities that left many wondering whether an accurate census was the 
goal.
By mid-July 1962, two months after the count, the final figures were 
in but as late as November, they were not released in spite of official promises to 
do so in early August. The delay in the release of the figures was so long that an 
opportunity was given for widespread rumours about attempts to inflate them; 
there was press speculation about political interference, and charges and counter­
charges between northern and southern politicians, who accused each other of
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trying to inflate the figures to ensure disproportionate political advantages in 
parliamentary representation.
As late as November 1962 it was alleged that census counts (which 
were supposed to end on 21 May) were still going on in Northern Nigeria. To this 
charge, an official of the Northern People’s Congress replied that 20,000 Ibos 
living in the Gboko Division of Northern Nigeria had been recounted because 
during the census they had travelled home to Eastern Nigeria to be counted, so 
as to swell the' population there to the disadvantage of Northern Nigeria.16 This 
was a clear admission of the double counting of 20,000 people in one division 
alone. Similar practices were alleged in many parts of the country. The Federal 
Census Officer stated in his report that:
"the figures recorded throughout the greater part of 
Eastern Nigeria during the present census are false 
and have been inflated. The figures for the five 
divisions of Awka, Brass, Degema, Eket, and Opobo, 
which have recorded increases of over 100 and 120 
per cent, can certainly be rejected out of hand."
On Western Nigeria, he reported that:
"of the 62 census districts ... provisional total figures 
are available for only five, due, in my view, to 
weakness in the census organisation in the 
Region."17
But he made no adverse comment of any kind in respect of Northern Nigeria.
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In December 1962 the Ministry of Information published and 
distributed to members of the Senate One Hundred Facts People Must Know, in 
which the 1962 census figures were given as: 22m in Northern Nigeria; 12m in 
Eastern Nigeria; and 8m in Western (including Midwestern) Nigeria, that is, a 
total of 42m. On 30 January 1963, however, the Daily Times, reporting that the 
Federal Cabinet had disagreed on the census figures and that the Chief Census 
Officer had been relieved of his post, quoted the final figures submitted to the 
Cabinet as: 30m in Northern Nigeria, 12m in Eastern Nigeria and 10m in Western 
(including Midwestern) Nigeria, that is, a total of 52m. Neither the official 
publication of December nor the unofficial report of January were denied, and 
this further convinced many southerners that northern politicians were continuing 
to inflate their own figures.
Finally in February 1963, 10 months after the count, the Prime 
Minister announced to the nation that the census results had been scrapped and 
that a new one would be conducted later in the year.18
The repeat performance produced no better or more acceptable 
result. For the 1963 census, a Central Census Board was set up, which consisted 
of representatives of the Federal and Regional Governments, under the 
chairmanship of the Prime Minister. Although each Region arranged the 
enumeration of its population, the Census Board provided census inspectors who 
were not natives of the Region to check the returns of the enumerators in each 
Region, by actually conducting a sample census. Also, a larger sum of money, 
£2.5m as against £1.5m, in 1962 was provided by the Federal Government, which 
financed an increased number of enumerators and inspectors. The period of
-179-
enumeration was shortened from 17 to 4 days - 5-8 November 1963, so as to 
reduce the chances of multiple counting.
The preliminary figures were released in February 1964, and finally 
accepted at a meeting of the National Economic Council in Lagos in May 1964. 
The population in Nigeria was put at 55.66m, made up of 29.78m in Northern 
Nigeria, 12.39m in Eastern Nigeria, 10.28m in Western Nigeria, 2.53m in 
Midwestern Nigeria and 675,000 in Lagos.19
These figures again evoked a great deal of controversy, no less than 
in 1962. The Eastern and Midwestern Governments rejected them out of hand, 
because they alleged that, as in 1962, the Northern figures were inflated to enable 
that Region to continue to dominate the politics of Nigeria. The Northern and 
Western Governments accepted the figures, and later, the Midwestern 
Government as well for the sake of national unity. But the Eastern Government 
challenged the acceptance, of the figures in the Federal Supreme Court and lost, 
on the technical ground that the Court had no authority to entertain the suit.
It is therefore obvious that no census of Nigeria has really enjoyed 
widespread acceptance, and the question, ’How many Nigerians?" still remains 
unanswered. Even today many Nigerian statisticians, administrators, and scholars 
are hesitant to accept the population total of 105m. The hope of the south 
breaking the predominance of the north at the Federal level through the census 
is still being dashed. On Sunday, April 22nd, 1990, one Major Gideon Gwarza 
Okar of the Nigerian Army nearly succeeded in overthrowing the military 
government of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida. Among other reasons for 
staging the coup, Major Okar claimed to be taking over
-180-
"on behalf of the patriotic and well-meaning peoples 
of the Middle Belt and the southern parts o f this 
country."
H e added,
"I wish to happily inform you of the successful ousting 
of the dictatorial, corrupt, drug baronish, evil men, 
sadistic, deceitful, homosexually-centred, —  
unpatriotic administration of General Ibrahim 
Badamosi Babangida."20
Reflecting the continued acrimonious north-south dichotomy in the 
country, Major Okar directed:
"In the light of all the above and in recognition of the 
negativeness of the aforementioned aristocratic 
factor, the overall progress of the Nigerian state, a 
temporary decision to excise the following states 
namely, Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano and Bauchi 
states from the Federal Republic of Nigeria comes 
into effect immediately... By the same token, all 
citizens of the five states already mentioned are 
temporarily suspended from all public and private 
offices in middle belt and southern parts of this 
country..."21
5.5 Press Reactions to the 1962/63 Census Crises
The Daily Times commented in an editorial that:
"there have been conflicting and disturbing
speculations concerning the national census held in 
May this year. These speculations do not inspire 
confidence. First, is the fact that six months after the 
census was held, the results have not been
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announced... The NCNC has expressed grave 
concern over this situation and the whole matter is to 
say the least disappointing."22
The newspaper then appealed to the Prime Minister to make a 
statement and reassure the nation that the census figures were not being 
mishandled.
When the 1962 census figures were finally rejected and eventually 
cancelled, theN Daily Times wrote in its editorial comment:
"three hearty cheers to the Nigerian Patriots who 
decided last Tuesday to scrap the 1962 census. They 
have taken a decision which we trust every citizen of 
the land will applaud. The history of the 1962 census 
is a long process of confusion, bitterness, mistrust and 
the violent exchange of words during which even civil 
servants came in for serious reprimand... The 
decision to nullify the census figures was taken, in the 
words of the official communique, ’because of the 
loss of confidence for the figures in the various 
Regions’. We need hardly emphasise the dangers we 
would have been exposed to both at home and 
abroad were we to insist on parading the discredited 
figures. We fully endorse the taking over by the 
Prime Minister of complete control of the new
• • 'T lcensus.
The Federal Government, Morning Post’s editor-in-chief, Aloba, 
known as the columnist Ebeneezer Williams, wrote a two-page spread early in 
March on why the 1962 census should be accepted. In it he described the 
Easterner:
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"The dynamism of the Easterner, the growing 
shortage of land, the love of adventure - all of these 
are nothing to be ashamed of; but all of them tend to 
send the Easterner away from home... It is not quite 
the same with other tribal groups."24
The political party and regional newspapers engaged in vehement 
personality attacks and name-calling in their reports, comments and feature 
articles. The Northern Region Government paper, the Citizen spoke of Ibos as 
being ’so industrious, migratory... impenetrably united tribesmen’. For the census 
they ’fly to the East, inflate the population there and return smiling to continue 
to thrive affluently in the North’. It proved to be most vicious of all the papers 
in its attacks. One cartoon portrayed Ibos as pidgin-speaking cannibals.25
The Morning Post was extremely sensitive to and hardly tolerant of 
any criticism of the government’s handling of the census. It condemned the 
NCNC/AG walk-out over the issue as ’rabble-rousing and violent expressions of... 
tribalistic sentiments’. It blamed the actions of the minister in charge on the 
’enemies of the government’ and maintained that the demand for his resignation 
was unjustifiable.26
The Northern Nigerian Government-owned paper, the Nigerian 
Citizen, declared itself ’convinced by the sincerity’ of the minister’s explanation 
and hence could not understand the NCNC furore over ’a simple and factual 
statement of census fraud’ in the East. It condemned the NCNC walk-out on the 
census as ’the most reckless [act of] political irresponsibility’. It cautioned the 
NCNC to be ’more reasonable, if not responsible’ with the reminder that the
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’NPC [with a working majority of 180 members in the Federal House] CAN GO  
IT ALONE".27
The Eastern Nigerian Regional Government owned paper, the 
Nigerian Outlook carried stereotypes of the North, particularly in the Editor-in- 
Chief Ajuluchuku’s ’Saturday Catechism’. H e spoke of the NPC leaders’ 
’childishness and amateurishness’ by which they showed ’they are not seasoned 
rulers of the North’. H e added:
"The North cannot afford a break-up of the Republic.
They have nothing up there to eat. They have little 
education. Their art of government is primitive.
They have no access to the sea."28
The Outlook inflated the political strength of the Ibos when it spoke 
of the Ibos...forced to defend themselves with stunning effectiveness against the 
nomadic herdsmen of the NPC. Ajuluchuku stated:
"I think the NPC leaders are merely bluffing. They 
know that Dr Okpara means to stand firm and that 
the East is ready to march, albeit constitutionally.
The North cannot afford a break-up of the 
Republic."29
On 7 March, the day of the cartoon portraying Ibos as cannibals, the 
Citizen published an ultimatum to Dr Okpara written by its political 
correspondent telling him to accept the census or withdraw the Ibos from the 
North.
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On March 24, the West African Pilot published an advertisement 
from the Ibo State Union asking Ibos to be vigilant. These attacks and 
pronouncements against the Ibos make it clear beyond all doubt that cthere is a 
well-laid plan and organised conspiracy to isolate, crush and totally annihilate or 
reduce all Ibos to the status of slaves in Nigeria.*30
The Daily Express disclosed unofficial figures reportedly scooped 
from ’reliable sources’ close to the Census Office. The figures were given as 11m 
for the North, 10.5m for the East, 8.5m for the West and 0.6m for Lagos. These 
were translated into 110 federal legislative seats for the North, 95 for the East, 85 
for the West, and 6 for Lagos. Far more important the paper jubilantly hinted at 
and described the political implications as entailing ’a major and inevitable 
realignment and readjustment’ in the relative power positions on the three 
regions. In this respect, it focused exclusively on the strengthened political 
position of the Western region.31
The NPC reacted to the Express disclosure by expressing doubts, 
among others, about the announced discovery of a village with 20,000 population 
in the East. The party called on the Eastern region Premier, Dr Okpara to clear 
the air on this grand discovery of eighty-seven day old described as a ’census 
hoax.’32
This immediately drew a strong reaction from the Pilot. It described 
the NPC act as a ’deliberate and savage attack on the integrity’ o f the NCNC  
leader. Apparently sensing some foul plays in the number game, the paper 
concluded that the NPC was stunned by the purported census figures and became 
enslaved by the fear that the North would lose its federal control. It attributed
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the NPC ’savage attack’ to this fear and viewed this as the first step in its attempt 
to challenge the census results. The paper remarked with quiet satisfaction that 
the
"NPC can now breathe easier and the rest of Nigeria 
will certainly feel more comfortable that the monolith 
has a thin edge on them - an edge that can be upset 
by serious politicking."33
The situation was further exacerbated by the presentations of the 
Minister in charge of the census. The resultant parliamentary fiasco over his 
presentations and the report of the Census Officer, evoked different reactions 
from the sampled newspapers. The reactions of the Pilot was an admixture of 
disappointment and bitterness. The paper was disappointed that a full 
parliamentary debate of an issue of such ’supreme national significance’ was not 
allowed after the ’outburst’ of the Census Minister and therefore commended the 
NCNC/AG walk-out. It was particularly bitter that the Minister did not justify ’the 
ugly epithets, the vicious language and grave charge ... [of census fraud against the 
Hast) with facts.’34
The second census count had its own brief but significant post­
enumeration moment of press speculation. This was spearheaded by the West 
African Pilot with the publication of the following unofficial figures: North, 15.7m; 
East, 13.6m; West, 10.8m; and the newly created Mid-West, 3.4m. The paper was 
particularly satisfied that these figures belied the previous claim o f 30m for the 
North. Neither could it resist gleefully noting that the East had made the most
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gain.35 The Census Board quickly denied the accuracy of these figures, which 
were identical to those reported by Reuters three weeks later.
This in turn, provoked a flurry of reports from the paper that alleges 
’some uneasiness’ among NPC Federal Ministers and ’sweeping changes’ in the 
Census Office.36 An immediate Northern reaction from the Nigerian Citizen 
took the Pilot and Reuters to task. The paper believed that it was not a mere 
coincidence that their reported figures were almost identical. It therefore 
surmised that the Reuter’s Nigerian correspondent must be an NCNCer and that 
his act was an NCNC attempt to ’rig the census’. Hence, it urged a full-scale and 
thorough official investigation of the source of Reuters’ ’semi-official figures.’37 
The significance of this exchange lies in providing the initial clue on 
subsequent newspapers’ line-up in the acrimonious inter-ethnic confrontation that 
ensued after the release of the official figures. It also defined the range of the 
Pilot, the Outlook, and the Citizen, the Post, the Express, the Times and other 
newspaper actors.
The Morning Post spoke on the implications of the 1963 second 
census count figures for the inter-ethnic balance of political power in the following 
words:
"... the main reason for the present controversy is that 
the Hausas are supremely delighted by the results of 
the census; the Yorubas are extremely happy about 
those results; but the Ibos are bitterly pained by the 
political implications of the outcome of the exercise.
Yet neither the happiness of the North nor the joys 
of the West nor the sorrows of the East have a 
foundation in the love of the nation or in the desire 
to rebuild it. Whatever the reception the census has 
received has been motivated by the hidden resolve to
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encourage discrimination (maybe to different 
degrees) in favour of ’my townsman’ in loyalty to the 
clan."38
Thereafter, the Post harped on the theme of catering to the welfare 
and happiness of the people. And donning the garb of an apostle of national 
unity and peace, the paper enjoined ’all men of goodwill’ to join hands towards 
that end. It soon realized, however, the falsity of its assertion about ’all the good 
that [had] been done by a frank exchange of opinions’ on the census. Instead, this 
exchange of questionable frankness had actually sown the ’seeds of hate, of 
political discord and regional disaffection’39 and fouled the political atmosphere 
with inter-ethnic recriminations, mistrust, and animosities. In this setting, the 
process of achieving the ’ultimate end’ of socio-economic improvements, national 
unity, and peace became stultified as the very foundation of political order 
became endangered.
5.6 Conclusion
The analysis in this thesis so far has illustrated the vulnerability of 
Nigeria’s highly politicised mass media to political passions in the country’s fragile 
political process.
When Nigeria attained independence in 1960, the mass media 
orientation shifted towards reinforcing tribal and sectional loyalties in preference 
to the goal of national unity, identity and integration. The press and other media
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became parochial in their content. They dedicated themselves to the articulation 
of particular ethnic interests.
When the Nigerian devastating crises of the 1960’s occurred, all the 
national press instantly took sides with their regional governments. Of course, 
such a course seems to be a natural tendency anywhere in the world. Failure to 
support one’s national or ethnic line of action, particularly during crisis situations 
may expose one to being labelled a saboteur and an unpatriotic element.
During the First Republic, the Federal Government press, the 
Morning Post was an uncompromising mouthpiece of the owner-govemment in 
all issues that concerned it. In the same vein, the regional government-owned 
newspapers, the Nigerian Outlook (East); the Sketch (West); the Nigerian Citizen 
(North) were also in favour of the owner-governments while the political party 
newspapers - the West African Pilot, the Tribune, the Express and the Service 
protected the interests of their owners.
The prevailing mood of the time was that even those newspapers 
which had some claims to being independent were expected to get involved in 
partisan politics. As a renowned, seasoned and leading journalist, Lateef Kayode 
Jakande put it:
"A foreign-owned newspaper which wants to continue 
in business for long must play ball with the ruling 
party or parties and with the government of the 
country where it is making a profit."40
In emphasising the structure of ownership and its impact as well as 
the role of the political conditions under which the media operate, Elaigwu notes:
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"... one realizes very often that the socio-political and 
ideological milieu in which media men operate colour 
their perspectives, and to some extent dictates the 
language used."41
From the Nigerian experience, several degrees or forms of 
government ownership of mass media can be identified. First, there is the direct 
government ownership which is effected in two ways:
a. by means of a limited liability company whose shares are subscribed 
wholly by the Government; and
b. by establishing papers directly administered and controlled by the 
Government Ministry of Information.
The first form of direct ownership is well illustrated by the Nigerian 
National press Limited, a printing and publishing company incorporated under the 
Companies Act in 1961. This Company prints and publishes the Morning Post 
(daily) and the Sunday Post. The second type of direct ownership is illustrated by 
the old Nigerian Review or its offshoots in the East and West. Another example 
is to be found in the establishment of the Daily Sketch in 1964 by the Government 
of Western Nigeria. For the first six months the Chief Information Officer of the 
Western Ministry of Information was also the General Manager of the newspaper, 
and the initial expenses of the newspaper were borne direct by the Regional 
Treasury. Later the Government was replaced by the Sketch Publishing Company 
Limited and now it is Sketch Press Ltd.
Another form of Government ownership or control is indirect. 
Again, there are two types of the indirect form. First, Government newspapers
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published by the statutory corporations. Notable examples are the Gaskiya 
Corporation of the North and the Information Service Corporation of the East. 
The second type of indirect control is by means of injecting capital into newspaper 
organisations from Government sources. In a public tribunal held in 1956, it was 
shown that a small part of £2,000,000 deposited by the Regional Government in 
a bank from the funds of the Regional Marketing Board was taken up as loans 
or investments to help meet the financial requirements of the West African Pilot. 
In 1962 during the public sitting of the Coker Inquiry, it was also shown that two 
newspaper groups received large sums of money as capital help indirectly from the 
funds of the Western Nigeria Marketing Board through the agency of the Western 
Government. One group was the Amalgamated Press of Nigeria, printers and 
publishers of the Daily Express and Sunday Express in which the Roy Thomson 
newspaper group of Britain and Canada had interests. The other group was the 
Allied Newspapers of Nigeria, publishers of the Service Magazine (formerly Daily 
Serviced Nigerian Tribune and Irohin Yoruba.
The analysis of the press behaviour on the census
controversy shows that the head count and population matters in Nigeria were 
primarily interpreted in political terms because of its importance as a key variable 
in the political formula of governance. It further shows that press behaviour 
towards the crisis was decisively shaped by the factor of ownership. This factor 
is expressed in terms of how the drastic alteration in the existent inter-ethnic 
balance of political power affected either the ethno-regional interests and political 
fortunes or corporate economic interests of their respective proprietors. In fact,
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it was this very consideration that determined the acceptance or rejection of the 
figure among the proprietors themselves.
Thus, the Nigerian Citizen, the Morning Post and the Daily Express 
were supportive of the figures because they favoured the political fortunes and 
ethno-regional interests of the NPC and the AG respectively. The three papers 
behaved differently toward the nullified 1962 figures. At that time, the Express 
fought hard to prevent the nullification simply because of the beneficial economic 
and political effects of the figures on Western Nigerian. Similarly, the Citizen and 
the Post were most vocal in their support for nullification because of the 
perceived adverse economic and political effects on the Northern region.
This consideration was equally evident in the case of the West 
African Pilot and the Nigerian Outlook. Both papers rejected the 1963 figures 
because they adversely affected the political fortunes and ethno-regional interests 
of the Eastern region. In the 1962 exercise, the Pilot was undisguisedly delighted 
about the revelations that the North, via the NPC, might lose its federal control. 
The same sentiments were noticeable in its reactions to the initial speculations 
regarding the 1964 returns. At that time, the paper even noted that the East had 
made the most gain in population which, given the weaker political position of the 
AG, would have enabled the NCNC to play a dominant federal role.
But it is equally evident from the above that press behaviour 
towards the crisis was significantly influenced also by the conflictive nature of 
inter-ethnic relationship. Although this derived from the shift in balance of 
political power and the perceived beneficial or adverse implications therefrom, it 
was exacerbated by the pre-existing strains in relationship. This factor was
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expressed with varied degree of explicitness but does not necessarily detract from 
its importance in shaping press behaviour.
The Citizen defined the issue in both political and inter-ethnic terms 
and its analysed behaviour focused exclusively on the strained and conflictive 
Hausa-Fulani/Ibo relationship. Its discussion consisted mainly of personal 
vilification of the Ibo leadership and blistering attack on everything that was Ibo. 
It depicted and cartooned the Ibos as a race of ’nudes and cannibals [with] recent 
or no historical background [and to whom] cow’s meat and clothes were 
foreign.’42
The Morning Post similarly showed clear indication of this factor in 
its scurrilous ethnic remarks, its choice of a truce text from the NPC pamphlet, 
and veiled attacks on the Ibo leadership. Likewise, the Outlook gave explicit 
indications of the influence of this factor. It most frequently described the Hausa- 
Fulani either as ’nomadic herdsmen and cattle-rearing’ or as ’feudalistic, backward 
looking desert tribesmen’. This frequent use of ethnic epithets was symptomatic 
of and had its origins in the strained inter-ethnic relationship and characterised 
the channels of political communication between the two via the NPC and the 
NCNC.43
These issues are directly related to the process of national 
integration insofar as they involve the distributive question of power and authority 
as well as their perquisites among the constituent groups in the society. This is 
particularly a fundamental question which may well determine the fate of national 
integration as well as the possibilities of socio-economic development and orderly 
political processes. That this question still represents a potential disintegrative
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force derives from the fact that it is often posed with the issue of equity. And, 
depending, upon how it is managed, the Nigerian State finds its legitimacy 
questioned each time and consequently it becomes weakened and/or threatened 
with disintegration, the most recent case of which occurred on April 22, 1990 
when the abortive coup leader announced that Nigeria was to be disintegrated. 
The partisan nature of the press and the tone of its language of political 
communication have not been helpful.
As the foregoing analysis shows, the press over-indulgence in 
reckless language of political communication not only exacerbates the political 
disagreement in Nigeria but also makes the process o f accommodation and 
compromise extremely difficult. It also bequeaths to the Nigerian political 
communication system a legacy of bitterness, which tends to perpetuate and widen 
the gulf of inter-ethnic animosities and mistrust and thereby stultifies the process 
of national integration. As a result of the press wars during the first republic, 
some regional and local governments enacted by-laws banning the circulation of 
some newspapers from their areas of jurisdiction. Vendors were killed or maimed 
for merchandising some papers and not others. Some newspaper executives were 
attacked and their properties destroyed; others sought police protection for 24 
hours daily.
Banning of newspapers was started by the Onitsha Urban County 
Council on 20 October 1965, when it forbade the hawking, buying or reading of 
seven papers with which it disagreed. A  few days later,Onitsha was followed by 
the Enugu Municipal Council, and within a fortnight several other local 
government councils had done the same. They included Port Harcourt, Aba and
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Owerri, all in Eastern Nigeria. The newspapers concerned were the Daily Times 
and Sunday Times, the Daily Express and Sunday Express, the Morning Post and 
Sunday Post. Daily Sketch and the Nigerian Citizen. Local government councils 
in Western Nigeria took similar actions. Led by the Ibadan City Council, they 
passed resolutions banning newspapers which favoured the party or alliance in 
control of the East. The papers this time included the West African Pilot and 
Daily Telegraph based in Lagos, the Nigerian Tribune and the Irohin Yoruba both 
of Ibadan. The Ibadan City Council went farther than its Onitsha or Enugu 
counterpart by attempting to forbid citizens in its area of jurisdiction tuning their 
radio sets to Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Service.44 The Nigerian Outlook and 
four other papers including the Daily Times were banned by the Ibadan City 
Council. Anyone caught reading the papers was liable to a £100 fine or six 
months in jail, and anyone caught listening to the Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting 
Service was liable to a £25 fine or two months in jail. The Ikare District Council 
Management Committee also prohibited four dailies and a weekly.45
The first military coup which took place in January 1966 rectified 
the situation, albeit temporarily, when the military government under General 
Ironsi instructed all the government authorities to lift all locally imposed bans on 
Nigerian newspapers and mass media. However, in January 1967 the military 
government of Eastern Nigeria excluded the Daily Times, the Sunday Times, the 
Morning Post and the Sunday Post from the Region, and in May the Western 
Government banned the Morning and Sunday Post.46
Reacting to the bans, Mr Peter Enahoro, writing in his column 
under the name of Peter Pan in the Daily Times of 8 November 1965, gave an
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opinion held by most journalists but one which very few dared to express publicly
in print. He said:
"The ban on the Daily Times, the Daily Express, the 
Morning Post and the Daily Sketch, is tantamount to 
censorship. It is a usurpation of the people’s free 
and independent right to read what literature they 
like. (I am paying no attention to the revenge in the 
West where certain copy cats have imitated the East.
This retaliation harms the image of the national 
newspapers. We are not the Press of the West and 
we don’t need this kind of aid).
"If Easterners feel genuinely aggrieved, it is not an 
official ban on newspapers that will show it, but an 
appreciable fall in circulation. There is no greater 
rebuke to a newspaper than cutting your supply from 
the vendor. You stop reading the paper and the 
paper misses your clientele. It may not go broke, but 
if sufficient numbers feel the same way and boycott 
the newspaper, then the pinch will soon become 
irritable somewhere upstairs in the boardroom.
During the June strike last year, a certain national 
newspaper suffered disastrous consequences from 
which it has never quite recovered. There was no 
ban. Democracy was not offended. But the people 
had spoken with their threepences..."47
Recurrent allegations of Press responsibility for violence must be 
treated with extreme caution however. It is true that, in a situation already 
inflamed with mistrust, a single report may have disastrous repercussions. Some 
people claim, for example, that the riots of late September and early October 
1966 were spontaneous outbreaks provoked by the news that Northerners had 
been killed in the Eastern Region; this information, first broadcast by Radio 
Cotonou and later relayed by Radio Kaduna, is alleged to have sent Northern 
mobs rampaging through the streets in search of revenge. Something of the kind 
may have happened but the case cannot be said to have been proved. Given the
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complexity of events which precede a civil disturbance it is difficult to locate a first 
cause, even assuming that it is realistic to think in such terms. The mass media 
are often singled out for blame simply because the message which they carry can 
be isolated from the multitude of informal communications taking place 
simultaneously. Only a detailed investigation of all the circumstances surrounding 
a particular incident can produce an accurate apportionment of responsibility. 
Very often such an investigation becomes completely impossible after the event. 
And, even if one could say with certainty that a specific disturbance was unleashed 
by a specific report, the finding might be of little real significance. Presumably the 
news of attacks on Northerners would have reached the urban centres of the 
North sooner or later, even if the mass media had attempted to suppress the 
information.
Of far greater practical importance is the question of the part 
played by the media in creating the general preconditions for violence within a 
society. Historians have made some progress in recording the development of the 
Nigerian Press during the century of its existence but little has been done to relate 
changing patterns of ownership, control, production, and distribution to the 
broader framework of the social environment.
A  country of the size and complexity of Nigeria will not stumble into 
unity by accident. Those in power must continually create and recreate a balance 
between interests which are in chronic disequilibrium. They operate at a grave 
disadvantage unless they are able to monitor responses to earlier measures and 
anticipate future causes of stress. Naturally they have other sources of intelligence
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but the Press should represent an important element in a genuinely reciprocal
communications flow.
The Press can contribute to national unity or disunity, socio-politico-
economic stability or instability, social integration or disintegration through its
coverage of national issues and events.
The power of the pen is a reality but ought not to be exaggerated.
Because papers are usually purchased by those in sympathy with their views, a
great deal of their energy is devoted to preaching to the converted, while their
influence upon uncommitted or hostile readers is far less dramatic than they
would have us believe. Most people would agree with the conclusion of the Royal
Commission on the British Press that:
"...it is not possible for a newspaper or group of 
newspapers to swing public opinion overnight in any 
particular direction, whether by tendentious 
presentation of news or by direct expressions of 
opinions. The influence of the Press is more gradual 
and takes the form of a subtle conditioning of 
opinion to the acceptance or rejection of particular 
approaches to social and political problems."48
Whatever the pros and cons of the press behaviour, it cannot be 
denied that the structure of mass media ownership has had some impact on the 
Nigerian political communications. Ownership also influences, to a great extent, 
the thinking of newspaper editors.
The following dialogue between two newspaper giants, one, a 
southerner and the other, a northerner, will show clearly that different Nigerian 
ethnic groups, had been thinking differently even before independence; and this 
diametrically opposed thinking has continued till today. In 1943, there was a West
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African press delegation to London. Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, founder and editor-in- 
Chief of the West African Pilot and Alhaji Abubakar Imam, then Editor of 
GASKIYA TA FI KWABO. were members of the delegation among others. 
While in the boat that took them to London, Dr Azikiwe drew up a memorandum  
on post-war reforms to which a few of the delegates, excluding Malam Abubakar 
Imam, appended their signatures.
When the memorandum was published in the West African Pilot 
it attracted considerable interest and support from Nigerian progressives, and 
when these groups learnt that Malam Abubakar Imam did not sign the document, 
he met with individual and press hostility on his return to Nigeria.
In order to clear the air, Malam Abubakar Imam published the 
memorandum in his paper - the Gaskiva Ta Fi Kwabo. and his reasons for 
refusing to sign it. This provided the first opportunity for the readers to know 
that Nigeria was far from being one country.
Dr Azikiwe, in that memorandum, had suggested two basic stages 
for the handover of power from the British to Nigerians.
By 1953, he said, Nigeria should be a self-governing territory and 
five years later (1958) it should be completely independent. This meant, said 
Malam Abubakar Imam, that all whitemen would leave Nigeria by that time.
Since he was a press delegate representing Northern Nigeria, he did 
not feel mandated by the Northerners to accept such a resolution. H e wrote "You 
[Northerners] never told us that you are worried by the whitemen living in this 
country, so that I should sign and say that you want them to go after 15 years".
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"However", he continued, "you ought to know, if we send away the 
’red’ whitemen surely we will get ’black’ whitemen [southerners] who went to 
England and learnt that kind of work done by the ’red’ whitemen. If we haven’t 
got one here in the North, we shall have to seek one in the South".
Thus, the whole attitude of the North at that time towards the 
independence of this country stemmed from the ideas expressed by this powerful 
individual who influenced Northern thinking and political awareness through his 
popular paper, Gaskiva Ta Fi Kwabo.
It is not surprising therefore that when Chief Anthony Enahoro, 
then an Action Group Member of Parliament, tabled a motion in 1953, that 
Nigeria demanded independence in 1956, two years earlier than Zik proposed in 
1943, the North rejected it outright, proposing that independence should come "as 
soon as practicable".
Regarding the freedom of the press, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe wrote in 
his memorandum that Nigerians should be allowed to install printing presses 
without obtaining permission to print their newspapers, and write what they like 
in them, so long as they do not break the law.
Malam Imam’s reply to this was short and cryptic. H e wrote:
"No one up here in the North ever complained to us
that the whitemen or government had prevented him
from buying a printing press."
On minimum wages, Dr Azikiwe suggested in his memorandum that 
every labourer ought to receive a salary of not less than £6.00 per month: a skilled
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and literate worker, who knows his job, should receive not less than £6.00 a 
month.
Again, Malam Imam had an answer to this. H e wrote: "This 
suggestion is correct. We all want it so. We may even be glad if it were more 
than £6.00".
"But reflect carefully", he wrote: "With us here in the North, at the 
moment, a person receiving a salary of £6 a month is among the highly ranked 
workers.
"Well, if a labourer is raised to £6 the highly ranked workers will 
without doubt, say they want salaries to be raise to £15, up to £20.00.
"The reason is because the office workers or highly ranked workers, 
will most probably, not agree to see a labourer who sweeps their offices receiving 
£6, and they themselves being paid £2.00, £3.00, etc.
"You should also note that for every salaried worker you come 
across, there are 100 who receive no salaries.
"Well, are we to increase the taxes of the non-salaried workers so 
that the salaried may have increases in their pays?
"And would the farmer agree to be pinned down labouring for one
year on the field so as to sell his produce for £3.00 whereas the labourer gets
£6.00 in one month."49
Each group or owner in the media protects its group interests by 
carrying news in favour of its owners and/or against other groups.
More recent examples of this trend are given in the analysis of the
press behaviour on the coverage of election campaigns in Nigeria’s Second
Republic, but first an examination of the Nigerian press under the military.
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CHAPTER 6
NIGERIAN POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS UNDER MILITARY
REGIMES
Introduction
This chapter examines the impact of mass media ownership on 
Nigerian political communications under military rule. It is possible to argue 
about ’what is political’1 in the use of the press under the military since during 
such periods, the constitution is suspended, political parties are abolished, houses 
of parliament are dissolved and democratically elected representatives o f the 
people are sacked. But the fact that Nigeria has been ruled by soldiers for more 
than twenty years in the thirty years existence of the country as an independent 
nation cannot be overlooked. More importantly the Nigerian press under the 
military provided a veiy good example of ’Authoritarian-Government-promotional’ 
media philosophy in which there is government monopoly and control of the mass 
media.
During the period under review, there was a noticeable proliferation 
of national mass media, making the formal channels of communication 
overwhelmingly owned by government. There was near complete government 
control of all instruments of mass communication. The major newspapers, all 
radio and television stations, the News Agency of Nigeria, and the extensive 
government information service - all were under official control and directly 
accountable to the military regimes. Even the ’independent’ newspapers were 
subjected to direct interference. In such a situation, it will be interesting to know
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what happens in a total ownership, complete monopoly and overwhelmingly direct 
control of the channels of communication.
Equally important is the fact that since the military rules by decrees
and/or edicts and in the absence of a democratically elected parliament, the mass
media were found not only performing the functions of interest articulation,
interest aggregation, political socialization and political communications, but they
were also playing the role of a deliberative assembly reflecting the feelings of the
people, their peccadilloes, their likes and dislikes of government policies and
actions and the conduct of the people who run the government. Government
leaders themselves were looking . to the mass media as instruments of tension
management and government media in particular were expected to perform the
primary function of system maintenance through the reporting of public, ethnic,
social, political, economic and a host of other national issues in a non-
controversial tone. The Press under this section is treated from the first* coming
of the military on January 15, 1966 to the fifth military rule under Babangida, 
(August, 1985 to 1992?)
6.1 The First Coming of the Military: The Ironsi Regime
A  military coup d’etat - the sudden and illegal replacement of a 
country’s legitimate government through the use or threat of violence by a small 
group of conspirators drawn from within the armed forces - took place in Nigeria 
for the first time on January 15, 1966. Since then, the country has been faced 
with the seeming inevitability of military coups occurring and recurring as if there 
is no end in sight. As at 1990, Nigeria has recorded five known coups and three
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announced abortive coups with increasing rumours of coups and demand for 
coups.2
The January 15,1966 coup marked the demise of the First Republic 
in Nigeria and the beginning of military intervention in Nigerian government and 
politics. Many leading politicians, political leaders of the First Republic and some 
military officers were killed in the coup.3 General Ironsi became the new head 
of state although the coup had been planned and executed by some junior army 
officers mainly the majors.
Led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna ty.zeogwu, the reasons given for 
staging the coup included the extreme tribalism, nepotism, regionalism and high 
level corruption in the country:
"Our enemies are the political profiteers, the 
swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek 
bribes and demand 10 per cent, those that seek to 
keep the country permanently divided so that they 
can remain in office as Ministers and VIPS at least, 
the tribalists, the nepotists... those that have 
corrupted our society..."4
However, this does not imply that within the military organisation, 
there were no discontents among the rank and file. As much as the young army 
officers wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, trade 
unions and the whole clumsy apparatus of federal system, they hated their top 
ranking army officers. What were seen as ills of Nigerian society were all 
embracing from the civilian political systems to her military organisation.
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The discontent and tribalism within the army was voiced by Major 
Okafor, who was said to have been buried alive during the counter-coup. He, 
once, feared that he would be dismissed from the army by Brigadier Z. Maimalari 
because he punished a ’Northern Nigeria soldier who went absent without leave’. 
Also Major Anuforo condemned Colonel Yakubu Pam, the Adjutant General and 
a Northerner from Jos for being brutal to TIV rioters of Northern Nigeria while 
he was in charge of operations there, as commander of the Third Battalion ... an 
officer who had caused the death of so many people should be punished.5
Huntington’s explanation of military intervention in 
domestic politics appears applicable to the Nigerian situation since 1966. From h is  
viewpoint, military interventions in developing countries are only one specific 
manifestation of general politicization of social forces and institutions. Societies 
where most social forces and institutions are highly politicised have political clergy, 
political universities, political bureaucracies, political labour unions, political 
corporations and of course political armed forces. All these specialised groups 
tend to become involved both in political issues which affect their particular 
interest or groups and also issues which affect society as a whole. Huntington’s 
contention is that:
"Military explanations do not explain military 
interventions and that the most important causes of 
military intervention in politics are not military but 
political."6
By 1966, it had become difficult for the Nigerian army to be 
completely immune from all the centrifugal forces in the Nigerian society. There
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were ethnic and regional conflicts, civil violence, census controversy, election 
crises, politicisation of recruitment and promotion in the army, tribalism, socio­
politico-economic inequalities - all of which provided the immediate stimulus for 
the January 1966 coup.7
The Major’s coup attempt, to be sure, was initially popular with the 
majority of Nigerians. However, because it was not guided by a popular peoples’ 
organisation or anchored directly on their aspirations, its popularity was soon 
eroded by the dynamics of the increasingly bitter in tr a -e lite  feud as well as 
by ethnic and regional contradictions in the polity. There was no doubt that the 
officers had good intentions about the need to alter the nature of Nigerian politics 
and held strong patriotic sentiments, in spite of what some people might think 
about them. Rather than view the defeat of the Majors and the eventual 
ascension to power of General Ironsi as part of an initial and deliberate so-called 
’Ibo conspiracy’ at national hegemony, it should be stated that they were victims 
of their own incorrect strategy. As Ademoyega’s first hand account shows, they 
wished to replace a system of ethnic and regional preferment with a meritocratic 
system. They expected to solve problems for the people and to win their support 
but had no direct contact with them.8
The coup planners got control of the North but they failed to get 
control of some Southern parts of Nigeria hence Nzeogwu was later persuaded to 
stop further action. Dr Azikiwe who was then the country’s president was away 
overseas for medical treatment. This led to Nwafor Orizu, Acting President, 
making a nationwide broadcast on 16th January, 1966 in which he announced the 
unanimous decision of the Council of Ministers to hand over the country’s
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administration to the armed forces of the Republic with immediate effect and 
then called on the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, General 
Aguyi Ironsi to make a statement to the nation.
General Ironsi’s first step taken on coming to power was the 
suspension of the legislative and executive bodies at the centre (in Lagos) and in 
the regions.9 Under Decree N o.l, 1966, the new Federal Military Government 
acquired the ’power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever.’ Federal laws 
attained expression in decrees while state laws were called edicts.
Political communications under the military have been without a 
clear picture and the press has suffered untold hardship, harassment, and banning 
through various decrees promulgated by the military juntas. Immediately after the 
coup of January 15th 1966, there were debates as to what would now be the role 
of the press since the military regime was being witnessed for the first time. Prior 
to that period, the Nigerian press had taken active part in nationalist activities, 
attainment of independence, census controversy, election campaigns and a host 
of other national and international issues.
One of the greatest problems Ironsi had was that of communication 
and this plagued him throughout his tenure of office. Gowon was later to have 
the same problem of communication when the press started a series of attacks on 
his lieutenants on questions of public morality, probity and rectitude. Gowon’s 
nine years in office were later to be described as nine years of misrule and failure.
As I noted earlier, some local councils and regional governments 
banned the circulations of certain newspapers and forbade listening to certain
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broadcasting stations prior to the January 1966 coup. As a result, the press
became dull and less critical on national issues of paramount importance.
However, General Ironsi on coming to power declared null and void various
regional laws banning the circulation of newspapers. By promulgating decree
No.2 of 1966, General Ironsi not only made it free for newspapers to circulate
anywhere in Nigeria but he also vested the regulation of the activities of the
newspapers on the federal military government:
"Any person who after the coming into force of this 
Decree, whether alone or with any other person, and 
whether as a member of a municipal authority or 
otherwise, does anything calculated to prevent or 
restrict the distribution or general sale of any 
newspaper in any part of Nigeria shall be guilty of an 
offence and be liable on conviction to a fine not 
exceeding £500 or to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding three years, or both."10
This was a welcome step as far as the newspapers and other mass media 
practitioners were concerned.
With this decree, the press could now start to comment on national 
issues as it had before the military take-over. The first press comment on 
government action and public morality came with the Daily Times comments 
criticising the military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lt.Col. Ojukwu over two 
appointments. Lieutenant Colonel Emeka Odumegwu Qukwu had appointed his 
father to membership of two public corporations, appointments which the Daily 
Times believed were one too many. When the Press was becoming too critical of 
the government actions, the federal military government reacted with the harsh 
Defamatory and Offensive Publications Decree Number 44 of 1966. This decree
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was aimed at publications - newspapers, leaflets, periodicals, or posters - that 
could provoke disaffection in any section of the community. A  publisher could 
be arrested, without warrant, by any police officer or any member of the armed 
forces in uniform. The author of the offending publication could be fined a 
maximum of £50 or sent to jail for three months or both. The court was also 
empowered to confiscate the offending material.
This measure did not stop the press from making unfavourable 
comments on government activities and challenging military decisions. In 
particular, the Nigerian Citizen, which had just changed its name to New Nigerian. 
gave expressions to the feelings in the North that the January 1966 coup was an 
Ibo coup. Under this situation, there was a communication gap between the 
military rulers and the people and the press which could have been used to 
explain policies of the government to the people was noten good terms with the 
military authorities. For example, Ironsi could not explain his indecision on what 
to do with the coup plotters. The Northerners who initially welcomed the coup, 
later saw the coup plotters as murderers while the Southerners saw them as 
heroes. Trying the plotters legally would have meant the pleasing of the North 
and the displeasing of the South. Ironsi detained them instead. The North 
suspected Ironsi as being part of the coup while the South saw him as trying to 
betray the interests of the January coup plotters.
On May 24, 1966, General Ironsi announced his programme to 
restructure the country, by his Decree No.34, 1966 which made Nigeria a unitary 
state:
"Nigeria shall on the 24th May, 1966... cease to be a 
federation and shall accordingly as from that day be
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a republic by the name of the Republic of 
Nigeria,consisting of the whole territory which 
immediately before that day was comprised in a 
federation."11
With this unification Decree, came also the move to rotate civil servants,Nigerian 
federal status was abolished and converted to a unitary form of government. 
Regions were abolished and constituted into groups of provinces under the control 
of the Military Governors appointed by the National Military Government. All 
the offices in the civil service of the Republic (except the office of the Attorney 
General of the Republic and group of provinces) became offices in a single 
service - the National Public Service.
All this infuriated the Northerners who regarded these moves as an 
attempt to subject them to the more educated Southerners.
So the Northerners decided to take revenge. Many Ibos living in the 
North were massacred within a month of the new Decree. The fury thus 
unleashed could be contained only after the Federal Military Governor’s Office 
had given definite assurances that the Unification Decree was a temporary 
measure taken by the miliary regime for the sake of a more convenient 
administration of the country and that,a s soon as the army regime had achieved 
its purpose, the people would be allowed to make their own decision in a 
referendum.
In July 1966, Major General Ironsi embarked on another plan 
designed to rotate the Military Governors. H e was still considering the matter, 
when he was overthrown in the counter-coup of July 29, 1966. In that coup Lt.
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Colonel Fajuyi^Major General Ironsi and many Ibo officers lost their lives. Fajuyi 
was then Governor of Western Nigeria.
Lt. Colonel Gowon then assumed control and, within a few days, 
restored order in the army. In August 1966, he revoked the Unification Decree, 
and the Regions regained the status they had before the May 1966 Decree.
After the July coup, while the country was gradually settling down, 
another wave of violence erupted in the North and many Ibos were attacked and 
killed. The people of Eastern Nigeria were so incensed by these outrages that 
they decided to recall all their people from the various Regions. Most trooped 
back. Many Northerners living in the East were also manhandled and some were 
killed in retaliation. That was the beginning of the drift to total separation which 
eventually, in May 1967, led Eastern Nigeria to declare secession.
6.2 The Press Under the Second Coming of the Military: The Gowon Era
As noted earlier, the nature of the January 1966 coup was very
exacerbated the
suspicious and this y  . . sense of distrust and ethnic hatred and chauvinism
among many people and institutions including the army. In fact, the Northern 
Army Officers were so bitter about the coup and the subsequent steps of General 
Ironsi that they no longer trusted the southerners especially the Ibo and even the 
Yoruba. The Northern Army officers were not ready to take the leadership of the 
Yoruba or the Ibo. The Northern officers also wanted secession.12
To forestall any possible secession, the Federal Government under 
Lt Colonel Gowon created twelve states out of the existing Regions. Lt. Colonel 
Gowon felt that the fears nurtured by the minority tribes would be allayed by the
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creation of states and that the grievances of the Southern parties over the regional 
imbalance would be removed. This gesture failed to impress the Eastern 
Government, and three days later, on May 30, 1967, it made its perilous 
declaration of secession.
The Federal Government was not prepared to accept this 
encroachment on the country’s territorial integrity. There was a war of words 
followed by a war of nerves, which ultimately developed into a full-scale war that 
went on for about two and a half years. In January 1970, the rebellion was finally 
crushed and ended in the surrender of the Biafran Army under the leadership of 
Lt. Col. Effiong.
Two main sources of the sour relationships between Ojukwu and 
Gowon could be identified. First was Col. Ojukwu’s claim that as a member of the 
supreme military council, he was not consulted for the appointment of Lt. Col. 
Gowon as the Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Head 
of State after the assassination of General Ironsi. The second was Col. Ojukwu’s 
insistence that then (now late) Brigadier Ogundipe was the next most senior army 
officer and should succeed Ironsi as Nigeria’s Head of State and Government. It 
was later learnt that the Northern junior army officers rejected the leadership of 
Brigadier Ogundipe or that of any senior military officer from the south.
When the civil war eventually broke out, there were peace moves 
that failed - Aburi talks of 1967 prior to the war, Kampala talks of May 1968 and 
Addis Ababa move of August 1968. The Organisation of African Unity passed a 
resolution supporting one Nigeria but this was rejected by ’Biafra’. Five countries 
later recognised ’Biafra’ as a sovereign state during the war - Gabon, Ivory Coast,
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Zambia, Tanzania and Haiti. About 3,000 people died in the war while the 
Federal Government spent about N600m to prosecute the war.
The role of the Nigerian press and the influence of mass media 
ownership on political communication can be seen from the following exchanges 
of the Nigerian military rulers at the Aburi meeting (referred to earlier) convened 
to find solutions to the civil war. The degree of the involvement of the Nigerian 
press and its partisan stance in Nigeria’s fragile political process during that 
critical period could also be deduced:
Lt.Col. Gowon: On the Government Information Media I think all
the Government Information Media in the country have done 
terribly bad. Emeka would say the New Nigerian has been very 
unkind to the East.
Lt.Col. Ojukwu: And the Post which I pay for.
Lt.Col. Gowon: All the other information media have done a lot.
When the Information Media in a country completely closed their 
eyes to what was happening, I think it is a dangerous thing. 
Major Johnson: Let us agree it is the situation.
Lt.Col. Ejoor: All of them have committed one crime or the other. 
Lt.Col. Hassan: The Outlook is the worst of them.
Lt.Col. Ojukwu: The Outlook is not the worst, the Post which we all in 
fact pay for is the worst followed closely by the New  
Nigerian.
Mr T. Omo-Bare: Let us make a general statement on all of them,
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no distinction.
Lt.Col. Gowon: I think we agreed that all Government Information
Media should desist from making inflammatory publications that 
would worsen the situation in the country.13
It was the general belief of the Nigerian militaiy regimes that 
unrestricted circulation of newspapers could constitute a danger to their 
governance*Hence they promulgated all kinds of decrees to gag the press. These 
decrees however, could not stop the press from commenting on many of the 
wrong-doings under the military. The Gowon era provides a good example of 
open confrontation between the press and military rulers and this eventually 
contributed to the fall of Gowon in 1975. In the words of Panter-Brick:
"The press played a vital role in preparing the ground 
for removing Gowon’s government, through reporting 
views of the government’s opposers and showing its 
own dissatisfaction. This was especially true of the 
New Nigerian (before its nationalization by the 
federal government) in spite of the fact that it was 
owned by governments of six northern states."14
A  manifestation of the press-government relationship under Gowon can be 
depicted through selected Nigerian newspaper headlines of the period such as the 
following: ’ADEBAYO BANS MORNING STAR AND IMOLE OW URO ’ (Daily 
Times 1, 1967); ’REPORTERS/CAMERAMEN O RDERED OUT OF 
GOW ON’S PLANE’ fMorning Post August 13, 1969); ’POLICE SWOOP ON  
TIMES OFFICE’ fNew Nigerian and Nigerian Observer. July 11,1969); ’ARM ED
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POLICEMEN BESIEGE TIMES OFFICE’, TIM ES PRESS SEALED OFF’ 
(Daily Sketch. September 7, 1967); ’EDITOR DETAINED’ (Daily Sketch 
September 12, 1969); ’AYO A D ED U N  ... DETAINED BY ARM Y CAPTAIN’ 
(Daily Sketch. September 13, 1970); ’NEW  NIGERIAN EDITOR ARRESTED’ 
(New Nigerian. April 10, 1970); ’TRIBUNE OFFICE SEARCHED’ (Daily 
Times. December 5, 1972); etc.
In 1967, the federal military government under Gowon promulgated 
the Newspapers Prohibition of Circulation Decree Number 17 to prohibit the free 
circulation of newspapers in Nigeria. The decree made the following provisions:
Whereas the Head of the Federal Military 
Government if satisfied that the unrestricted 
circulation in Nigeria of a newspaper is or may be 
detrimental to the interest of the Federation or of 
any state thereof, he may bij order... prohibit the 
circulation in the Federation or in any state thereof 
as the case may require, of any newspaper; and 
unless any other period is prescribed in the order, the 
prohibition shall continue for a period of twelve 
months unless sooner revoked or extended, as the 
case may require.
The penalty for non-compliance with the above Provisions of the 
decree includes the following:
(a) A  fine of not less than fifty pounds or not more than one hundred pounds, 
or an imprisonment of not less than six months for an individual offender. 
If he commits the offence twice "the penalty shall be double that 
prescribed for a first offender."
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(b) For any other person, there shall be a fine of not less than five hundred 
pounds or not more than one thousand pounds.15
The first victim of the decree was the New Breed Magazine whose 
publications and circulation were banned. The magazine was published by the 
Newbreed Organization of Lagos, Nigeria but printed in London. Security men 
seized 50,000 copies of the magazine as they arrived at Lagos airport. The 
publisher/editor and two other staff writers were called in for the inevitable "chat" 
(convenient euphemism for preventive detention) by the military authorities.
The mid-June 1978 issue of the same magazine was seized by police. 
When the editor-in-chief, Chris Okolie, called for the release of the seized 
magazines, a halt to airport searches of his staff and an end to censorship of their 
publications including unnecessary visits to the premises of the organization and 
residences of its editorial staff, the government reacted by banning the magazine 
for two years.
Earlier in 1967, the Western Nigerian regional government headed 
by Adeyinka Adebayo but also under Gowon complained that the Morning Post 
was misrepresenting facts about the Western State. Consequently Adebayo 
imposed a ban on the circulation of the Morning Post within the jurisdiction of the 
former region. The ban was, however, lifted after two months.
Other decrees promulgated under Gowon which directly and/or 
indirectly affected the press and Nigerian political communications were the 
Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree Number 24 and the Trade 
Dispute Decree Number 53, both of 1967. These decrees were meant among
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other purposes, to keep the soldiers in power with little or no questioning of their 
policies, to help maintain an atmosphere in which a war could be executed with 
minimal difficulty and to maintain if not a good image for the soldiers, at least not 
to make them appear worse than they actually were.
The Police (Special Powers) Decree 24 of 1967 empowered the 
Inspector General of Police and the Army Chief of Staff to detain without trial 
and for an indefinite period any one considered to be a ’security risk’. This 
decree provided a pretext for extensive abuse of power as people’s liberties were 
wantonly reduced. The decree was extensively used to muzzle opinions which the 
authorities considered unfavourable. Between January 1973 and June 1975, 
application of Decree 24 of 1967 resulted in 44 recorded cases of arbitrary arrests, 
detention and a few actual cases of physical abuse of journalists and those who 
write in papers.16
Notable among the arrests and detentions were those of the editor 
of the Renaissance Henry Onyedike, and his literary correspondent, Agwu 
Okpanku, for publishing an article titled ’Killing Biafra’. The article commented 
on the decree that changed the name of the Bight of Biafra into the Bight of 
Benin. The two men were not only jailed without trial but were also deprived of 
their salaries while in detention.
As one observer pointed out, ’it symbolized the highest 
concentration in one hand of all the paraphernalia of governmental powers which 
embrace the legislative, the executive and the judicial, and that one hand was the 
executive as personified by the Supreme Military Council’. For good measure, 
and to tighten its grip on ’trouble makers’, the government passed the Trade
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Dispute Decree Number 53 of 1967. It forbade the press to publish anything that 
’is likely to cause public alarm or industrial unrest’. Any infringement could earn 
the offender a prison term of three years.
By 1973 General Gowon, though still declaring the intention of the 
military to return to their barracks by 1976, had shifted his ground. H e said that 
only an administration which included the military could guarantee political 
stability, and he suggested a ’diarchy’ civilian-military government to succeed the 
soldiers.
By 1974 bitterness between the press and the military was at a peak. 
The Christian Science Monitor news service reported: ’A new crisis of confidence
t r t
has developed between the Nigerian police and the Press.’
The soldiers who had come to power to eliminate corruption were 
now as crooked as the civilians they had ousted - more crooked, for Nigeria’s oil 
wealth was beginning to flow, bringing in wealth undreamed of by any other Black 
State.
The Nigerian mass media left no stone unturned in ensuring that all 
cases of corruption, mismanagement and abuse of office under Gowon were 
reported. One newspaper alleged that soldiers who had joined the army virtual 
paupers had in a few years become millionaires. With much of the oil revenue 
going on major public works projects, thousands of millions of dollars were spent 
importing building materials like cement. Such international deals eased the way 
for illicit fortunes to be acquired outside of the country - the ’just in case money’ - 
as it is known in Africa.
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Another newspaper spoke of Vast wealth hidden abroad, especially 
w
in Swiss banks’. The military high command reacted to these attacks by warning 
the press to behave or face the consequences.
Alhadji Kam Salem, Inspector General of Police, told a press
conference:
"The press has recently mounted a campaign against 
the Federal Government, putting pressure on it to 
institute an inquiry into the conduct of certain 
government functionaries and levelling accusations 
against individuals. The Federal Government will no 
longer tolerate press indiscipline and calculated 
attempts to undermine its authority. It may be forced 
to take drastic and unpleasant measures to curb the 
excess of the press." ^
The Nigerian Tribune challenged the government to substantiate its 
charge that the press had attempted to blackmail the authorities by publishing 
misleading stories; what the press was doing, said the Tribune was mounting a 
campaign against corruption in line with the declared policy of the government.
Recalling that the rooting out of corruption had been the principal 
reason why the military had seized power, the Tribune said:
"It will be damaging to the reputation and good name 
of the Federal Military Government if, instead of 
encouraging the press to expose this evil, it imposes 
restrictions on the freedom of the press and the 
personal liberty of journalists." ^
Also under Gowon military rule was what has now become known 
as the ’Amakiri Case’. It involved a press report that teachers throughout the
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Rivers State were threatening to resign en masse if their working conditions were 
not examined. On July 30, 1973, the Nigerian Observer, under the headline 
"Rivers Teachers On The War Path", published a report that dealt with school 
teachers’ grievances in Rivers State. The report was filed by Minere Amakiri, the 
paper’s correspondent in Port Harcourt, capital of Rivers State. Coincidentally, 
it was published on the 31st birthday of the state military governor, Alfred Diette- 
Spiff. Amakiri was promptly arrested and detained for 27 hours in the guard room 
of State House, Port Harcourt, where his hair and beard were shaved off and he 
was given 24 strokes with a cane. Official explanation that the story embarrassed 
the governor because it coincided with his birthday celebration seemed puerile. 
Nobody ever/^9*,mtfiat the published story was false.
Every newspaperman in the country, every journalists’ association, 
the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association, the Guild of Editors, the Association of 
Radio and Television Journalists (all Government employees) demanded action.
’Amakiri: Press Fury on the Rise’, said a Daily Express headline. 
’We Call For Freedom, Justice’, said a story in the Daily Times. ’The Port 
Harcourt Scandal’, said the leading article in the Nigerian Observer, which 
describing the incident as ’jungle-style manhandling’ commented:
"It amounts no less to a primitive attempt to muzzle 
the truth and compromise an elemental right - the 
freedom of the press."
For this transgression, he was clean shaven and caned. Encouraged by other 
media men, the correspondent Minere Amakiri, sued and was in 1974 awarded 
N10,750 in damages. The presiding judge reminded the defendants that the
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Fundamental Human Rights clause in the 1963 Constitution was still intact. T h e  
meaning of the rule of law in practical terms’, he said, ’is that no person is beyond 
the law while those concerned with the law should act with the fear of God.’
The Amakiri case turned into a watershed in government-press 
relations. But it did nothing to diminish the ardour for confrontation among law 
enforcement agents. Between 1973 and 1975, according to one count, there were 
50 cases of government harassment of journalists."
Nineteen seventy four was a bad year for editors and reporters. On 
January 31, a correspondent of the New Nigerian, a government newspaper. 
David Atalase, was arrested for reporting$vtfprisoners had escaped from a local 
prison. On March 18, a managing editor of the New Nigerian. Tukur Uthman, 
was invited to the Supreme Headquarters to disclose the source of a story that 
reported the suspension of two senior army officers. Another example is the 
detention, for about a week, of a Daily Times reporter, Chinaka Finecountry, for 
the false news that a marijuana pedlar was in Nigeria.
The following day, March 19, the acting editor of the Daily Sketch. 
a state government paper, Emmanuel Olofin, was whisked away from his office 
for a story that alleged shady cement and milk deals on the high seas. H e spent 
a day in custody. Seventeen hours earlier, his Lagos city editor had been released 
after five days in police custody?^
Soon after the Amakiri affair, three journalists on the Daily Express, 
Fola Ashiru (chief sub-editor), Miss Toyin Johnson (features editor) and Goody 
Emegokwue (feature writer) were charged with sedition. When they came to 
court, the director of prosecutions withdrew the case and they were discharged.
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No doubt mindful of the outcry and the substantial damages in the Amakiri case 
the governors of the country’s States were now a little more circumspect in their 
handling of errant journalists. When Femi Ogunleye, Daily Times, and John 
Anishere, Daily Sketch, who worked in the Kano offices of their newspapers, fell 
foul of the Kano State Military Governor, Audu Bako, he simply deported them  
out of the State. The Daily Sketch commented:
"The mind boggles at the prospect of what would 
happen to a Nigerian journalist who has been  
declared persona non grata in all the states of the 
Federation",^
and a columnist in the same paper said that but for the deterrent effect of the 
High Court decision in the Amakiri case, the two journalists barred from Kano 
State,
"would have suffered worse personal indignity than Min^ye Amakiri."
On 9th April 1975, thirty journalists from different Lagos 
newspapers marched in protest on the office of Edwin Clark, the Federal 
Information Commissioner and handed over a letter calling on General Yakubu 
Gowon, the Head of State, to make a policy statement on the press. A  few days 
earlier the Army Chief of Staff, Major General David Ejoor, had told an 
interviewer that the military government held ’the strong view that Nigerian 
journalists are corrupt not only in terms of money but also politically. This 
allegation was not proved however, when he was challenged by journalists.
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Relations between the press and the military government of Gowon 
were at a very low point. Each was accusing the other of corruption. In August 
1974, General Gowon returned from a State visit abroad and dismissed the 
waiting Nigerian pressmen at the airport with ’get out of my sight’. Meanwhile, 
the Nigerian mass media continued to report cases of corruption under his regime. 
Cases reported included those of Dr Mbadiwe’s 1 jora land deal, the mentioning 
of the name of Brigadiers Adekunle and Sotomi by k/abo Olorunkoya, who was 
jailed in London on March 5, 1974 on charges of importing hemp to Britain, the 
Aper Aku versus Joseph Gomwalk affair, the Daboh-Tarka case, and Gowon’s 
declaration of 1976 as ’unrealistic’ for a return to civil rule?^ The mood for 
confrontation between the press and the military government persisted.
But on his return from the 1975 Jamaica Commonwealth 
Conference, on May 14, General Yakubu Gowon, Head of State, sued for 
reconciliation between the press and the government. H e declared correctly that 
they both needed each other and promised not to make things difficult for 
newsmen.
Not long after this peace plea, a group of tough-talking combat- 
tested officers, overthrew the Gowon government on July 29, the ninth anniversary 
of his coming to power. They accused its leader of ’inaccessibility to the people’ 
and ’disregard for responsible opinion’. The coup was led by Brigadier Murtala 
Ramat Muhammed.
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6.3 The Third Coming of the Military: The Muhammed/Obasanio Regime
In 1975, Murtala Ramat Mohammed replaced General Yakubu 
Gowon’s government in a coup. Murtala’s brief but eventful rule captured the 
popular imagination of many Nigerians for six months before he was struck down 
by an assassin’s bullet in an abortive coup attempt on 13 February 1976. The July 
29 coup marked the coming of the military into the Nigerian government
and politics. The military anchorman Col. Garba, who announced the coup said 
that:
"In view of events in the past few months, the 
Nigerian Armed Forces have decided to effect a 
change of leadership of the Federal Military 
Government, and from now General Yakubu Gowon 
ceases to be the Head of the Federal Military 
Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Axmed 
Forces of Nigeria1!®'9
In his broadcast of July 30, 1975, the new Head of the'Federal 
Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Brigadier 
Murtala Ramat Mohammed, recalled the past few years and how ’the government 
has not been able to fulfil the legitimate expectations of our people’. H e pointed 
out that:
"Nigeria has been left to drift. This situation if not 
arrested, would inevitably have resulted in chaos and 
even bloodshed... The armed forces having examined 
the situation came to the conclusion that certain 
changes were inevitable."^
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The new leader went farther in analysing the weaknesses of his predecessor
"After the civil war, the affairs of the state, hitherto 
a collective responsibility, became characterised by 
lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline, and even, 
neglect. Indeed the public at large became 
disillusioned and disappointed by these developments.
This trend was clearly incompatible with the 
philosophy and image of a corrective regime...
Responsible opinion, including advice by eminent 
Nigerians, traditional rulers, intellectuals, etc., was 
similarly discarded. The leadership either by design or 
default, had become too insensitive to the true 
feelings and yearnings of the people. The nation was 
thus being plunged inexorably into chaos."^
In the light of above issues, the armed forces, he announced, took 
a number of decisions, to grant the nation ’a new lease of life...’ General Gowon 
was removed as Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces; and was retired from the Armed Forces ’in his present rank of General 
with full benefits, in recognition of his past services to the Nation.’#
Murtala Muhammed’s major commitment after coming to power in 
1975 was to return the country to civilian rule by 1979. To achieve this goal a 
time table was drawn up. Although, Muhammed was killed in the Dimka-led 
abortive coup of February 13, 1976, his successor, Obasanjo, followed the time 
table meticulously and handed over power to the civilians in October, 1979 - thus 
marking the inception of Nigeria’s second republic.
The first major step taken by Muhammed/Obasanjo regime on the 
Nigerian press and political communications was the acquisition of a majority of
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equity of 60% shares in the Daily Times and the total takeover (ownership) of the 
New Nigerian by 31st August 1975.
The government said the reason for its decision to participate in the 
ownership of the Daily Times was to ’provide a channel of communication with 
the public without...having to set up an additional newspaper in competition with 
the established press’.- However, it is interesting to note that the Federal 
Government has not had any newspaper of its own, quite unlike the state 
governments, since the demise of its Morning Post. Also, although the Times was 
originally a foreign financed newspaper, by 1974, Nigerians had bought up all its 
shares and the London Daily Mirror was paid off. The Times, over the years, had 
grown to be the largest circulating newspaper in Nigeria due to its neutrality and 
non-allegiance to any political party before the takeover. %^?the New Nigerian 
ownership, the government said it would like to see the newspaper expand its 
activities to cover more effectively all parts of the country.
The statement announcing the takeover also said that government 
wished to underline its policy of full support for press freedom and its objective 
of serving the national interest at all times. It added that:
"the newspapers would be expected to make 
constructive criticisms in their comments, but it was 
hoped that they too would see it necessary to serve 
the national interest and that they and other Nigerian 
news media would take into consideration, at all 
times, in their reportage and commentary, the 
sensitivities of the Nigerian community.1#
Two months later, the federal commissioner for information Major 
General I.B.M Haruna announced that ’the federal government is to take over all
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the radio and television networks in the country... so as to prevent proliferation 
of the networks at the expense of the tax payers’ money’. A  second reason given 
by the commissioner for the take over was government’s wish ’to effectively 
participate in the country’s mass media to supplement its giant programmes in 
educating the masses’. He said that these moves ’should not be construed to 
mean a design by the government to stifle public opinion against the government’.
’All we are doing is to harness our limited resources of capital and manpower to 
our best advantage and if we can establish a credible and meaningful television 
network to the benefit of the people... we are doing the right thing.
Changes in Ownership began immediately to have impacts on the mass media.
For instance, the Daily Times since its takeover in 1975, started to reflect Federal 
Government views, in a number of ways/ its Managing Director was
appointed by the Federal Government. For example, in an issue of the Daily 
Times published on February 20, 1976 over the alleged involvement of Gowon in 
the Dimka-led abortive coup affair, the paper reported that there were sporadic 
reactions in the country ’immediately it was known General Gowon was involved 
in the abortive coup of last Friday’.^ It claimed that various groups had paraded 
the Lagos Streets, after the Federal Government statement, demanding that:
i) the Federal Government should do all it could to bring Gowon back 
to the country;
ii) Gowon should be dismissed at once from the Nigerian Army and 
that his entitlements should be stopped;
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iii) all those military governors, police and military officers who had 
been close to the Gowon regime and who had been retired should 
be detained immediately; and
iv) all those involved in the abortive coup should be paraded in the 
cities for people to see them before they were publicly e x e c u t e d .^7
The Daily Times went on to quote the Federal Government 
statement which implicated Gowon. Although the Times was supposedly 
reporting events, its manner of reportage shows that it was raising public 
expectations and feeling the pulse of the public on issuesy^he Federal Government 
wc*s about to take major decisions*
In its editorial entitled ’A  Plotter For All Seasons’, the Daily Times
stated:
"This nation must be shocked by the news of General 
Yakubu Gowon’s complicity in last Friday’s abortive 
coup in which the Head of State and Commander-in- 
Chief of the Armed Forces, General Murtala 
Mohammed was assassinated."^8
The editorial went on to express further shock occasioned by the inordinate 
ambition of a man who after nine years of rule and ’a dismal record of officially 
encouraged corruption, graft, nepotism and ineptitude’ wanted to return to power. 
It wondered how after all the concessions made to General Gowon, he could still 
plot against the government. The editorial added that it was unknown to most 
Nigerians that as of then, Gowon’s ’cooks, stewards, gardeners, etc.’ were
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maintained through the ’sweat of the Nigerian people’. It added that, ’General 
Gowon has betrayed Nigeria. The law of the land stipulates death penalty for 
treason. General Gowon should face charges of treason...’^
Many other Nigerian newspapers also reacted in similar fashion, 
notably the New Nigerian, the Nigerian Standard and the Nigerian Herald among 
others.
The New Nigerian under the caption ’Gowon’s Blood-Stained
Hands’ wrote:
"... We call on the Federal Military Government to 
seek extradition of Gowon for complicity in a most 
foul murder. H e should be put on trial for his vile 
deeds. Gowon has been quick to say his hands are 
clean and his conscience is clear. His hands are 
blood-stained. As for his conscience, we cannot see  
it."^
In its own editorial, the Nigerian Standard stated:
"General Gowon should be prepared to accept full 
responsibilities for the bloody abortive coup of last 
Friday which claimed the life of the Head of State, 
General Murtala Mohammed, and threatened to 
engulf the country in another major upheaval. And 
he should be ashamed of himself. No one grudges 
him the right to seek the leadership of his country. 
But his vaulting ambitions should not have carried 
him to the extent of planning to do so over the dead 
bodies of his fellow Nigerians, especially those who 
have proved within seven months of taking office that 
they are better leaders than he."^
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It is pertinent to mention that the taking over of the major mass 
media organisations under the Mohammed/Obsanjo regime did not prevent some 
newspapers from making comments on some policies of the government hence the 
military administration had to promulgate a decree in 1976 to gag the press. In 
that year, the government had empanelled a public complaints commission so that 
citizens could tell all they knew about corrupt officials. It turned into a 
boomerang. A  lecturer in law at the University of Lagos insinuated in a 
magazine article that the Head of State himself was corrupt. H e challenged him 
in that article, published in Spark, to declare his personal assets. To forestall such 
‘ impertinences’ the government came up with Decree Number 11 of 1976, 
otherwise known as Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusations) 
Decree. It took retroactive effect from July 29, 1975, and provided in part that:
(A) "Any person who publishes or reproduces in any form whether
written or otherwise, any statement, rumour or report alleging or 
intended to be understood as alleging that a public officer has in 
any manner been engaged in corrupt practices or has in any manner 
corruptly enriched himself or any other person, being a statement, 
rumour or report which is false in any material particular, shall be 
guilty of an offence under this Decree and liable on conviction to 
be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, 
without the option of a fine.
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(B) In any prosecution for an offence under this Decree the burden of 
proving that the statement, rumour or report which is the subject 
matter of the charge is true in every material particular shall, 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment or rule 
of law, lie on the person charged."3^
. The decree defined a public officer to include:
(a) any member of the Supreme Military Council, the National Council 
of States or the Federal Council, the Military Governor of a State, 
any commissioner in the Government of the Federation or a State;
(b) any member of the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy, the Nigerian 
Air Force or the Nigerian Police; and
(c) any person who holds any office in (i) the public service of the 
Federation or of a State within the meaning of the Constitution of 
the Federation or a State; (ii) the service of a body whether 
corporate or unincorporate established under a Federal or State 
Law; or (iii) a company in which any of the Governments in the 
Federation has controlling interest.
One important observation here is that under this decree, corruption
was shielded. Very few newspapers, if any, took the risk of conducting
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investigative reporting. Having added this decree, the government seemed to 
possess everything necessary to hold in check a vigorous press and courageous 
citizen. With its rigorous demands, testifying against a public official became a 
less tempting avocation.
This was the position of the Nigerian Press and political 
communication under the military before the handover of power to civilians in 
1979. There was no further development except the creation of the News Agency 
of Nigeria (NAN) and the establishment of the Nigerian Press Council both in 
1978. The Nigerian press and political communications during the Second 
Republic are treated in Chapter Seven. Before it however, I examine the press 
behaviour under the remaining periods of the military - the Buhari and Babangida 
regimes.
6.4 The Fourth Coming of the Military: The Buhari Regime
By 1983, the Nigerian economic crisis had started in earnest. The 
political situation was also worsening with the police and the courts growing 
increasingly more repressive. The deepening economic and political crises led to 
considerable disillusionment in the society. The opposition’s unconvincing attempt 
to take advantage of this was roundly defeated by the NPN which, through its 
control of FEDECO and the Police, was best placed to manipulate the electoral 
facade of 1983 to its advantage. It took for itself direct control of 13 out of 
Nigeria’s 19 states and gave itself a large governing majority in the Senate and 
Federal House of Representatives in a bid to establish its untrammelled political 
hegemony. This created deep political tension within the ruling class not
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dissimilar to that of 1964-66. The state was losing its legitimacy, the politicians 
were highly discredited. This provided the background for the coup of 31 
Decem ber 1983 in which the government of Shehu Shagari was overthrown by 
senior military o ff icered  by Major-General Muhammad Buhari.
The coup which was first announced by a military anchorman 
Brigadier (now General) Sanni Abacha, was seen by many Nigerians as a welcome 
relief hence they jubilated and demonstrated their support for it on the streets of 
the country. The new Head of State, Major-General Muhammad Buhari claimed 
that he took over power to avert a bloody coup from junior military officers, 
adding that the civilian regime from 1979-1983 was very corrupt and inefficient. 
However, the jubilation of Nigerians was short-lived following the high-handedness 
and repression of the new regime. Social critics were imprisoned, journalists were 
incarcerated and new repressive decrees were promulgated.
The first negative move of the Buhari regime on the Nigerian press 
and political communications was the promulgation of the notorious and 
obnoxious decree on ’Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) of 
1984 otherwise known as Decree Number 4 which has the following basic 
provisions:
1. "Any person who publishes in any form whether written or 
otherwise, any message, rumour, report or statement, being a 
message, rumour, statement or report which is false in any material 
particular or which brings or is calculated to bring the Federal 
Military Government or the Government of a State or a public
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officer to ridicule or disrepute, shall be guilty o f an offence under 
this Decree.
2. Any station for wireless telegraphy which conveys or transmits any 
sound or visual message, rumour, report or statement, being a 
message, rumour, report or statement which is false in any material 
particular or which brings or is calculated to bring the Federal 
Military Government or the Government of a State or a public 
officer to ridicule or disrepute, shall be guilty of an offence under 
this Decree.
3. It shall be an offence under this Decree for a newspaper or wireless 
telegraphy station in Nigeria to publish or transmit any message, 
rumour, report or statement which is false in any material particular 
stating that any public officer has in any manner been engaged in 
corrupt practices or has in any manner corruptly enriched himself 
or any other person."*^
The decree also empowered the Head of State to prohibit the 
circulation in the entire country of any newspaper that may be detrimental to the 
interest of the country. The prohibition order was for twelve months unless it was 
revoked earlier or extended at the expiration of the twelve months. It also 
empowered him to either revoke the license granted to any wireless telegraphy 
station or order the closure or forfeiture to the Federal Government of the wire
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telegraphy station concerned. The decree also established a tribunal whose 
membership shall consist of a serving or retired High Court Judge as its chairman 
and the members of the Armed Forces whose ranks were not below that of an 
army major or its equivalent in either the navy or the air force.
The decree provided stiff penalties for any contravention of its 
provisions. Any person who was tried and found guilty under it would be 
sentenced to a term not exceeding two years without any option of fine. In the 
case of a corporate body, a fine of not less than N10,000.00 was to be imposed.
Besides, the tribunal was vested with the powers to order for all or 
any of the equipment of either the newspaper or wireless telegraphy station with 
which the offence was committed to be forfeited to the Federal Government. The 
decision of the tribunal was final. Its decision was not to be appealed against in 
any court of law.
This decree led to the celebrated trial of two Guardian reporters: 
Nduka Irabor, assistant news editor, and Tunde Thompson, diplomatic 
correspondent. During the trial, the Attorney-General of the federation made the 
Federal Government presentations, while the Guardian and its reporters were 
defended by a prominent Lagos-based lawyer. The appearance of the Federal 
Attorney-General signified the determination of the Federal authorities to win a 
case they saw as a big apple. When judgement was pronounced after the case 
had lasted for weeks, the two journalists were found guilty and each sentenced to 
one year imprisonment. The Guardian newspaper was itself fined N50,000.00. 
The tribunal was pres;ded over by Justice J.O. Ayinde.
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The two Guardian journalists were accused of publishing statements 
that contravened Decree No.4. The offending statements were:
"Eleven Missions to be closed."
"Eight Military Chiefs Tipped as Ambassadors."
and
"Haruna to replace Hannaniya as UK Envoy."
A  career diplomat and M.George Edwin, a permanent secretary in the Ministry 
of External Affairs were among the principal witnesses that appeared for the 
prosecution. They affirmed that the articles were substantially correct, ie. Mr 
Edwin said that 10 out of 11 Foreign Missions were to be closed and the report 
on Eight Military Chiefs tipped for Ambassadorial appointment was also correct. 
And on the report that Major General Haruna was to replace Major General 
Hannaniya as UK Envoy, permanent secretary Edwin said that the report was not 
correct.
The Guardian newspaper filed an appeal on this judgement and 
failed. The Nigerian union of Journalists (NUJ) filed another separate suit against 
Decree No.4, they too lost the case.
The reaction of the Federal Government that culminated in the 
promulgation of the decree under which the two Guardian reporters and their 
newspaper were tried was surprising. In many circles,the government was 
condemned for an over-reaction and intimidating the rest o f the country’s 
journalists by usingkGuardian and its reporters as examples o f what the military
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government had in stov®Tor them. In defence of its action against negative public 
opinion, of its prosecution of the reporters, the Federal Government explained 
that its action was based on the so-called sensitive nature of the diplomatic list the 
newspaper had made a public consumption. It said the newspaper had no right 
at all to have made it public when it (ie. the Federal Government) was yet to hear 
from the prospective foreign governments, the ambassadors and high commissions 
were being assigned to. Also, it was speculated that somebody who was looking 
forward to being appointed as an ambassador might have been disappointed when 
he did not see his name on the list. The speculators went further to suspect that 
the frustrated prospective ambassador could have influenced the prior publication 
of the list by the Guardian so as to force the Federal Government to withdraw it, 
as the alternate list likely had his name on it.
Some media critics also found it hard to agree with the Guardian 
that what it had published was anything but a scoop. The newspaper’s news 
judgement was questioned. The question the critics asked was when did 
ambassadorial appointments become a national issue to warrant a prior 
publication of list of prospective appointees when the government was yet to 
make it public. Also, the rationale for the news judgement was further questioned 
at the time when a bag of 50 kilograms of rice was costing from $500 to $650 in 
open markets. While the Federal Government did not escape public indictment 
for reacting in such a harsh manner, irrespective of the ’sensitivity’ of the list, 
neither was the Guardian nor were its reporters found less guilty of promoting 
sensational journalism on trivial issues that serious-minded newspaper managers 
and editors would rebuke a reporter for wasting a whole day prying on
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government files that contained lists of prospective ambassadors and high 
commissioners.
However, the fact remains that the Guardian carried a report other 
national newspapers in the country had similarly carried at one time or the other 
in the political history of the country. Also, until politicians and retired military 
officers stop influencing the press and until the newspaper public in Nigeria opts 
for more serious news items than what it currently pays for and gets, the Federal 
and State Governments in the country might as well begin to ignore some of the 
frivolities the newspapers carry as news.
Decree 4 was the major issue on the Nigerian press and political 
communication under the Buhari administration. However, according to that 
regime, the Decree was meant to ’maintain order and safeguard State security’. 
But many people saw it as a further instrument of maintaining political control. 
What this decree did was to circumscribe the power of the media professionals, 
while making them adopt roles that protected the interests of Government by 
censoring the kind of information that was to be disseminated. Decree No.4 was 
also regarded as a mechanism that protected top government functionaries from 
criticism for whatever they did or said. With this Decree, no form of ’speculative’ 
journalism was permitted. In fact, more Nigerian journalists found themselves 
jailed when they acted contrary to the stipulations of the decree.
In comparison with Section 36 of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution, 
Decree No.4 of 1984 if given another interpretation, had the conception of 
freedom implicit in it - freedom to tell the ’truth’ and avoidance of mere 
speculation that ended up as mere rumour. In this way, the Decree could be
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considered as making provision for detailed research on the part of the media
personnel before disseminating any information. From public reaction, this
Decree proved very unpopular, a further indication that it was mainly out to serve
the interest of the Buhari administration.
A
Although the Buhari regime introduced a number of measures to 
solve some of the economic, political and social problems confronting the country, 
such measures such as the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) were hampered by 
lack of effective communication through the mass media.
On Tuesday October 23, 1984, the Chief of Staff, Supreme 
Headquarters, Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon announced the intention of the Federal 
Military Government to close down all the FRCN radio stations that were 
established during the Shagari administration. He complained bitterly about the 
poor and unprofessional performance of the radio stations particularly during the 
civilian administration.
Of all the 48 FRCN stations only five A be allowed to function.
*
According to the military announcement, the five stations A the original FRCN  
stations in Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu, Kaduna and (now) Abuja. This plan was yet to 
be implemented when the Buhari regime was overthrown on the 27th August, 
1985.
6.5 The Fifth Coming of the Military: The Babangida Regime
The coup which brought Major-General (now General) Ibrahim 
Badamosi Babangida to power was announced by Brigadier Dogonyaro and later 
confirmed by Major-General (now General) Sanni Abacha. The first step taken
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on coming to power was the abrogation of Decree Number 4, the release of 
politicians imprisoned under Buhari regime, the conversion of death penalty for 
cocaine pushers to life imprisonment and a promise to respect citizens’ rights. 
The press was relieved, and a long honeymoon with the new government started 
during which President Babangida seemed ready to bend^Jbackwards to please 
media practitioners, allow open national debates of issues (the IMF loan, the type 
of political order for Nigeria in 1990s and beyond, among others),while the press 
was so fulsome in its praise that some sections of the public began to complain 
about journalists being overwhelmed by their gratitude for the abrogation of 
Decree 4.
The Babangida regime made use of mass media to disseminate 
some of its programmes and policies such as the programme of mass mobilization 
for self-reliance, social justice, and economic recovery - (MAMSER). The media 
coverage of such programmes shows that types of ownerships played significant 
parts. For example, while the federal and state-government owned media were 
reporting evidence of the success of the MAMSER programme, the privately- 
owned newspapers tended to focus more on the problems of implementation 
encountered by the National Directorate for Social Mobilization changed with the 
responsibility for executing the MAMSER programme.
However, the honeymoon between the press and^Babangida regime has 
come to an end. And following the bloody but abortive coup of April 
22, 1990 against the regime, some journalists were accused of causing disaffection 
and incitement. The Punch Newspaper, a privately-owned venture, was sealed up, 
journalists were arrested, the General Manager and Director of Programmes,
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FRCN in Kwa\fa State were suspended among others,^Jewswatch reporter was 
banned from Dodan Barracks, some university s ta f  f  such as Professor Obaro 
Ikime, Professor of History at Ibadan University were detained, Dr Bala Usman, 
another history lecturer at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria was sacked, former 
politicians - lawyer Tunji Braithwaite, Paul Unongo among a host of others were 
imprisoned for commenting on the coup and on other national issues.
Relations between the press and Babangida regime deteriorated 
over several issues - the government’s economic policies, which made the rich, 
richer and the poor, poorer, the treatment of politicians o f the second republic, 
many of whom were appointed to big positions in the government; government 
decisions on religious issues especially those that affect the Christians and the 
Muslims; government’s handling of the students’ crisis and demonstrations, many 
university students were killed in the process while their campuses and those of 
other colleges and polytechnics were closed down for many months; government’s 
sacking of ministers and state governors which had some subterranean ethnic, 
tribal and religious undertones; the murder of Dele Giwa by a parcel bomb when 
he was Editor-in-Chief of Newswatch Magazine and the proscription of the 
Newswatch itself for six months for its detailed expose^on the Cookey Political 
Bureau report titled: "Third Republic: A New Political Agenda".
The Babangida military regime also promulgated many decrees to 
curb political communication activities and gag the press, despite the 
administration’s euphoria and attempts to wear a human rights face. As pointed 
out earlier, journalists were imprisoned, newspapers/magazines were proscribed, 
university teachers were sacked, social critics were arrested and jailed, students
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were massacred and a press council was established, all o f which were still being
criticized as at June 1991'
Ownership has continued to affect political communications in the
running and
country while many of the issues were still reflecting the long^deep-rooted tension 
between North and South .As a matter of fact, one of the main reasons of the 
coup makers of April 22,1990 for staging their coup against the Babangida regime 
was to save the people of the Middle-Belt and Southern part o f Nigeria from the 
domination of the Northerners. It is also pertinent to mention that while 
privately-owned newspaper and magazines were being proscribed or sealed off, 
no government-owned newspapers was proscribed under the Babangida regime.
6.6 Conclusion
This section has examined the Nigerian press and political
communications under the Nigerian military regimes. Judging from the ferocity
of enactments and persistence of pursuits, the military periods appeared more
restrictive than the civilian era. The military mustered enough decrees to keep
the boldest journalists in check. Yet, Nigerian press was still able to come up with
criticisms of government policies. But largely, the Nigerian mass media was
employed constantly to exhort the public to support the military government 
including and
programmes /  Operation Feed the Nation/ Mass Mobilisation *
The government-owned media carried no direct criticism of the military
leadership. They served not only as the ’ideological’ spokesmen of the military
government but also as the publicizes of the military’s ’great campaigns’, as well
as legitimizers of illegal military regimes. As a result the Nigerian mass media
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under the military failed to provide adequately informed and intelligent reports 
of current public issues for the people; news relevant to peoples’ lives, sufficient 
useful information, cultural news and criticisms, adequate economic and fiscal 
information for government agencies and businesses as well as the necessary 
feedbacks to the military governments on public opinion.
Perhaps more restricting than all the decrees promulgated under the 
that covering
military was^the ownership pattern. Of more than 33 newspapers that were 
published in the country under the military, the federal and the state military 
governments between them owned and controlled at least more than 22 of them. 
And all the radio and television stations were owned exclusively by the 
government because the law did not permit private ownership. The appointment 
of chief executives and editors of these media was almost always political. Merit 
seemed to be of secondary consideration. Not many workers of these media could 
afford to be independent minded and carry stories that were fit to be carried. 
Criticism of the military government was taboo. A few media practitioners who 
tried their hands at it were either sacked or redeployed to sinecure offices. 
Mortality rate appeared to be highest in the media compared with other 
institutions in the country. It was rare for editors and media executives in Nigeria 
to retire after years of meritorious service. They were either forced to resign or 
they were removed because of political and boardroom power-play, interference 
in editorial policies or simply because they did not belong to the ruling group 
because of the accident of their place of birth, religion and/or political persuasion.
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Even considering the severe constraints within which the Nigerian 
press has to operate under the military, there are a number of things the media 
can still do better in political communications. For instance, the media could be 
more effective if they carry more news and information of direct importance and 
relevance to the daily lives and political interests of the people. This could be 
more easily accomplished if there are more local mass media. In Nigeria today, 
most news media try to be national in scope, but by trying to serve everyone, they 
end up serving only a few in the capital. If there are more local news media 
which use local languages, the media, now largely an urban phenomenon, could 
begin to serve more the neglected rural poor of Nigeria by making them  
participate more effectively in political communications.
So far, I have treated Nigerian political communications during the 
colonial era, the independence period, the post-independence period, the First 
Republic and the five military interregna between 1966 and 1991, What remains 
to be done is an examination of political communications in Nigeria’s Second 
Republic and the lessons that can be learnt to guide the character of the Nigerian 
political communications in the Third Republic - 1990s and beyond. This is the 
subject matter of the ensuing chapters.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SIX
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politics strives for power either as a mans in serving other aims, 
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to enjoy the prestige feeling that power gives.
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CHAPTER 7
NIGERIAN POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE SECOND 
REPUBLIC: THE FIRST PHASE
Introduction
This chapter examines the behaviour of the Nigerian mass media on 
political communications in the Second Republic. However, the full political 
influence of the Nigerian press on Nigeria’s politics during the Second Republic 
cannot be 1. understood without a brief recapitulation of Nigeria’s political 
setting and its attendant intrigues. Since the attainment of independence in 1960, 
Nigeria’s political administration, as previously stated has been fiercely contested 
and dominated by three prominent ethnic groups: the Hausa Fulani of the Muslim 
North, the Yoruba of the Muslim cum Christian West and the Ibo of the Christian 
East. Political parties have always evolved along ethnic lines in which their 
solidarity depended on ethnic loyalty. Consequently, it has not been possible for 
any of the three dominant ethnic groups, because of their tribal orientation and 
affiliation, to command national consensus and mandate at any of the general 
elections. The result has always been uneasy political alliances that lead to 
coalition governments, culminating into political instability each time the alliances 
break up. This section therefore begins with an overview of the background to 
the Second Republic, the emergence of political parties and presidential 
candidates during the period and then goes on to examine the ownership and
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control of the mass media by the federal government, the state governments, 
political parties and politicians, the private ‘independent’ newspaper owners and 
their implications for the coverage of general elections and a host of other issues 
germane to the Nigerian political communications in the Second Republic.
7.1 The Background to the Second Republic
"The coming months would pose testing challenges 
not only to the participants in the ensuing political 
activities, but also to the mass media who have the 
responsibility of interpreting and informing the public 
of the issues, as well as correctly conveying the public 
mood to those vying for political leadership. I am 
sure you will rise to the occasion and not let the 
nation down".1
The swearing-in on October 1, 1979 of Nigeria’s First Executive 
President was a milestone in the political and governmental history of the nation - 
second only perhaps to the achievement of independence in 1960. It marked the 
end of over thirteen . years of military administration in the country since the 
coup d’etat of January 15, 1966 which marked the demise of the first 
Republic, and a definite departure from the ‘cabinet’, ‘Westminster model’ system 
of government inherited from Britain on independence, to a Presidential form of 
government with close parallels to the American system of government, in which 
there is a clear separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial 
arms of government.
The stage was set in 1975 by the then Head of State and 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed,
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who declared that the transition to an elected government would be effected not 
a day later than October 1st, 1979 and that pledge was treated as binding by the 
Obasanjo government as from 1976 when General Muhammed was assassinated 
in an abortive coup led by Dimka on February 13, 1976.
The Muhammed coup which brought the Gowon regime to an end 
on the ninth anniversary of its coming into power halted the political degeneracy 
of that regime and provided a new vista of life. Immediately after the coup, in a 
broadcast to the nation on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of Nigeria’s 
independence on 1st October 1975, the new head of state, General Murtala 
Ramat Mohammed stressed the need to ‘correct the mistakes of the past, and to 
apply firm, and in some cases drastic, measures in order to set the stage for 
healthier and more efficient society. Towards that end General Mohammed 
outlined the major ‘political programmes’ of the regime which culminated in a 
return to civil rule on 1st October 1.979. The main highlights of the political 
programme of transition to civil rule were: .
(1) the creation of more states in the federation as a means of ensuring even 
development^-
(2) the systematic and deliberate nationwide reorganisation of the local 
government set up as a means to bring government close to the people;
(3) constitutional review - the setting up of a constitution drafting committee, 
followed by a constituent assembly to adopt a new constitution;
(4) the lifting of the ban on political activities, the formation of national 
political parties and preparations for elections;
-257-
(5) state and federal elections to usher in a democratically elected government 
by 1st October 1979.2
Having accepted the report of the panel appointed to inquire into 
and recommend the creation of new states and boundaries adjustments on 22nd 
Decem ber 1975,3 seven new states were created with effect from 1st April 1976, 
increasing the number of states from 12 to 19.
Other steps taken were the composition and inauguration of the 
Constitution Drafting Committee (C.D.C.), the establishment of the Constituent 
Assembly (C.A.) and the creation of the Federal Electoral Commission 
(FEDE: CO). In short, the process which culminated in the establishment of the 
Second Republic in Nigeria is divisible into three analytical categories: the 
formative constitutional period from September 1975 through April 1977 
(dominated by the C .D .C  deliberations); the pivotal middle-decision-making 
phase from May 1977 through September 1978 (dominated by the Federal 
Military Government F.M.G.); and the final electoral politics period from 
October 1978 through September 1979 (dominated by FEDECO acting in a 
regulatory role).
In a broadcast on 21 September 1978, General Olusegun Obasanjo 
blew the whistle for the game of politics to begin by lifting the ban prohibiting the 
formation of political parties - the emergency decree of May 1967. The national 
state of emergency was also lifted. Taking into consideration the time-lag between 
the lifting of the ban on the formation of political parties and the holding of the 
general elections, some nine months, and coupled with the vastness of the country,
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both the politicians and the electorate needed the mass media. The politicians 
needed the media to reach the electorate, to sell their political party manifestos 
and programmes, among others, while, the electorate needed the media for 
information dissemination and political communication so as to be able to make 
voting decisions. As McGaughey observed:
"Coverage of election campaigns by the press is 
assumed to be a rather critical component of the 
political election process. With it, an electorate can 
make its decisions about political leaders from a 
variety of comment and information".4
Although, one might argue that it is usually easier to mobilise the 
urban masses than the rural electorate; that the concentration of the mass media 
and better communication and transport facilities in the urban areas make such 
mobilisation more rewarding; and that the percentage of those who are exposed 
to the media is infinitesimal. While some of these arguments may be true to a 
certain extent, it is also true that they are sometimes a misleading index of 
penetration. Apart from the fact that single copies of newspapers are passed 
from hand to hand and items of news are often read aloud or relayed to friends 
in the course of conversation, the electronic media - radio and television - to some 
extent, convey messages which are accessible to people from a wide variety of 
social backgrounds. Also, those exposed to the media (however small their 
number) do serve as opinion leaders to others who may not be exposed. 
Lazarfeld, Berelson and Gaudet suggested the possibility that:
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"... ideas flow from radio and print to the opinion 
leaders and from them to the less active section of 
the population".5
7.2 The Political Parties and Presidential Candidates of the Second Republic
The lifting of the ban on political activities precipitated an explosion 
of ‘political parties’ and a plethora of political associations formed or 
announcements to that effect were made. Some writers say about 52 parties were 
formed while others contend that by the end of 1978, some 150 parties were 
supposed to have been formed.6 By the provisions of the Electoral Decree (and 
the Constitution) no association by whatever name could function as a political 
party unless it was registered as a political party by the Federal Electoral 
Commission (FEDECO).7
Out of the myriad of the political associations formed in the name 
of political parties, only five (5) qualified for registration by FEDECO and were 
so registered for the 1979 general elections. These were the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian Peoples’ Party 
(NPP), the Great Nigeria Peoples’ Party (GNPP) and the Peoples’ Redemption 
Party (PRP). In 1983, one other political party, the Nigeria Advance Party (NAP) 
qualified for FEDECO’s registration thus making a total of six political parties 
which contested the 1983 general elections.
In its election manifesto the NPN claimed that it was the only party 
formed out of nationwide consultation and consensus by Nigerians. The party 
promised to promote social justice, social welfare, equality of opportunity for all 
citizens of Nigeria, the Unity of Nigeria, personal liberty, fundamental rights and
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freedoms of citizens, the supremacy of the will of the people democratically 
expressed, self-respect and self-reliance. It also promised ‘qualitative* education, 
food and agriculture, rural development, creation of states among others.
The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the first political party to be 
announced, promised free education at all levels, free medical and health services, 
integrated rural development and full employment opportunities for all. It also 
promised an agricultural revolution which would make Nigeria self-sufficient in 
terms of her food needs within the space of five years.
The Nigerian Peoples’ Party (NPP) promised to be part and parcel 
of the people’s every day life, be continually informed and educated about their 
hopes and aspirations, to preserve the constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, promote and sustain the unity of the country, work towards free and high 
quality education at all levels, and fight relentlessly against poverty, disease, 
ignorance, intolerance, indiscipline, feudalism, racism, neo-colonialism and unjust 
exploitation of man by man.
The Great Nigeria Peoples’ Party (GNPP) promised to play politics 
without bitterness, promote the just and equitable distribution of the fruits of 
economic development among persons and states of Nigeria, to work towards free 
and high quality education at all levels and free and better health services, create 
a society free of violence and ignorance and give the Nigerian people a 
government that will be committed to a fairer distribution of wealth, amenities 
and power; among others.
The Peoples’ Redemption Party (PRP) claimed to be the organised 
vanguard of the Nigerian people and stressed collective leadership. Its manifesto
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contained the party’s practical solutions to the nation’s political, economic, social 
and diplomatic problems, drawn up in the light of Nigerian’s reality and in 
accordance with the general principles contained in the party’s general 
programme.
The Presidential Candidates
According to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
1979, a candidate for the office of the Presidency must be a Nigerian citizen by
birth; he has to be at least 35 years old and must not have any characteristics
which would have disqualified him from contesting to be a member of the Senate.
The President holds office for a term of four years after which he must vacate the
office. No one can hold office for a period exceeding two terms. To be considered
to have been duly elected, a candidate for the office of President, even where he
is the only candidate nominated, will still be required to poll a majority of Yes
over No votes and not less than 25 percent of the votes cast at the election in
each of at least two-thirds of the states.8
The formation of political parties and the selection of presidential
candidates for Nigeria’s Second Republic election race showed that history has
repeated itself with considerable eclat in Nigeria. Although none of the political
parties claimed any link to the pre-military era parties, nevertheless, it was obvious
both in composition and ideology (if any), that the registered political parties and
descendants, even
their presidential candidates were/caricatures of the political organisations and 
actors of the First Republic. With the re-emergence of the old politicians on the 
Nigerian political scene, especially the presidential candidates like Azikiwe,
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Awolowo, Aminu Kano, Shagari and Waziri Ibrahim, many people argued that 
Nigeria was now back to square one. The widespread feeling was that those who 
emerged as presidential candidates were the same politicians who had featured 
prominently in and survived the first Republic. It was also argued that nothing 
had changed, no lesson had been learnt and that no new charismatic political 
leader had emerged - despite all efforts at newness, at re-combinations, at 
stringent standards and controls.9
The only differences, perhaps, were that the First Republic elections 
were conducted on the basis of three and four regions in 1959 and 1964 
respectively, while the Second Republic elections (1979 and 1983) were based on 
a nineteen-state federation.10 Secondly, there were conditions laid down for the 
formation of political parties and the selection of presidential candidates in an 
attempt to encourage national spread. But despite these differences, important 
as they are, each of the five presidential candidates chosen or ratified by national 
party conventions had figured prominently in the First Republic period.
Chief Jeremiah Oyeniyi Obafemi Awolowo, the UPN presidential 
candidate, had been a veteran politician of the First Republic, a founder and 
leader of the subsequently banned Action Group, (AG); first Premier of the 
Government of Western Nigeria, leader of the Opposition in the Federal House 
of Representatives from 1960 to 1962 after which he was jailed for felonious 
treason.11
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, the NPP’s Presidential Candidate, was leader 
of the NCNC, first Premier of Eastern region, first Nigerian Governor-General of 
the Federation, and first President of the Republic.12 Both Alhajis ShehuUthman
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A liy* Shagari13 and Waziri Ibrahim,14 Presidential candidates of the NPN and 
GNPP respectively served as federal ministers during the First Republic while 
Malam Alhaji Muhammed Aminu Kano, PRP Presidential candidate had been the 
leader of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (N EPU ).15 In the 1983 
general elections, all the five registered political parties and presidential 
candidates contested again with the exception of Malam Aminu Kano, who was 
replaced, because of his death, by Alhaji Hassan Yusuf, as PRP Presidential 
candidate.16 A  sixth political party was also registered by FEDECO under the 
name of Nigeria Advance Party (NAP). With its motto: "Together we take the 
destiny of Nigeria in our hands", NAP presented a Lagos lawyer, Mr Tunji 
Braithwaite, as its Presidential Candidate for the 1983 general elections.17
It is pertinent to mention however, that two of the presidential 
candidates in the 1979 general elections - Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Malam Aminu 
Kano - faced the problem of disqualification by FEDECO on account of the 
alleged non-payment and evasion of taxes. Although, the case was taken to court 
and the alleged irregularities in tax payments were later sorted out, most of the 
election process had already elapsed before the electorate could know for sure 
who the Presidential Candidates of the NPP and PRP would be to vie for the 
presidential office. The political party characteristics are shown in the following 
table.
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TABLE 4
CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA'S SECOND REPUBLIC
NPN1 UPN2 NPP3 PRP4 GNPP5
Regional Base of 
support
North West East North North-east
Presidential
Candidate
Alhaj i Shehu 
SHAGARI
Chief Obafemi 
AWOLOWO
Dr Nnamdi AZIKIWE Malam Alhaj i 
Aminu KANO
Alhaji Waziri 
IBRAHIM
Ethnic
Identification
Hausa-Fulani Yoruba Ibo Hausa Kanuri
Programmes "Conservative” : 
Moderate - 
promises; favours 
an open market 
economy without 
much state 
interference; 
emphasizes 
stability and 
status quo
"Progressive": 
Concrete
objectives; free 
education at all 
levels for all; 
free medical 
treatment; a 
progressive 
program of 
development of 
roads, schools, 
and government 
services
"Centrist": 
stresses 
continuation of 
the progress made 
by the military
"Populist- 
Socialist" : real 
welfare state; 
considers itself 
most radical
"Welfare
Capitalist"
SOURCES: New York Times. March 6, 1979; Africa, no. 87, Nov. 1978; Financial Times of London. March 1979'
Issue. 1/2 Spring/Summer, 1981.
1. National Party of Nigeria 4. People's Redemption Party
2. Unity Party of Nigeria 5. Great Nigeria People's Party
3. Nigeria People's Party
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7.3 Ownership and Control of the Nigerian Mass Media in the Second Republic 
The transition programmes which culminated in the advent of 
Nigeria’s Second Republic involved public discussions focused by the Nigerian 
Press. Apart fy&m the military leaders’ acknowledgement of mass media 
responsibility of interpreting and informing the electorate of the issues, the 1979 
Constitution also requires special obligations from the press on Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of state policy. In fact, the Federal Electoral 
Commission (FEDECO) recognized the role of the press in election campaign 
communication when it decided in its guidelines for party registration that 
whatever amount spent by registered political parties on political communications 
through the mass media would be one of the factors to be taken into 
consideration for the purpose of determining election expenses such as:
"the cost of advertisements of all types in connection 
with, or pertaining to, the election including - 
advertisements by means of radio and television 
broadcasting, cinematograph, newspapers, hand-bills 
and posters and in any other form whatsoever".18
If the quantity of newspapers and the fearlessness of their editorial 
opinions and reportage are taken as measurements of level of political awareness 
and consciousness prevailing in a country at any given period, then the growth of 
the newspaper industry in Nigeria, between 1979 and 1983, the period of the 
duration of the Second Republic, could aptly be said to represent a high level of 
political participation and interest articulation in a democracy. Every political 
pressure group established its own newspaper as a medium of putting its message
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across the political spectrum and seeking entry and recognition into the political 
decision-making process. With the exception of the well edited broadsheet 
Weekly Democrat that made its debut in January 1984, and quickly disappeared^, 
' ‘ the following newspapers developed to represent one
form of political interest group or the other: National Concord. Satellite. 
Guardian. Nigerian Call. Eagle. Okigwe Voice. Trumpet. Daily Nation. Echo. 
Daily News, Record. Stamp. Advocate. Premier. Hope. Graphic, Sun and People’s 
News. Ralph Waldo Emerson’s observation that in the United States of his time 
they had the newspapers that did their best to make every square acre of land and 
sea give an account of themselves at one’s breakfast time19 is just an appropriate 
political epigram to describe the proliferation of the newspaper industry during 
Nigeria’s Second Republic.
Government Monopoly and Control of the Media 
The Federal and State Government Media
During the Second Republic, the Federal Government owned and 
controlled the Daily Times, the New Nigerian, the Federal Radio Corporation of 
Nigeria and the Nigerian Television Authority. After the 1979 elections, these 
media were still owned by the Federal Government which was however, under the 
control of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN).
All the state government media were owned and controlled by the 
respective state military governments - except the Sketch Press Limited which was 
owned and controlled by the governments of Oyo, Ogun and Ondo States. After 
the 1979 elections, the Sketch was owned by Oyo, O gun and Ondo States
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controlled by the Unity Party of nigeria (UPN). The Standard, the Star, and the 
Statesman were owned by Plateau, Anambra and Imo states controlled by the 
Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), the Observer was owned by the Bendel State 
controlled by the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the Herald was owned by the 
Kwal|fa State controlled by the National Party of Higeria (NPN). But after the 
1983 elections, the Herald was owned by the Kwara State controlled by the UPN, 
while the Star was owned by the Anambra State controlled by the NPN.
Political Party Newspapers
In addition to the existing political party newspapers such as the 
Tribune, owned by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Presidential Candidate of the 
Unity Party of Nigeria, there were Waziri Ibrahim’s "The Nationalist", Augustus 
Akinloye’s "Sunday Advocate", Kingsley Mbadiwe’s "The Eagle", Alex Ekweme’s 
"The Trumpet", Victor Akan’s "The Call", Jim Nwobodo’s "Satellite", Nwakanma 
Okoro’s "The Nation", and Anthony Enahoro’s "The Sun", to mention just a few 
most of which are now defunct. The National Concord which is still being 
published today was founded by Chief M.K.O. Abiola in 1980 to support the 
policies of the NPN. The paper’s philosophy however changed when its owner 
Chief Abiola, quit politics.
The Independent Press
The Punch was the only newspaper that could be described as 
‘independent* during the Second Republic, since its owner and publisher, Chief 
Olu Aboderin was with no known political affiliation then. H e was however,
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known to be close to chief Obafemi Aw^lowo, leader o f the UPN. In the strict 
sense of the word, the so-called ‘independent’ newspapers were not so 
independent. They subjected their readers to all kinds of publicity about the 
politics, ideology and culture of their owners or of those who are close to them.
There were other newspapers founded during the tail end of the 
second Republic and after the demise of that Republic. They included the 
Guardian of Alex Ibru, the Lagos News of Lateef Jak^nde, the Vanguard of Sam 
Amuka-Pemu, the Democrat of Alhaji Ahmed/Joda, Philip Asiodu, Alhaji Shehu 
Malami and Alhaji Mai Sango among other owners, the Mail of Dr Clarkson 
Majomi, the Patriot of Mr Amos Onanuga, the Reporter of retired Major-General 
Shehu Musa 'Yir’adua and the Republic of Chief Williams Olufemi Ajayi which was 
started in the middle of 1987, to mention just a few.
7.4 Nigerian Mass Media, Political Communications and the Coverage of the 
Campaigns that led to the general elections of the Second Republic
Two phases of the campaigns that led to the general elections in the 
Second Republic can be identified. The first phase was between 1978 and 1979 
when the mass media were under . .  militar^and the 1979 elections were 
conducted with the military playing some supervisory role. The phase was 
between 1982 and 1983 when the mass media were owned by governments 
controlled by political parties of the Second Republic. In the first phase, there 
were other factors that contributed to the press bias in the coverage of election 
campaigns in addition to the ownership and control factors, while in the last 
phase,ownership was the main predominant factor that dictated the direction of
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election campaign coverage. But first, we. analyse .. how the press covered the 
1979 election campaigns.
The Daily Times
An analysis of 49,785 column centimetres o f news stories was carried 
out in the Daily Times. Out of this figure, 43,135 news stories were classified as 
favourable, 637 as unfavourable while 6,013 were i found neutral. O f the 43,135 
favourable news stories, the GNPP had 5807 (13.5%); NPN got 11,373 (26.5%); 
NPP 8513 (19.7%); PRP 4541 (10.4%); and UPN got 12,901 (29.9%). This is 
shown clearly in Table 5 with percentages scored by each party indicated.
Table 5: Favourable Coverage Given by the Daily Times
Parties
Front
Pages
Back
Pages
Inside
(Other)
Pages
Special
Pages
Edit­
orial Total %
GNPP 749 996 2962 1100 - 5807 13.5
NPN 1376 1482 6604 1911 - 11373 26.5
NPP 1158 1643 4309 1403 - 8513 19.7
PRP 644 834 2408 655 - 4541 10.4
UPN 2259 1925 6272 2445 - 12901 29.9
Total 6186 6880 22555 7514 - 43135 100
Source: The British Newspaper Library, Colindale, London 
(SeeWReferMCai796)and Calculations from the Microfilm and the papers
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The Daily Times, as can be seen from the above table, gave the 
highest favourable coverage to the UPN followed by the NPN, the NPP, GNPP 
while the PRP received the least favourable coverage. All things being equal the 
expected coverage for each party should be 20 percent. In performing a chi- 
square statistic to find out whether the content o f the above table differs 
significantly from chance, we used the percentages indicated in column seven of 
the above Table 5 as observed frequency (0f) while 20 percent was used as 
expected frequency (Ef). The total for both the observed frequency and the 
expected frequency is 100%. The 100% can vary within the five categories (the 
five registered parties). The frequencies for any four of the categories are free 
to vary within the 100% but once four of the categories are fixed, the fifth 
category is not free to vary; thus the degree of freedom (df) =  4. The result 
indicates that the observed coverage differs significantly from the expected 
coverage meaning that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 1% significant level. 
With the total of (0f) 100, the parties stood at 13.5; 26.5, 19.7; 10.4; and 29.9 
respectively. With the total of (Ef) 100, we had expected 20 percent for each of 
the parties. X 2 = 13.4255 df = 4. The inference is that the UPN received the 
most favourable coverage from the Daily Times and the party also had its 
programmes brought to the electorate by the Times more than the other four 
parties combined.
The following are some of the "live illustrations" of favourable news 
stories carried by the Daily Times on the election campaigns of the Second 
Republic. The first story carried by the Daily Times on the 1979 election 
campaigns was favourable to the UPN. The news story, which was also the
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headline for the day, reported that barely twenty four hours after the ban on 
politics was lifted, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, announced the ‘Four Cardinal 
Programmes of his party’.20
Daily Times. December 29. 1978 - Front Page Headline: 
‘AWO ASSURES ALL THE PUPILS’
Story:
"Chief Obafemi Awolowo has come up with a new 
election promise and it is again in respect of 
education. By 1980, he said every qualified child 
would be given admission into Secondary School, if 
the Unity Party of Nigeria wins the election.
Chief Awolowo was addressing a rally of his party at 
Uishan in Remo Local Government area of Ogun 
State on Wednesday".
Daily Times. January 3, 1979 - Front Page Headline: 
UPN WILL WIN 15 STATES
Story:
"Chief Obafemi Awolowo claimed yesterday that the 
Unity Party of Nigeria has already captured majority 
of the states in the North. These states are Kano, 
Kaduna, Sokoto, Niger, Gongola and Benue.
By that, he pointed out, the UPN was sure to win 15 
states in the coming elections".
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Dailv Times. January 2, 1979 
SHAGARI RESUMES TOUR
Story:
"The Presidential Candidate of the National Party of 
Nigeria, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, continues his whistle- 
stop nationwide campaign tour today after the New  
Year break.
H e will address a rally at campus square, Lagos, at 
4pm today. Tomorrow he will leave Lagos for Akure 
an*Benin to "show-the-flag" of the NPN.
On Thursday, Alhaji Shehu and his campaign team  
will travel to Calabar by air."
These favourable stories were directed to the electorate in order to 
get votes for the political parties being reported.
UNFAVOURABLE STORIES IN THE DAILY TIMES
The Daily Times gave 637 unfavourable new stories. Out of the 
coverage, the GNPP got 26 (4%); NPN had 203 (40%); NPP 171 (26%); PRP 40 
(6%) and UPN 197 (24%). The result of chi-square test performed as in Table 
5 indicates significant difference at the 1% confidence level. X 2 =  50.28 df =
4. This shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 1% confidence level. 
Table 6 shows this clearly.
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Table 6: Unfavourable Coverage in the Daily Times
Parties
Front
Pages
Back
Pages
Inside
(Other)
Pages
Special
Pages
Edit­
orial Total %
GNPP - - 26 - - 26 4.0
NPN 77 - 126 - - 203 40.0
NPP - 56 115 - - 171 26.0
PRP - 35 5 - - 40 6.0
UPN 28 23 146 - - 197 24.0
Total 105 114 418 - - 637 100
Source: The British Newspaper Library, Colindale, London
(My own derivation and calculations).
Some of the unfavourable stories on the U PN  were attacks on its
Free Education Programme. For instance a former Commissioner for Education 
during Gowon regime, commenting on UPN’s free Education Programme, argued 
that "Free Education at all levels should not be an issue for political campaign in 
any party.21 Also, attacking U PN ’s ideology, Chief Adeniran Ogunsanya was 
quoted as saying "any vote cast for UPN by the people o f Lagos State would be 
a disservice to the nation".22
In a story titled "Crisis latest - NPP Secretariat shut down",23 it was 
reported that the national secretariat of the party at Lagos was shut down by 
splinter group of the party led by Chief Akanbi Onitiri. Significantly, this story 
was the headline for that day. Another story reported that the election of Ogoja
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senatorial candidate for the NPP could not take place, as two members of the 
party engaged in exchange’ of hot words.24 The launching ceremony of the party 
in Gombe Bauchi State did not succeed as the Chief launcher did not arrive on 
time.25
The unfavourable stories on the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) 
and the Great Nigerian People’s Party (GNPP) again centred on crises or lack of 
organisation in both parties. For instance, a story titled "Crisis in Anambra PRP 
deepens" reported serious problems within the PRP in Anambra State, while 
another story titled "shocker for Waziri"26 aired the view that the GNPP 
presidential candidate was shocked as his Governorship candidate for Anambra 
State was not in Enugu to receive him during his tour of the state. In a story 
titled "Party Boss changes Camp", it was reported that the secretary of the NPN  
in a local government area of Borno State resigned his membership of the Party 
to join the GNPP.27
NEUTRAL COVERAGE IN THE DAILY TIMES
The Daily Times reported 6,013 neutral news stories. Out of this 
figure, the GNPP received 1026 (17.0%); the NPN received 1146 (19.1%) column- 
centimetres; the NPP 2089 (34.7%); the PRP 1105 (18.4%); and the U PN got 647 
(10.8%). When the Chi-square test was performed on the observed frequency 
(Of) and the expected frequency of 20% each (Ef), the data yielded a high value. 
This shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected at more than 1% significant 
level. X 2 =  15.63 df =  4. Table 7 shows this clearly.
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Table 7: Neutral Coverage in the Daily Times
Parties
Front
Pages
Back
Pages
Inside
(Other)
Pages
Special
Pages
Edit­
orial Total %
GNPP 225 97 704 - - 1026 17.0
NPN 32 326 728 60 - 1146 19.1
NPP 344 376 983 326 60 2089 34.7
PRP 459 289 357 - - 1105 18.4
UPN 31 157 342 57 60 647 10.8
Total 1091 1245 3114 443 120 6013 100
Source: Ihe Briltish Newspaper Library, CoJLindale, London.
(My own derivation and calculations from the Microfilm and papers). 
T H E  N E W  N I G E R I A N
A total of 26,878 column centimetres of news stories were analyzed in the 
New Nigerian. Out of this figure, 22,684 were classified as favourable, 1113 
column centimetres news stories as unfavourable and 3081 as neutral. Of the 
22,684 favourable news stories, 3163 (13.9%) was reported on GNPP; NPN  
received 7055 (31%); NPP got 3881 (17%); PRP had 2609 (11.5%) while the UPN  
received 5976 (26.6%). A  Chi-square test performed on the observed frequency 
(Of) and the expected frequency of 20% for each party (Ef) indicated the rejection 
of the null hypothesis at 1% confidence level. X 2 =  14.148 (df) =  4. This is 
shown clearly in Table 8.
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Table 8: Favourable Coverage in the New Nigerian
Parties
Front
Pages
Back
Pages
Inside
(Other)
Pages
Special
Pages
Edit­
orial Total %
GNPP 161 60 2742 200 - 3163 13.9
NPN 262 230 5540 1023 - 7055 31.0
NPP ' 10 177 2611 1083 - 3881 17.0
PRP 42 - 1996 571 - 2609 11.5
UPN 460 113 4973 430 - 5976 26.6
Total 935 580 17862 3307 - 22684 100
Source: The British Newspaper Library, Colindale, London. (My own 
calculations from Ref. MC 1796 H and NP 1385).
The following news stories represent few examples of "live 
illustration" of the Hew Nigerian Favourable Coverage:
New Nigerian. April 18, 1979 - Front Paee Headline 
NPN PLANS ‘GREEN REVOLUTION5
Story:
"National Party of Nigeria (NPN) intends to usher 
‘the Green Revolution’ into the country if voted into 
power.
The party’s Presidential Candidate, Alhaji Shehu 
Shagari, made this known yesterday at the first press 
luncheon for Presidential Candidates organised by the 
Newspaper Proprietors’ Association of Nigeria 
(NPAN)".
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Many of the favourable stories of the New Nigerian on the National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN) concentrated on the party’s programmes, described its 
Presidential Candidate, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, "as the most qualified living 
Nigerian for the exalted post of the country’s first executive President",28 and 
projected the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), as the Party "committed to the 
unity and stability of Nigeria".29 The paper also carried news stories advertising, 
"selling" the NPN programmes and urging the electorate to cast votes for the 
party.
One of the New Nigerian stories favourable to the Unity Party of 
Nigeria (UPN) reported the opening of the party’s secretariat shortly after the ban 
on politics was lifted.30
UNFAVOURABLE STORIES IN THE NEW NIGERIAN
A total o f | l l3  column centimetres news stories was classified as 
unfavourable in the New Nigerian. Out of this figure, the GNPP received 136 
(17%); the NPN got 76 (6.5%); the NPP had 377 (32%); the PRP got 83 (7%); 
while the UPN received 441 (37.5%). A Chi-square analysis performed on the 
variables of observed frequency (Of) and the expected frequency of 20% for each 
party (Ef) shows a significant difference at the 1% confidence level. X 2 = 40.525 
df =  4. This shows the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% significant level. 
Table 9 gives the details. This is followed by "live illustration" of column 
centimetre news stories as few examples of unfavourable coverage by the New  
Nigerian N ewspaper.
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Table 9: Unfavourable Coverage in the New Nigerian
Parties
Front
Pages
Back
Pages
Inside
(Other)
Pages
Special
Pages
Edit­
orial Total %
GNPP 105 - 31 - - 136 17.0
NPN - - 76 - - 76 6.5
NPP ' 76 65 236 - - 377 32.0
PRP - - 27 56 - 83 7.0
UPN - - 128 313 - 441 37.5
Total 181 65 498 369 - 1113 100
Source: The British Newspaper Library, Colindale, London.
New Nigerian, January 25, 1979 - Back Page Headline 
UPN WON’T PUT KOBO ON ABUJA PROJECT UNTIL ... - AWO 
Story:
"A Government of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) 
will not spend a kobo to develop the new federal 
capital at Abuja until all its four cardinal programmes 
are fully implemented.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, UPN leader and 
Presidential Candidate, told journalists that if voted 
into power, he would have more worthwhile things to 
do with money than pumping it into the development 
of a new capital".
He was addressing newsmen in Sokoto last Tuesday 
on the last phase of his current political campaigns in 
the northern states."
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New Nigerian. April 16, 1979 - Front Page Headline
ZIK, AMINU OUT OF RACE
[NB: This story was also carried as Front Page 
Headline of New Nigerian on 21st April 1979]
Story:
"Dr Nnamdi Azikwe, presidential candidate o f the 
Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) is virtually out of the 
presidential race in this year’s general elections. So 
also is Alhaji Aminu Kano, Presidential Candidate of 
the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP). This is 
because the Federal Electoral Commission 
(FEDECO) has informed the federal military 
Government on the tax position of all the five 
presidential candidates and only two of them were 
still to get letter of clearance from Government, a 
reliable source has said."
There were also some few unfavourable stories on the NPN in the 
New Nigerian. For example, the story titled "pressmen inspect goods" was 
unfavourable on the party as it appeared at a prominent back page position. The 
story reported that members of the press were taken to the baggage hall at 
Murtala Mohammed Airport to inspect six trunk boxes and four cartons 
containing textile, window curtains, party brochures smuggled into the country by 
NPN.31 Another story titled "Chief Abiola and three others in court" which 
incidentally occupied a prominent back page position also reported that a national 
executive member o f the NPN Chief M.K.O. Abiola and three others were 
arraigned before a Chief Magistrate court for taking part in an unlawful assembly 
at Abeokuta.32 There was another story which reported that the NPN rally in 
Minna ended in confusion because Alhaji Shehu Shagari insisted that the state 
gubernatorial candidate Alhaji Anwal Ibrahim must be presented before the
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crowd. The story was further elaborated to indicate that as the confusion rose, 
the party’s presidential candidate, the Chairman of the party and other officials 
at the rally left the scene to their respective lodgings.33 Apart from the fact that 
this story is unfavourable, it reveals some weakness of organisation in the party.
The New Nigerian’s unfavourable coverage of the Unity Party of 
Nigeria either accused its leader of being tribal or attacked the party’s 
programmes. For example, in a story titled "On Programmes and Ideologies", it 
is reported that "the most fundamental inconsistency of the U PN ’s programme is 
its commitment to socialism as an ideology for governing this country".34 Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo was once urged to retire from politics "that being the only 
honourable cause opened to him".35 Women were also called upon to reject Chief 
Awolowo’s regressive stand on family planning.36
New Nigerian unfavourable stories on NPP reported leadership 
tussle in the party, issue of people decamping or breaking away from the party 
and other crises which the party had. One of such stories blamed Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikwe "as the major brain behind the crisis in the party"37 Another story 
described the NPP as a party born out of treachery and bound to collapse one 
day.38 Commenting on the effects of the party breaking into two factions, a story 
titled "Leadership crisis hits NPP" reported that the leadership crisis within the 
party took a new dimension as the "Akinfosile - Azikwe faction of the party 
dramatically moved the Party’s national secretariat from its original site to a new  
place".39
Also, problems of decamping and lack of principle constituted the 
topic for some of the unfavourable stories of the New Nigerian on both GNPP
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and PRP. In a story titled “The return of the Prodigal Son" Alhaji Waziri of the 
GNPP was described as "having been used all the time to give semblance of 
legitimacy to the ambition of a more ambitious man",40 while another story titled 
"PRP: After the disqualification of Aminu Kano, its presidential candidate from 
contesting the presidential elections, the party was disarrayed.41
NEUTRAL COVERAGE IN THE NEW NIGERIAN
A  total of 3081 column centimetre news stories was classified as 
neutral in the New Nigerian. Out of this figure, the GNPP received 348 (9.4%); 
the NPN got 927 (30.7%); the NPP had 731 (24.3%); the PRP received 561 
(18.6%); while the UPN got 514 (17%). A  Chi-square test was performed on the 
percentage coverage given to the parties (0f) and the expected coverage of 20% 
for each of the parties (Ef). The result is X 2 = 12.815 and df = 4, and this shows 
the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% significant level. This is shown clearly 
in Table 10:
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Table 10: Neutral Coverage in the New Nigerian
Parties
Front
Pages
Back
Pages
Inside
(Other)
Pages
Special
Pages
Edit­
orial Total %
GNPP - - 284 - 64 648 9.4
NPN 86 23 818 - - 927 30.7
NPP 2 3 9 - 443 16 33 731 24.3
PRP 84 - 460 17 - 561 18.6
UPN - - 467 47 - 514 17.0
Total 409 23 2472 80 97 3081 100
Source: The British Newspaper Library, Colindale, London.
(My own calculations from the Microfilm and the papers).
A  New Nigerian story titled "Parties Programmeyand Pointers" 
which commented on the programmes of each of the parties and made a neutral 
assessment of each of the presidential candidate and their programmes is an 
example of a neutral story. While it is unhelpful for UPN to stress education 
without a concomitant appraisal of its implications and wider ramifications for the 
society, the story says’, the PRP, NPN, NPP and the GNPP talk of bolstering co­
operatives which shows that there has been no clear examination of the issues 
raised by the programmes of these parties. On the Presidential candidates the 
story described Chief Awolowo as one who seems better than the others "but his 
controversial streak may be a handicap. While Aminu Kano has not been tested 
in a position of leadership, Alhaji Waziri may wonder what to do with his newly
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acquired power if voted in. Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe is a man of compromise but this 
quality is not necessarily the best for an executive president; even though Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari looks a good statesman and the most national of the presidential 
aspirants, but the main problem is: Can he deliver? the story queried® Noting that 
none of the parties seemed to have any new approach, the story argued that on 
the whole most of the party manifestos are vague. "It is either we will encourage 
this or we will promote that: To an audience which has listened for years to such 
unfulfilled promises that come with every budget speech, such statements mean 
nothing".42
To give a clearer picture of the column-centimetre news stories 
carried by the two papers and the amount of coverage received by each of the five 
registered political parties, we put the total favourable, unfavourable and neutral 
news stories together. The Chi-square statistic performed indicated that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significant level. Looking at the observed 
frequency and expected frequency of 20% each for the political parties, we 
obtained the following results:
Daily Times = X 2 = 10.204 df = 4;
New Nigerian =  X 2 = 12.10 df = 4
The following tables show clearly the total amount of coverage and their 
percentages:
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Table 11: Total Amount of Coverage (Favourable, Unfavourable, Neutral)
Received by the Parties
Parties
Daily
Times %
New
Nigerian % Total %
GNPP 6859 13.8 3647 13.5 10506 13.7
NPN 12722 25.6 8058 30.0 20780 27.8
NPP 10773 21.6 4989 18.6 15762 20.1
PRP 5686 11.4 3253 12.1 8939 11.7
UPN 13745 27.6 6931 25.8 20676 26.7
Total 49785 100 26878 100 76663 100
Source: The British Newspaper Library, Colindale, London
(My own calculations from the Microfilm).
The Daily Sketch. The Star and Punch
Apart from the federal newspapers - the Daily Times and the New  
Nigerian - the way the state newspapers paid attention to the 1979 electioneering 
campaign of the five registered political parties under the military showed that 
greater attention was given to political parties strongest in the locations of those 
newspapers. For example, the Daily Sketch and The Punch gave the highest 
coverage to the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) while the Daily Star reported the 
campaign activities of the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) overwhelmingly.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo who came second both in the nationwide 
newspaper coverage and the presidential election got his worst votes from Imo 
(7,335 votes) and Anambra (9,063 votes) the area where Daily Star which placed
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UPN last in its preferential coverage of the electioneering campaigns, is mostly 
read. He, however, came first in Oyo, Ondo, Ogun, Lagos and Bendel states and 
took second in Kwara state where the Daily Sketch and Punch which gave him the 
best coverage are mostly patronised.
Table 12 Parties and Newspapers
Parties Sketch Star Punch
GNPP 10.6% 13.8% 6.5%
NPN 29.5% 21.3% 28.7%
NPP 16.7% 33.1% 24.5%
PRP 12.7% 21.3% 6.5%
UPN 30.5% 10.5% 33.8%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Source: The Universities of Ibadan and Lagos Libraries, 
the Sketch Library, Nigeria, and the British Library at 
7.5 Conclusion Colindale, London, NW9 5HE. (My own calculations).
This section has examined Nigerian political communications in the 
first phase of the Second Republic. It also analyzed the press coverage of the 
campaigns that led to the 1979 general elections. Although the media were under 
the military government, yet, they were favourable to some political parties and 
unfavourable to others. It was assumed that since the military was supposed to be 
neutral, the media under its ownership and control would also be neutral, be more
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responsible in providing truthful, comprehensive and intelligent account of the 
day’s events, serving as a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism, in 
projecting a representative picture of the constituent groups in society and in the 
presentation and clarification of the goals and values of the society.
However the state media paid the greatest attention to the coverage 
of the electioneering campaigns of those political parties strongest in their 
locations while the federal press which was supposed to be ‘national’ in ‘coverage 
character’ did' not give equal amount of coverage to the registered political 
parties; also, the federal press did not behave "nationally"; the papers neither 
conformed to the requirements of the theory of a socially responsible press nor 
upheld the constitutional provisions on the obligations of the mass media, and all 
these have had serious implications for the Nigerian political communication 
system.
Given the amount of coverage received by the five registered
political parties, their performance in the various elections and the consequent
results of the 1979 general elections, there is evidence to suggest a high .. positive
correlation between election campaign coverage and election performance of the
parties and their candidates. For instance, the NPN which had the highest
nationwide mass media coverage than all other political parties came first in the
1979 elections. The UPN which had the second highest media coverage came 
#
second, Dr Azikjjtwe and his NPP came third both in the nationwide mass media 
coverage and the presidential elections. In fact, Dr Azikiwe took the first position 
in Imo and Anambra where Daily Star which gave him the best coverage is best
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read. Other presidential candidates - Awolowo, Shagari - also came first in 
coverage and elections in their catchment areas namely, the West and the North.
Malam Aminu Kano who was given the fourth best nationwide 
newspaper coverage also took fourth in the presidential election. The same is true 
of Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri who came last both in newspaper coverage and the 1979 
presidential elections.
When the Federal Electoral Commission declared the presidential 
candidate of the NPN, Shehu Shagari, winner of the presidency, the U PN  
presidential candidate, ObatSmi Awolowo, together with the leader o f the GNPP, 
Ibrahim Waziri, went to the Supreme Court of Nigeria where its justices 
surprisingly upheld the submission of the NPN’s leading counsel who argued that 
mathematically, two-thirds of nineteen was twelve, and two-thirds (12%). Despite 
its victory that was upheld by the Supreme Court, the NPN could still not form 
its Federal cabinet because it did not have enough Senators and members in the 
House of Representatives in the National Assembly to pass any of the President’s 
bills and other legislative requests. It therefore had to enter into a political 
alliance with the NPP, led by Nnamdi Azikiwe. But the alliance did not last as 
both the contracting parties accused each other of a series of violations of the 
accord and bad faith.
The NPN, however, continued in power until the 1983 general 
elections were held. The fuller implications of the influence of media ownership 
on Nigerian political communications will be better appreciated when I examine 
the press coverage of the campaigns that led to the last phase of the Second 
Republic - the 1983 general elections and this is the focus of Chapter 8.
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In analyzing the Daily Times and the New Nigerian - between 
December, 1978 and July, 1979, we examined a total of 76,663 column-centimetres 
of news stories, which were also categorized into favourable, unfavourable and 
neutral front, back, special, editorial and inside (other) pages of the newspapers.43 
(See Tables 13 and 14).
The period covered was from the date the five recognised political 
parties were registered to the eve of the first elections: that is from December 22, 
1978 to July 10, 1979. This involved analyzing the contents of a total of 341 issues 
of the newspapers.
The Sketch. Star and Punch Newspapers were also analyzed on the 
basis of ownership. The Sketch was owned by the governments of Oyo, Ogun and 
Ondo States, the Star was owned by the Anambra State Government while the 
Punch was a privately-owned newspaper during the period under study.
The Sketch sells most in the western states of the country. Out of 
its daily sale of 83,000 copies, 66,000 are sold in the five western states - Lagos, 
Oyo, Ondo, Ogun and Bendel. It is located in Ibadan.
The Star is read most in the eastern states of the country. Of its 
daily circulation of 150,000 copies, 113,850 are sold in the four eastern states - 
Cross River, Rivers, Imo and Anambra. Its headquarters is at Enugu.
The Punch, located in Lagos, tries to maintain some neutrality. It 
concentrates on sales in Lagos and some other more easily accessible centres, 
presumably to maximise advertising revenue and reduce overheads. It had a daily 
circulation o f 120,000 copies during the period under study.
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In analyzing the three papers two issues each were analyzed per 
week making 6 newspapers every week. On the whole 39 weeks were used and 
a content analysis of 390 editions of the three newspapers was carried out. The 
study covered the day the ban on politics was lifted - September 21, 1978 - to the 
day of the presidential elections on August 4, 1979. The last two weeks of 
September 1978 and all the weeks from October 1978 to July 1979 as well as the 
first week of August 1979 were included in the study.
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TABLE 13
A TABULAR PRESENTATION OF THE TOTAL COLUMN CENTIMETRES OF NEWS STORIES ANALYZED IN THE DAILY TIMES
PARTIES F+ F- F B+ B- B 0+ 0- 0 S+ S- S E+ E- E TOTAL PERCENT
GNPP 749 - 225 996 - 97 2962 26 704 1100 - - - - - 6859 13.8
NPN 1376 77 32 1482 - 326 6604 126 728 1911 - 60 - - - 12722 25.6
NPP 1158 - 344 1643 56 376 4309 115 983 1403 - 326 - - 60 10773 21.6
PRP 644 - 459 834 35 289 2408 5 357 655 - - - - - 5686 11.4
UPN 2259 28 31 1925 23 157 6272 146 342 2445 - 57 - - 60 13745 27.6
TOTAL 6186 105 1091 6880 114 1245 22555 418 3114 7514 - 443 - - 120 49785 100
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TABLE 14
A TABULAR PRESENTATION OF THE TOTAL COLUMN CENTIMETRES OF NEffS STORIES ANALYZED IN THE NEW NIGERIAN
PARTIES F+ F- F B+ B- B Oh- 0- 0 S+ S- S E+ E- E TOTAL %
GNPP 161 105 - 60 - - 2742 31 284 200 - - - - 64 3647 13.5
NPN 262 - 86 230 - 23 5540 76 818 1023 - - - - - 8058 30.0
NPP 10 76 239 177 65 - 2611 236 443 1083 - 16 - - 33 4989 18.6
PRP 42 - 84 - - - 1996 27 460 571 56 17 - - - 3253 12.1
UPN 460 - - 113 - - 4973 128 467 430 313 47 - - - 6931 25.8
TOTAL 935 181 409 580 65 23 17862 498 2472 3307 369 80 - - 97 26878 100
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KEY TO TABLES 13 AND 14
F + = Favourable Front Page
F- = Unfavourable Front Page
F = Neutral Front Page
B + = Favourable Back Page
B- = Unfavourable Back Page
B = Neutral Back Page
o+ = Favourable Other Page
O- = Unfavourable Other Pages
O = Neutral Other Pages
S + = Favourable Special Pages
s- = Unfavourable Special Pages
s = Neutral Special Pages
E + = Favourable Editorials
E- = Unfavourable Editorials
E — Neutral Editorials
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TABLE 15
NIGERIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS 1979 - THE OVERALL PARTY POSITIONS
PARTY HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 
449
SENATE
95
STATE ASSEMBLIES 
1347
STATE
GOVERNORS
19
PRESIDEN­
TIAL
ELECTION
AGGREGATE
AVERAGE
A B C A B A B C A B
NPN 168 16 38% 36 36% 487 17 36% 7 34% 36%
UPN 25% 111 9 30% 28 25% 333 11 26% 5 29% 27%
NPP 17% 78 9 17% 16 17% 226 10 16% 3 17% 16%
PRP 11% 49 2 7% 7 11% 144 5 11% 2 10% 10%
GNPP 10% 43 7 8% 8 11% 157 13 11% 2 10% 10%
K e y : a - P e r c e n t a g e  o f  S e a t s  Won
b - T o t a l  Number o f  S e a t s  Won 
c - Number o f  S t a t e s  (1 9 )  i n  w h ich  S e a t s  Won
S o u r c e : N i g e r i a  S i n c e  1 9 7 0 ,  K irk -G reen e  and Rimmer, (London: Hodder and
S t o u g h t o n ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p . 4 1 ) .
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NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SEVEN
1. General Olusegun Obasanjo, the then Head of the Federal Military 
Government, made this statement while lifting the ban on the game of 
politics on Tuesday, September 21, 1978. For more details, see The 
Nigeria Year Book. 1979, pp. 9-20.
2. See the Text of a message broadcast to the nation by General Murtala 
Ramat Muhammed on the occasion of Nigeria’s 15th Independence 
anniversary. 1 October. 1975fLagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1975.)
3. Ayo Irikefe et al., ‘Report of the Panel on the creation of States’ (Lagos: 
Federal Ministry of Information, 1976.)
4. McGaughey, Robert H: "1972 American Elections" (PhD Thesis, Ohio 
University, 1972).
5. Lazarfeld, Paul F. et al; The Peoples Choice (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1948).
6. According to a Report on the Operation of the Federal Electoral 
Commission FEDECO (Lagos: Nigeria, FEDECO, 1979) pp. 51-4, a total 
of 52 political associations publicized their intention to form political 
parties. Of these 52 organizations, 40 requested registration forms from 
the Electoral Commission, but only 19 officially applied for registration as 
political parties by the December 18, 1978 deadline.
FEDECO’s report broke down the list of the 52 organizations into the 
three categories of announced, requested forms, and applied for 
registration. Only five of the parties we^ adjudged by FEDECO to have 
satisfied the laid down criteria. The five registered parties being:
(1) the Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP);
(2) the National Party of Nigeria (NPN);
(3) the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP);
(4) the People’s Redemption Party (PRP); and
(5) Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN).
7. The Electoral Decree (Decree No. 73 of 1977) provided guidelines for the 
formation and registration of parties, defining a political party as ‘any 
association of persons whose activities include canvassing for votes in 
support for a candidate for election to the office of President, Vice- 
President, Governor, Deputy Governor or membership of a Legislative 
House of a Local Government’, with the qualification added that ‘no 
association other tha.n a political party shall canvass for votes for any 
candidate at an election or contribute to the funds of any political party or 
the election expenses of any candidate at any election’. The Decree also 
provided that no association shall function as a political party unless
(a) the names and addresses of its national officers are registered with 
the Electoral Commission;
(b) its membership is open to every Nigerian citizen irrespective o f his 
place of origin, religion, ethnic group or sex;
(c) a copy of its constitution is registered in the principal office of the 
Electoral Commission;
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(d) has established party offices in 13 of the 19 states of the federation: 
(a) its objectives conformed with Chapter II of the 1979 constitution 
on The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy; among a host of other criteria.
For more details on the background to the Second Republic and the 1979 
Elections in Nigeria, see:
Dudley, Billy J.,"The Nigerian Elections of 1979: The Voting Decision" 
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. XIX, Number 3, 
November, 1981, pp. 276-297;
Joseph, Richard,"Political Parties and Ideology in Nigeria" Review of 
African Political Economy. No. 13 May-August, 1978, pp. 78-90;
Joseph, Richard,"The Ethnic Trap: Notes on the Nigerian Campaign and 
Elections, 1978-79". Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Opinion 1/2, 
Spring/Summer, 1981, pp. 17-23.
Phillips, Claude S,"Nigeria’s New Political Institutions, 1975 - The Journal 
of Modern African Studies. Vol. 18, No. 1, 1980, pp. 1-22;
Koehn, Peter, "Prelude to Civilian Rule: The Nigeria!) Elections of 1979" 
Africa Today Vol.28, N o.l, 1 June, 1981, pp.17-45; and
Graf, William, "Issues and substance in the prescription of Liberal- 
Democratic forms for Nigeria’s Third Republic" in African Affairs. Vol. 88, 
No. 350 January 1989, pp. 91-100; to mention just a few.
8. See The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 (Lagos: 
Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, 1979).
9. All five presidential candidates had previously occupied high positions in
the federal government, two of them (Awolowo and Shagari also served as 
deputy chairmen of the Executive Council, and hence as leading civilian 
politicians in the military government in 1967-71 and 1971-75, respectively. 
Alhaji, Mallam Aminu Kano also served as Federal Commissioner for 
Health under the military while Alhaji Waziri and Dr Azikiwe were 
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CHAPTER 8
NIGERIAN POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE 
SECOND REPUBLIC: THE LAST PHASE
Introduction
This chapter examines the influence of media ownership on Nigerian 
political communications during the last phase of the Second Republic, the 1983 
general elections. It analyses the coverage of the campaigns leading to the 
elections by looking at the contents of the news stories carried by the state and 
federal government newspapers, newspapers owned by political parties, politicians 
and private ’independent’ owners as well as the coverage of the elections by the 
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (F.R.C.N.), the Nigerian Television 
Authority (N.T.A.), the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State (B.C.O.S.) among 
a host of other allied electronic media.
By October 1979 when the politicians who won the elections of the 
Second Republic were sworn in, ruling political parties at the Federal and State 
levels in control of governments automatically took over the ownership and 
control of the print and electronic media under their jurisdictions. This situation 
helped in the intensification of old ethnic antagonisms and the atmosphere of 
political communication seethed with bitter rivalry and enmity. The press became 
completely immersed in the vortex of partisan politics and was in no position to
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prepare the people for the challenges of the new presidential system of 
government.
The press openly supported one political party against the other, 
fuelled embers of tribalism, sectionalism, and ethnic chauvinism all o f which 
culminated in fragmentation and disintegration that again threatened the unity and 
stability of the Nigerian state. The media were unable to develop the required 
ethos of professionalism - impartiality, responsibility, objectivity, and balance in 
reporting political events, national issues, campaigns and activities - as social 
commentators, tools of political communication, watch-dogs, and path-finders for 
the public. This partisan political coloration of the media incapacitated and 
prevented them from performing their functions of educating, informing and 
entertaining the public. The veracity of the media and the credibility of their 
practitioners became questionable. This was one of the contributory factors to the 
fall of the Second Republic in December 1983.
By the time the 1983 election campaigns began, it was difficult to 
distinguish between the ruling political parties and the mass media under them. 
Each political party made use of its own press; personalities were attacked while 
the’real’campaign issues and principles were ignored. There were allegations that 
many media practitioners during the period were on sale. Some were said to have 
been on secret pay-rol^of politicians, some analyzed issues and events from the 
point of view of their political mentors, some reported press conferences they 
never attended, while some carried releases that were never issued. Whereas, 
media practitioners are expected to seek the truth, teach the truth and preserve 
the truth, some of the media practitioners became blinded by the maxim: "facts
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are sacred, comments are free". Thus, campaigns for elections which in Nigeria 
as elsewhere, are crucial to national survival and political stability, caused serious 
problems in Nigeria’s Second Republic - internal rioting, arson, assassination, 
vandalism, hooliganism and exacerbated ethnic distrust and antagonism.
The consequences of all these were disastrous for the country.
a similar
Nigeria again began to manifesy drift and hopelessness which preceded the 
collapse of the First Republic’s experiment in democratic rule and over twenty 
years of military intervention. The signs were obvious and ominous: intense and 
violent political rivalry, unguarded and inflammatory public statements, deliberate 
destruction of public and private properties as well as brigandage. Eventually, the 
military intervened again.
8.1 The Newspapers
The Nigerian mass media’s coverage of political campaigns is 
examined in this section by analyzing stories on the campaign leading to the 1983 
general elections as published by 13 ‘national’ newspapers. These are the Daily 
Times, the New Nigerian^Herald, the Nigerian Observer, the Nigerian Standard. 
the Sketch, the Daily Star, the Nigerian Statesman, the Nigerian Tide, the Punch, 
the National Concord, the Satellite and the Nigerian Tribune.
The emergent picture in the content-analyses of these papers depicts 
the press ownership pattern of this phase of the Second Republic in which 32 per 
cent of the campaign stories were published in NPN-affiliated newspapers, 29.4 
per cent in UPN-affiliated newspapers, 27.3 per cent in NPP-affiliated newspapers 
with only 11.3 per cent published in new spapers whose owners were neither
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members of nor pledged any alliance officially to oneof the competing political 
parties. It is pertinent to mention that the G.N.P.P., the N.A.P. and the P.R.P. did 
not own or control any national newspapers during the 1983 election campaigns.
On the whole, the 13 newspapers concentrated on the NPN, the 
U PN and the NPP more than they did on the other three remaining parties - the 
GNPP, the NAP and the PRP. ! 36.1 per cent of the 1,504 stories
analyzed focused on the NPN, followed closely by the UPN with 34.2 per cent/ the 
NPP got 18.8 per cent, with a very sharp drop to NAP’s 2.8 per cent, PRP 2.1 per 
cent and GNPP 1.1 per cent. The rest of the stories focused on all the parties 
(2.3 per cent) on none of the parties (0.5 per cent) and 2.1 per cent on the 
Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA).1
Of all the campaign stories 11 per cent appeared in the Tribune. 
followed by Satellite (with 10.6 per cent), Times (10.2 per cent), Observer (9.4 per 
cent), Sketch (8.8 per cent), Herald (8.3 per cent), New Nieerian (7.8 per cent), 
Statesman (7.6 per cent), Concord (6.9 per cent), Star (5.7 per cent), Tide (5.3 
per cent), Punch (4.6 per cent) and Standard (3.5 per cent).
There was also an apparent lopsidedness relating to where the 
stories were published and where the stories originated. For instance, 21.7 per 
cent of the stories were published in Lagos, 19.9 per cent in Ibadan, 16.3 per cent 
at Enugu, followed by Benin (9.4 per cent), Ilorin (8.3 per cent), Kaduna (7.8 per 
cent). Owerri (7.6 per cent), Port Harcourt (5.3 per cent) and Jos (3.5 per cent). 
Using the popular ethnic classificatory method to divide the country into North 
(Hausa-Fulani), West (Yoruba), East (Ibo) and "minorities", 41.6 per cent o f the
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stories were published in the West, 26.6 per cent in the "minority" areas, 23.9 per 
cent in the East and 7.8 per cent in the North.
Moreover, 19.1 per cent of the stories originated from Lagos State, 
followed by Bendel (11.4 per cent), Anambra (8.5 per cent), Kano (6.6 per cent),
Oyo (6.5 per cent), Cross River (5.9 per cent), Ogun (5.8 per cent), Imo (5.7 per 
cent), Plateau (5.1 per cent), Rivers (3.7 per cent), Kwara (3.2 per cent), Benue 
(2.8 per cent), Gongola (2.8 per cent), Kaduna (2.4 per cent), Ondo (2.3 per 
cent), Bauchi (1.2 per cent), Borno (0.9 per cent), Niger (0.9 per cent, Sokoto (0.2 
per cent), and outside Nigeria (0.1 per cent). Stories whose origins were not 
indicated were 5 per cent of the total. (See Pages 2 and 84 for the Maps of Nigeria)
Another general picture that emerged was that the campaigns as 
reflected in the newspapers were uneducative and there was a concentration on
personalities. For instance, only 1.9 per cent of the campaign stories had
which focused on the "real" issues^ 
educative content,/the rest (98.1 per cent) consisted of uneducative news items
about events. Moreover, 52.3 per cent of the stories concentrated on the
personality of the politicians, followed by 11.6 per cent which focused on the
economy. Other themes focused on were announcements of campaign movements
(11 per cent), violence (8.4 per cent), religion (5.1 per cent), education (3.5 per
cent), health (2.3 per cent), housing (1.7 per cent), stability (1.5 per cent),
agriculture (1.3 per cent), minorities (0.7 per cent), foreign policy (0.4 per cent),
state creation (0.2 per cent) and others (0.1 per cent).
Major sources of such stories were campaign fields (34.8 per cent), 
police (0.8 per cent), news conferences (7.6 per cent), press statements (31.4 per 
cent), official engagements of candidate (0.9 per cent), candidate in transit (10.1
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per cent), non-staff of paper (6.0 per cent), and others (5.7 per cent). The 
sources o f the rest of the stories (2.7 per cent) were not indicated.
It is important to note that 31.4 per cent o f campaign stories in the 
newspapers were got from press statements, when compared to the amount got 
from outdoor campaigns which was (34.8 per cent).
8.2 The National Concord
T he National Concord is worth singling out again because it shows 
a very good example of how political party newspapers were used to attack 
political opponents. In the same vein, it is also a good example of how a political 
party press could become ‘non-partisan’ and ‘independent’ overnight when its 
owner is no longer tied to the apron strings of a political party or ideology. When 
its publisher and owner, Chief M.K.O. Abiola was still a ‘strong’ member of the 
NPN, the National Concord took to printing stories alleging that Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo and his UPN supporters had hatched a plot to subvert the constitution 
and were about to launch this plan over the radio by courtesy of a foreign radio 
station. The Kaduna-based Hausa language newspaper Gaskiva ta fi Kwabo (‘The 
Truth is Worth More than a Penny’), took this allegation further by quoting from 
a leading Kaduna State politician:
"The secret aims of the UPN continue to be exposed 
in relation to the plot and intrigue to destabilise the 
Federal Government of this country, to create 
disturbances, strife and civil war which will please 
Odumewgu Ojukw#, former Biafran secessionist 
leader, no end.
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The Deputy Leader of the Kaduna State House of 
Assembly, Alhaji Maccido Muhammad made this 
statement in Kaduna recently. He said that, as things 
stand at the moment, the UPN has sought assistance 
from organisations outside this country in a plan to 
prevent the Federal Government of this country from 
importing foodstuffs and to plot to create strife 
between the different communities of the country"2
Also, in a series of investigative journalism reports, the National Concord 
revealed how Awolowo, the leader of the UPN, had "immorally" acquired 360 
plots of land in reservation areas of Maroko Village of Lagos at a paltry purchase 
price of $1.5 million. This revelation of Awolowo’s capitalistic tendency 
constituted a political embarrassment to his image and credibility as a presidential 
aspirant who fancied and advocated socialism and its unquestionable acceptance 
in Nigeria. The Nigerian public, influenced by the National Concord's expose on 
Awolowo, began to doubt his sincerity and commitment to the masses if he had 
such an insatiable capitalistic urge. The public confidence in Awolowo’s integrity 
for the highest public office in the land^further eroded when his political party’s 
director of research and publicity said that Awolowo "had a right to own 
property...The fact that the UPN leader was preaching socialism did not mean 
that he should be a poor man".3 Meanwhile, the National Party of Nigeria, the 
arch-rival of the UPN, in a reaction to the Maroko land scandal, observed that 
Awolowo was "wearing a toga of deceit, wanting the nation to see him as a 
socialist while he was busy perpetuating capitalist ideas".4 When confronted by 
journalists to defend himself on the land scandal, Awolowo said that the issue was 
strictly personal and that the National Concord’s expose had not had any effect 
on his political career. But at a later press conference, Awolowo told reporters
-305-
that he had ceased to own the lands (360 plots) since February, 1976, when he 
transferred the land to his family company, Dideolu Estate Limited, which, he 
said, was a private limited liability company "in which the only shareholders are 
myself, my wife and our children."5
The National Concord, bent on smearing Awolowo’s political image, 
career and ambition and to prevent him from winning the presidency, questioned 
his probity in a series of editorials relating to the land scandal. These are some 
excerpts from two of such numerous editorials:
By multiple acts which can hardly pass moral, legal or 
ethical tests, chief Awolowo or Dideolu Estate 
Limited has held 360 plots of prime land, and we do 
not think this is good enough for someone who claims 
to be the most qualified person to be the President of 
Nigeria.6
The picture one gets from the Chiefs defence is not 
one of a socialist but a greedy, egocentric leader who 
however engaged in acts of philanthropy whenever 
his conscience pricks him.7
The credibility of the National Concord as an authoritative, 
respectable and non-tribal newspaper began to erode when it made a surprising 
U-turn to support the presidential candidature of Awolowo whom it ha^set out 
to discredit and destroy politically, as evidenced from the preceding pages. When 
the National Party of Nigeria, at a hurried party convention on June 12, 1982, 
renominated Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the incumbent President of Nigeria then as its 
flag-bearer for the 1983 general and presidential elections, the National Concord 
believed that its publisher, Abiola, had been jilted by an ungrateful party 
machinery. It thought that it was the turn of a Yoruba to be the party’s flag-
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bearer for the 1983 general elections in accordance with the party’s zoning policy. 
Its publisher, Abiola, ought to have been the choice. It was in preparation for 
Abiola’s presidential race, among other reasons, that the newspaper was 
established. And to accomplish that objective of becoming a serious presidential 
candidate capable of defeating U PN ’s Chief Awolowo, the National Concord had 
to expose what it believed to be Awolowo’s political scandals to tarnish his 
political image. Also, Awolowo hailed from the same Ogun state with Abiola, his 
fellow tribesman. Frustrated by denial of party nomination as a presidential 
candidate for the NPN, Abiola, at a press conference, announced his withdrawal 
from active and partisan politics. He also renounced his membership of the NPN  
and said that he did not plan to join any other party. H e accused the Hausa- 
Fulani (Northern) politicians in the NPN of treating the rest of the country as 
second class citizens. H e vowed to reject the leadership of anybody whom he did 
not consider to be as "competent" as himself and "who cannot show that he has 
contributed more as an individual to Nigeria."8 The leader of the UPN, Awolowo, 
sent him a telegram, congratulating him for having left darkness (NPN) and that 
the light he had just seen would make him free.
Its publisher, having left the NPN, the National Concord, in an 
editorial that tacitly endorsed the presidential candidature of Awolowo of the 
UPN, whom its previous editorials and expose"on the Maroko land episode had 
ridiculed, humiliated and scandalised, wrote in part:
"Chief Awolowo, veteran Nigerian politician and UPN  
leader, turned 74 on March 6, 1983. The elder 
statesman of Nigerian politics has cause to rejoice in 
the manner he has done in the last few days...When
-307-
in 1981 the chief stridently raissjthe alarm bell to 
warn the nation of the clouds gathering around her 
economy, he was accused of playing politics with the 
economy. Subsequent events proved him right. That 
has led to the perception of him in certain quarters 
as a far-sighted leader who could bail out our 
economy from the downturn in which it is now. It is 
a new Awo who is conciliatory to his opponents and 
is prepared to recognise the religious, ethnic and 
geographical complexities of Nigeria. H e certainly 
has come a long way since 1970. New vistas seem to 
be opening up for the UPN. The party hitherto 
perceived as a tribal outfit has made impressive 
gains in Cross River, Rivers, Kwara, Sokoto and 
Gongola states. The vistas opening for the chief and 
his UPN have already led to talks of the Mitterand 
principle operating in his favour this year. French 
President Mitterand got elected after so many tries. 
If Awo should be that lucky, it would certainly be a 
fitting crowning of the efforts of dogged and 
principled fighter who refused to permit the accident 
of his birth to keep him down... Awo’s grandfather, in 
the world beyond, would be proud of him. So is 
Nigeria. We rejoice with Awo on his 74th birthday.”9
The contradictions of the National Concord and its adaptation to 
the intrigues of the Nigerian politics are aptly summarised by a critic, thus:
"The image of the UPN leader which the Concord 
sold to the reading public is best summarised in the 
following attitudinal words and phrases which the 
newspaper used to describe Awolowo in many of its 
editorials: "aged and faded; truculent and irascible; 
naked; anarchist; tribalist; dictatorial; holier-than- 
thou; inconsistent; power monger; illusionist; false 
image; and mischievous." After its publisher had left 
the NPN, the image of Awolowo in the Concord 
changed to the following: ’far-sighted; dogged and 
principled fighter; democratic; consistent."10
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Within the same period, the National Concord carried the following 
editorials that derided the person of the former President, Shagari, whose 
administration and actions it had previously defended against mounting opposition 
from the other political parties, particularly the UPN and NPP. The editorials, 
in part, read:
Since 1979 President Shagari has tried to put on the 
garb of an innocent, pious, humble, honest gentleman 
o f  honour who was always being persecuted by 
opponents. Now it seems the real Shagari is 
breaking out of his shell.11
President Shagari has in the last fortnight given the 
country a cause for concern by his utterances which 
must not escape comment. Apart from claiming to 
have built hundreds of unnamed schools in 
(American) "Time" magazine, he also said he 
believed "there is a lot of corruption in the private 
sector." As if that was not enough insult to the 
intelligence of the generality of Nigerians, he also 
claimed there was nothing like food scarcity in the 
country...The President must not leave the impression 
that he has little respect for facts. How could anyone 
in his position dare say there is no food scarcity at a 
time food and other items cost 300 per cent more 
than when he took office? How could he leave the 
impression that corruption is limited to the private 
sector when public buildings and other property 
running into scores of millions have gone up in 
flames in order to cover shady financial deals, when 
his cabinet and party men are widely being accused 
of having amassed wealth by virtue o f their 
positions?"12
The above editorial excerpts typify the chicanery of the National 
Concord each time Nigeria’s political fortunes did not favour the interests o f its 
publisher. These editorials that appeared four months to the elections were
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undoubtedly aimed at influencing public opinion which would affect the outcome 
of the elections.
At a time when the public began to question what the National 
Concord really stood for as it suddenly switched to support the presidential 
candidature of its publisher’s fellow tribesman, some political thugs were 
suspected to have set ablaze the newspaper’s warehouse that housed its 
newsprints. The newspaper lost substantial bundles of its newsprints in the blaze. 
This happened when the 1983 general elections were about to begin. The public 
sympathy and support for the National Concord and its publisher were quite 
tremendous and encouraging. It was widely believed that some politicians who 
were being frustrated by Concord’s editorials and news coverage, decided to burn 
down the entire newsprints so that the newspaper would have nothing to print on 
as the NPN central government would not grant it import license to enable it 
place orders for newsprints.
The publisher of the National Concord was also involved in another 
political intrigue that had an international ramification, barely two months after 
the fire incident. The Nigerian Tribune and Daily Sketch, two influential pro- 
Awolowo and UPN newspapers, with Awolowo the owner of the former, carried 
an alarming news story in their respective editions that appeared the same day. 
Their identical new story had alleged that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) had concluded plans to "solve before the general elections the problems 
posed by the UPN leader, Awolowo, and Chief Abiola through operations 
‘heartburn and headache’ in which Abiola and Awolowo would be killed."13 The 
U.S. embassy promptly denied it. The Federal Nigerian Government set up a
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one-man investigative panel. The editors of the two newspapers, Tribune and 
Sketch, sought and got court order not to testify and disclose the source and 
authenticity of their report. Some people blamed the Russian KGB for planting 
the news story in the two media establishments. But a more plausible explanation 
seem ed to be that the UPN leader, Awolowo, and his party hierarchy 
masterminded the whole episode in order to draw Abiola and his National 
Concord closer to his side and the UPN. Identification of a common enemy that 
threatened to eliminate both of them physically, it was probably thought, would 
offer the gimmick and opportunity to win Abiola and his newspaper.
Following the bad example of the National Concord, other 
newspapers supporting one or other of the six registered political parties in the 
1983 elections reported a series of allegations against their rivals. For instance, 
the Nigerian Observer was owned by Bendel State government controlled by the 
UPN in 1979. But immediately after the 1983 elections and Dr. S. Ogbemclia, the 
state NPN gubernatorial candidate was declared the winner, the Observer changed 
its policies against the UPN and now in favour of the NPN. In the same vein, the 
Nigerian Herald owned by the Kwara State government controlled by the NPN  
in 1979 changed its policies against the NPN and in favour of the UPN when the 
UPN gubernatorial candidate Senator C. Adebayo was declared winner in the 
1983 elections. Also, the Star of Anambra owned by government controlled by 
NPP in 1979 changed policies in favour of NPN and against the NPP when the 
State NPN gubernatorial candidate Chief C. Onoh was declared winner in the 
1983 elections.
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The 1983 elections were not only rigged>but false and bogus election
figures were also released over the Federal Government-owned media and those
of the states the NPN controlled. The opposition parties in control of the other
states also released their own election result figures that conflicted with those of
the NPN, through the media they also controlled. As a matter of fact, the then
governor of Imo State, Samuel Mbakwe, without waiting for the Federal Electoral
Commission to officially announce and release the gubernatorial election result
for Imo State, went and seized both the radio and television studios his
government owned and controlled, to make a live broadcast declaring himself
winner. The Imo Television had just been built few months prior to the 1983
general elections. The following day, the Imo State Government-owned
like
newspaper, the Nigerian Statesman, unstatesman^carried the election results as 
declared by the then governor Mbakwe. Governor Mbakwe took the Federal 
Electoral Commission, FEDECO, and the Federal media unawares. H e outfoxed 
them. He had suspected a foul play. His fears were not unfounded as numerous 
court cases and judgments that followed the elections nullified some election 
results and reverted them to what the courts thought to be the real result. Some 
appeal courts over-ruled the judgments of the lower courts. The Federal Supreme 
Court, the highest court in the land, also did over-rule and uphold some of the 
rulings of the Appeal Courts. In Ondo State, an angry mob burned down the 
Nigerian Television Authority station, Akure, for allegedly declaring falsified 
results that made the incumbent governor the loser. Eventually, the incumbent 
governor of Ondo State emerged the winner after numerous court verdicts and 
counter-verdicts.
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Many houses, vehicles were burnt while many people were killed 
during the elections.
In analyzing the 13 national newspapers, a content-analysis of 1,504 
stories was carried out on the campaign leading to the 1983 general elections. 
The starting point for our analysis was the month of March, 1983, by which time 
all the contending political parties had officially launched their campaigns for the 
elections. The People’s Redemption Party (PRP) was the last party to launch its 
election bid, and it did this in Kaduna, Kaduna State on 27 February. Before this, 
the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) had opened the campaign race in Gboko, 
Benue State, on Saturday, 22 January, followed by the Great Nigeria Peoples 
Party (GNPP) in Sokoto, Sokoto State, the next day, the Unity Party of Nigeria 
(UPN) in Lagos on 29 January, the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) in Kano and 
the Nigeria Advance Party (NAP) in Bauchi - both on Sunday, 26 February. The 
terminal date for analysis was 3 August.
The Electoral Act decreed a campaign truce between 3 and 6 
August, when the Presidential election was held. Subsequent campaigns were 
mainly summaries of earlier positions, hence nothing is lost by not considering the 
period of the elections themselves.
Since the last launching by individual parties was on February 26, 
it was decided that two months would be randomly picked from subsequent 
months up to July, 1983. The two months randomly selected by balloting were 
March and May. For each of these two months, issues of the 13 newspapers for 
the first 15 days were used for analysis. This gave a sample size of 30 editions for 
each newspaper, and a total of 390 editions for all the papers.
TABLE 16
OWNERSHIP ORIENTATIONS OF NIGERIA*S MAJOR NEWSPAPERS IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC
MIXED PARTY GOVERNMENT POLITICAL PRIVATE POLITICAL
NEWSPAPERS AND NON- MONOPOLY/ PARTY/ NON-PARTY OWNER AFFILIATION READERSHIP CIRCULATION
PARTY CONTROL POLITICIAN NON-GOVERN­
MENTAL
Concord * Chief M.K.O. 
Abiola
N.P.N.
(later private)
National
i
400,000
Herald * * Kwara State 
Govt.
N.P.N.
(later UPN)
National 75,000
New Nigerian * * Federal
Government
N.P.N. National 150,000
Observer * * Bendel State 
Govt.
U.P.N.
(later N.P.N.)
National 100,000
Punch * Chief 0. 
Aboderin
Independent National 150,000
Satellite * Chief
Nwobodo
N.P.P. Eastern Region 20,000
Sketch •it * Oyo, Ogun, 
Ondo State 
Governments
U.P.N. National 240,000
Standard * * Plateau 
State Govt.
N.P.P. National 50,000
Star * * Anambra 
State Govt.
N.P.P.
(later N.P.N.)
National 75,000
Statesman * * Imo State 
Government
N.P.P. National 80,000
Tide * * Rivers State 
Govt.
N.P.N. National 50,000
Times * * Federal
Government
N.P.N. National 425,000
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TABLE 17
NIGERIAN DAILY NEWSPAPERS AS AT 1991
NEWSPAPER'S NAME PLACE OF PUBLICATION OWNER CIRCULATION
D a i l y  Times Lagos 60% F e d e r a l  Government 4 0 0 ,0 0 0
E v e n in g  Times Lagos 60% F e d e r a l  Government 1 0 0 ,0 0 0
New N i g e r i a n Kaduna F e d e r a l  Government 1 5 0 ,0 0 0
The T rum peter B a u ch i B au ch i S t a t e  Government 2 0 ,0 0 0
N a t i o n a l  Concord I k e j a ,  Lagos C h ie f  M.K.O. A b i o l a 4 0 0 ,0 0 0
The G u ard ian I s o l d  Read, O s h e d i ,  Lagos C h ie f  I b r u 2 5 0 ,0 0 0
G u ard ian  E x p r e s s  (E v e n in g ) I s o l o  Read, O s h o d i , Lagos C h ie f  I b r u 5 0 ,0 0 0
The Punch I k e j a ,  Lagos C h ie f  A b e d e r in 1 5 0 ,0 0 0
E v e n in g  Punch I k e j a ,  Lagos C h ie f  A b© derin 5 0 ,0 0 0
D a i l y  S k e tc h Ib ad an G overnm ents o f  O yo, Ogun and Onde 2 4 0 ,0 0 0
E v e n in g  S k e tc h Ib ad an G overnm ents o f  Oyo, Ogun and Ond© 1 0 0 ,0 0 0
N i g e r i a n  H e r a ld I l e r i n Kwara S t a t e  Government 7 5 ,0 0 0
N i g e r i a n  T r ib u n e Ib ad an C hie  0 .  Awelew© 6 5 ,0 0 0
The S a t e l l i t e Enugu P r i v a t e 2 0 ,0 0 0
D a i l y  S t a r Enugu Anambra S t a t e  Government 7 5 ,0 0 0
E v e n in g  S t a r Enugu Anambra S t a t e  Government 2 5 ,0 0 0
N i g e r i a n  O b se r v e r B e n in  C i t y B en d e l  S t a t e  Government 1 0 0 ,0 0 0
The S cop e Y o la G ongola  S t a t e  Government 2 0 ,0 0 0
N i g e r i a n  C h r o n ic l e C a la b a r C ross  R iv e r  S t a t e  Government 5 0 ,0 0 0
N i g e r i a n  S ta te s m a n O w erri Imo S t a t e  Government 8 0 ,0 0 0
N i g e r i a n  S ta n d a r d J e s P l a t e a u  S t a t e  Government 5 0 ,0 0 0
N i g e r i a n  T id e P e r t - H a r c o u r t R iv e r s  S t a t e  Government 5 0 ,0 0 0
The V anguard L agos P r i v a t e  (Sam Amuka-Pemu) 6 5 ,0 0 0
Triumph Kanfc Kan© S t a t e  Government 5 0 ,0 0 0
The R e p o r te r Kaduna R td . G e n e r a l  Musa Shehu Y a r 'a d u a 2 0 ,0 0 0
D a i l y  News L agos A lh aj  i  L . J akande 2 0 ,0 0 0
The N i g e r i a n  V o ic e Makurdi Benue S t a t e  Government 2 0 ,5 0 0
L agos S t a t e  N ew spaper I k e j a ,  L agos Lagos S t a t e  Government 2 5 ,0 0 0
(L agos  News)
The R e p u b l ic Lagos P r i v a t e  - C h ie f  W. Femi A j a y i 2 0 ,0 0 0
N e w s l in e Minna N ig e r  S t a t e  Government 2 0 ,0 0 0
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8,3 The Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCflh and the Nigerian 
Television Authority fNTA)
By the time the 1983 election campaigns took off,14 there were about 40 
radio stations in Nigeria and about 30 television stations. Out of the 40 radio 
stations, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was controlling 28, the Unity Party 
of Nigeria (UPN) had 5, the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) 3, the Great Nigeria 
Peoples’ Party (GNPP) turned UPN/NPP governments of Gongola and Borno 
States were controlling one each with the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) 
turned NPP governments of Kano and Kaduna also controlling one each.15
Similarly, out of the 30 television stations in the country, the NPN  
Federal Government owned 22, the UPN State governments owned 5, the NPP 
2, and one was owned by the PRP turned NPP government of Kano State.
With this ownership structure, it was to be expected that the media 
would become megaphones (mouthpieces) of their owners during the elections, 
thus reflecting the influence of media ownership on political communications in 
Nigeria’s 1983 general elections. The Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria 
(FRCN) carried news bulletins of various kinds between January and December, 
1983. These included National News Summary comprising 06.00, 08.00, 11.00, 
14.00,17.00,20.00,21.00, 23.00 and fl&OO hours bulletins. National Network News 
Bulletins at 22.00, 07.00 and 16.00 hours were also carried by the Corporation, as 
well as News Panorama, Editorial Reviews and External News Bulletins.
Between January and December 1983, the FRCN carried a total of 
21,468 news stories, making and average of 1,789 news stories monthly. Out of 
the 1,789 stories carried in January, 1983, about 739 or 41.3 per cent were on
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elections. Out of the 739 elections stories, 43 or 5.81 per cent were for the 
GNPP, 27 or 3.65 per cent for NAP, 452 or 61.16 per cent for NPN, 96 or 12.99 
per cent for NPP, 20 or 2.70 per cent for PRP and 101 or 13.66 per cent for the 
UPN.
In February of the same year, a total of 1,098 stories were carried 
on elections. Out of this number, the GNPP had 70 or 6.37 per cent, NAP 67 or 
6.10 per cent, NPN 564 or 51.41 per cent, NPP 124 or 11.29 per cent, PRP 53 or 
4.82 per cent and 220 stories or 20.03 per cent were carried on the UPN.
In March, 1983, 1,097 news stories were carried by the FRCN out 
of this number, 103 or 9.38 per cent election stories were carried in favour of the 
GNPP, NAP had 109 or 9.93 per cent, NPN 503 or 48.83 per cent, NPP 142 or 
12.94 per cent, PRP 90 or 8.19 per cent and the UPN recorded 150 or 13.67 per 
cent election stories.
In April, 1,320 election stories were carried. Out of this number, 
the GNPP had 133 or 10.07 per cent, the NAP 137 or 10.37 per cent, the NPN  
570 or 43.18 per cent, the NPP 154 or 11.66 per cent, the PRP 109 or 8.25 per 
cent and the UPN 217 or 16.43 per cent.
The figures for the month of May on election stories are 1,476 total 
election stories, GNPP 148 or 10.02 per cent, NAP 170 or 11.51 per cent, NPN  
592 or 40.10 per cent, NPP 173 or 11.72 per cent, PRP 122 or 8.26 per cent and 
the UPN 271 or 18.36 per cent.
In June, 1,371 election stories were carried and the share per parties 
were, GNPP 147 or 10.72 per cent, NAP 168 or 12.25 per cent, NPN 506 or 36.90
TABLE 18
OWNERSHIP OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA BY COMPETING POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS 
IN NIGERIA. THE LAST PHASE OF THE COUNTRY'S SECOND REPUBLIC
RADIO STATIONS
TOTAL GNPP % NAP % NPN % NPP % PRP % UPN %
40 02 5.0 NIL 0.0 28 70.00 03 7.5 02 5.0 05 12.5
TELEVISION
STATIONS
30 NIL 0.0 NIL 0.0 22 73.33 02 6.66 01 3.33 05 16.66
TOTAL ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA
70 02 2.85 NIL 0.0 50 71.43 05 7.14 03 4.28 10 14.28
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per cent, NPP 198 or 14.44 per cent, PRP 129 or 9.40 per cent and the UPN 233 
or 16.26 per cent. In July, 1,531 election stories were carried. Out of this 
number, the GNPP had 172 or 11.23%, NAP 171 or 11.16%, NPN 558 or 36.44%, 
NPP 204 or 13.32%, PRP 149 or 9.73% and UPN 277 or 8.09%.
In August, 1,765 election stories were carried by the FRCN out of 
this number, the GNPP had 204 or 11.55 per cent, NAP 270 or 15.29 per cent, 
NPN 592 or 33.54 per cent, NPP 223 or 12.63 per cent, PRP 191 or 10.82 per 
cent, and UPN 285 or 16.14 per cent.
In September, 373 election stories were carried. Out of this 
number, the GNPP had 20 or 5.36 per cent, NAP 17 or 4.55 per cent, NPN 204 
or 56.03 per cent, PRP 14 or 3.75 per cent, NPP 45 or 12.06 per cent, and the 
UPN 73 or 19.57 per cent.
The October figures are 347 election stories, GNPP 18 or 5.18 per 
cent, NAP 19 or 5.47 per cent, NPN 200 or 57.63 per cent, NPP 33 or 9.51 per 
cent, PRP 11 or 3.17 per cent and UPN 66 or 19.02 per cent.
In November, 197 election stories were carried. Out of this number, 
the GNPP had 12 or 6.09 per cent, NAP 14 or 7.10 per cent, NPN 101 or 51.26 
per cent, NPP 21 or 10.65 per cent, PRP 9 or 4.56 per cent and UPN 40 or 20.30 
per cent.
Before the military take-over on December 31st, 1983, 151 stories 
had been carried on elections. Out of this number, the GNPP had 9 or 5.96 per 
cent, the NAP 7 or 4.63 per cent, the NPN 87 or 57.61 per cent, the NPP 20 or 
13.25 per cent, the PRP 4 or 2.64 per cent and the UPN 24 or 15.89 per cent.
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It is no exaggeration to say that gping through the amount of 
election stories carried on the NPN compared with those stories carried in favour 
of other parties, the FRCN, because of the ownership factor by the then NPN  
controlled federal government, demonstrated open support for the coverage of the 
NPN campaign activities and programmes thus giving preferential treatment to the 
party on political communications in the 1983 general election.
It is pertinent and valuable to give some ‘live illustrations’ of some 
of the kinds of stories carried on the political parties. Prior to the 22nd January 
1983, the day on which campaigns for the election actually started, we noticed that 
most of the news stories were carried by the FRCN to prepare the minds of the 
electorate for the election. For instance, on January 14, the FRCN carried the 
following news story as part of political communication with the people on the 
general elections.
Elections
"Political parties in the country have been called upon 
to ensure a peaceful atmosphere during the 
campaigns for the forthcoming general election.
The call was made by the Bendel State Publicity 
Secretary of the UPN crusade Chief Sunny 
Omoregbe while speaking to Newsmen in Benin.
He said that the country could no longer afford a 
situation where political opponents saw themselves as 
enemies.
Chief Omoregbe pointed out that Nigeria would only 
continue to be a leading African nation if its 
experiment in democracy was successful.
He therefore, called on the Federal Electoral 
Commission (FEDECO) to ensure a free and fair 
elections".
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Also, we noticed that very close to the elections the FRCN  
embarked upon some educative, informative and persuasive broadcasts, jingles 
and stories. The following are some of the ‘live examples’ of such bulletins:
July 30. 1983 Count Down ’83
"By this time next week, we must have cast our votes 
in the first election.
Don’t be used for thuggery and confusion".
"The beginning of the general election is six days 
away. Ensure that you conduct yourself peacefully on 
the voting day and throughout the period of 
elections".
Although the FRCN organised a programme o f ‘political broadcasts’ 
for all political parties, the NPN got preferential treatment in the process of 
headline casting, news story placement, actuality allotment as well as the quality 
and quantity of political communication stories on the elections. Stories were 
carried obviously to campaign openly for the NPN even when the campaign 
period had not started.
For example, the FRCN carried a news story as a campaign strategy 
for the NPN on 10/1/83 - thus:
"The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) has again been 
described as the only political party that is national in 
character and capable of bringing about the much 
needed unity and development in Nigeria.
This assertion was made in Lagos yesterday (9/1/83) 
by Chief Francis Ijewere while talking with an FRCN  
correspondent during his fiftieth birthday celebration.
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Chief Ijewere who is a senatorial aspirant in Agbazilo 
local government area of Bendel State also said that 
any political party founded on tribal basis with 
clannish inclination can never stand the test o f time."
Our research has also discovered that out of every 10 news stories 
carried by the FRCN on elections, 5 were always on the NPN and the NPN  
controlled Federal Government, 2 for the UPN, 1 for the NPP, 1 for the GNPP, 
and 1 shared by the PRP and NAP.
By the time the campaigns started officially on elections on 22.
January, 1983, more news stories on elections were carried. The higher the 
number of the news stories, the higher the amount of stories carried in favour of 
the NPN activities and party programmes.
Immediately the NPN launched its campaign on 22 January, 
1983, the FRCN made it a point of duty to say something positive and favourable 
to the NPN in all the news bulletins - morning, afternoon and evening. The 
following are some ‘live illustrations’:
23/1/83
"President Shehu Shagari has enumerated some of 
the achievements of his administration since its 
inception in 1979.
He was speaking at the launching o f the NPN  
General Election Campaign in Gboko, Benue State, 
yesterday.
They include paving way for the creation o f more 
states this year.
In this connection, the President called on all other 
political parties to join with the National Party of
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Nigeria (NPN) in its crusade for more states in a 
more elastic democracy".
Gboko ’83
"President Shehu Shagari has in Gboko reiterated his 
party’s determination to ensure that more states are 
created in the country this year.
Speaking at the launching of the party’s campaign for 
the elections, President Shagari invited other political 
parties to join the NPN in the crusade.
On defence, he said that the law enforcement 
agencies had taken steps to check some activities 
designed to impair the country’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity".
"President Shehu Shagari has called on all members 
of the National Party of Nigeria to sink their 
differences to enable the party to succeed at this 
year’s polls.
H e made the call yesterday at the launching of the 
NPN General Election Campaign in Gboko, Benue 
State.
The President said that each member of the party 
should strive to be an agent of peace and harmony 
among their brethren".
Such preferential treatments o f political communication on the 
election were not meted out to other political parties. Instead, most of the news 
stories carried by the NPN-owned FRCN in 1983 on other competing political 
parties were either to ridicule them or curry favour for the NPN. In fact, stories 
carried on these other parties were manifestations of naked suppression of their 
activities or at best dissemination of half-truth, mis-truth, jaundiced reporting and 
total ‘black out’ of the campaign endeavours of such parties.
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For example, the very day the UPN campaign was launched in 
Lagos 29/1/83, the following story was carried by the FRCN on the UPN:
29/1/83 Decam pees - Ovo
"Members o f the Afolabi and Omisade factions of the 
Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) in Oyo State have 
formally declared for the National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN).
The ceremony which took place at the Iyaganku Press 
Centre, during a news conference was witnessed by 
about three thousand decampees from the UPN.
Addressing the News Conference on behalf o f the 
two factions, Mr. Babatunde Babalola from Ejigbo 
Local Government area gave reasons why they were 
decamping from the UPN.
Mr. Babalola stated that the principle of democracy, 
justice and fair play which was in line with the UPN  
policy has been thrown overboard by the party’s 
leadership".
Immediately the result of the Presidential election was announced 
and Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN was declared the winner for the second 
term of office, the FRCN political communication news stories changed to 
congratulatory messages galore for the re-election of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. For 
example, the following news stories were carried by the radio station:
11/8/83 President Shagari Re-Elected
"President Shehu Shagari has been re-elected for a 
second term of office.
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H e won last Presidential election with 12,047,648 
votes on the platform of the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN).
President Shagari also won twenty-five per cent or 
more of the total votes cast in sixteen states.
His closest opponent Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the 
Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) came second with 
7,885,434 total votes.
Chief Awolowo won twenty-five per cent or more in 
seven states".
13/8/83 Shagari
"President Shehu Shagari has received more messages 
of congratulations on his re-election for a second 
term in office.
In his message, President Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria, 
expressed the confidence that relations between  
Nigeria and his country would develop and 
strengthen.
And from Seoul, President Chun Doo Hwan, of 
South Korea welcomed the re-election of President 
Shagari and invited him to visit that country.
In another message, Nigeria’s Ambassador to Ivory 
Coast, Mr. Dennis Ukeme, described President 
Shagari’s victory in the Presidential election as an 
assurance of continued peace and progress in the 
country".
13/8/83 - Dikko
"The director-general of the Presidential campaign 
team, Dr. Umaru Dikko, has attributed the landslide 
victory of the NPN to the determination of Nigerians 
to have honest and sincere leadership which they 
have found in President Shehu Shagari.
Dr. Dikko has also attributed the victory to the 
dedication and hard work of the members of the 
NPN and the sterling qualities of Mr. President".
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12/8/83 - Election
"Commenting on the re-election of President Shehu 
Shagari, two British Newspapers - The Times and 
The Guardian, expressed satisfaction at the peaceful 
atmosphere which prevailed during the poll.
On its part, the Times said President Shagari’s 
personal honesty and dedication to the cause of 
Nigerian unity was above reproach".
21/8/83 - Congratulation Message
"The National Chairman of the NPN, Chief Adisa 
Akinloye has said that the re-election of President 
Shehu Shagari has emphasised the determination of 
Nigerians to do away with tribal and clannish politics.
Chief Akinloye stated this in a congratulatory 
message to the President on his victory in the 
Presidential election.
He said the victory of the NPN in thirteen states in 
the gubernatorial election showed that the people 
had embraced the notion of unity and stability of the 
country".
The FRCN was also used by the NPN to warn media organisations 
and people of the unpalatable consequences of incitement and rioting because of 
the results of the 1983 general elections. Below are some ‘live illustrations’ of 
such stories:
23/8/83 - Media:
"Media practitioners have been advised not to be 
involved in the incitement of any section of the 
country to violence and bloodshed.
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They are also told to refrain from aiding or abetting 
any act capable of disturbing the* peace of the 
country.
The Minister of Information, Mallam Garba Wushishi 
gave the advice in a letter he sent to the General 
Managers of all radio and television stations and 
Editors of all newspapers.
H e remarked that some Governors who disputed the 
results of the Gubernatorial election had used their 
state-owned radio and television media and 
newspapers to fan the embers of crisis, by making 
inciting and unpatriotic statements to the people.
This has given rise to sporadic incidents o f arson, 
looting, rioting and violence in those states.
Mallam Garba Wushishi pointed out that while the 
affected Governors exploited their immunities under 
the law to commit a breach of the peace, media 
practitioners could be liable for carrying out unlawful 
orders.
He therefore appealed to media practitioners 
whether in the electronic or print media either in the 
employ of the state or Federal Government to 
uphold the tenets and ethics of their profession.
The Minister then appealed to the Nigeria Union of 
Journalists and other professional bodies connected 
with the media to impress on their fieldmen, to help 
in diffusing tension and maintaining peace, order, 
tranquility and the unity of the country".
19/8/83 - Ovo/Ondo:
"Here is the government statement on the political 
situation in Oyo and Ondo States.
The Federal Government views with displeasure, the 
acts of thuggery and hooliganism that have been  
unleashed on parts of Oyo and Ondo states as a 
result of the outcome of the governorship elections.
Government is satisfied that the generality o f the 
people are law-abiding and, in fact, that most parts of
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the two states have been peaceful. The senseless 
destruction of life and property is essentially limited 
to Ilesha/Ife senatorial zone in Oyo state, and 
Akure/Ondo/Okitipupa areas of Ondo state.
Government is concerned that the wanton acts of 
arson and thuggery have been initiated and 
encouraged by a few highly-placed political leaders in 
the country.
Some political leaders themselves adequately 
protected by immunity, have unfortunately called 
upon their supporters to kill and commit other acts of 
illegality.
All citizens should be warned that they will hold 
themselves (not their mentors) responsible for all 
illegal acts committed by them. Government is 
determined to maintain peace and order in the few 
areas affected and indeed throughout the country.
Appropriate directives have been issued to the 
security agencies to ensure that the generality of the 
people go about their normal business unmolested.
Government appeals to all citizens in their interests 
to remain law-abiding and to cooperate with the 
security agencies to safeguard the lives and properties 
of their fellow citizens”.
19/8/83 Radio Nigeria
"The statement by the Minister of Communications 
Mr. Audu Ogbe:
"For some time now, particularly since the conduct of 
the gubernatorial elections and the announcement of 
the results be FEDECO, certain individuals some of 
them, state Governors who lost in the elections, have 
gone on radio or television or both in some parts of 
the country inciting their supporters to riot, commit 
arson, loot and generally to act in a manner 
inconsistent with public order and public safety.
The state governor, went to the extent of inciting 
supporters on radio and television, and I quote "Kill 
repeat kill", all returning officers of FEDECO".
-328-
I must invite your attention to the fact that the 
statutory power to issue licence to operate your 
station for the purposes of the wireless telegraph act 
is vested in the Federal government.
It was in pursuance of that power that licence was 
issued to your station to operate.
Needless to say, you have no unrestricted power to 
operate.
You must operate in a manner consistent with the 
provisions of the constitution of Nigeria particularly 
sections thirty-six and forty-one.
You must also operate in accordance with the 
provisions of wireless telegraph Act No.31 o f  1961 
and of the various regulations made under that Act.
The Federal Government will not stand by and watch 
radio and television stations for whose operations, it 
has had the instruments of subversion and destruction 
of the nation.
I want to make it absolutely clear, that the sustenance 
and continuance of public order and public safety in 
this country will not be compromised under any 
circumstances.
It is in the light of the foregoing provisions and 
recognising that government has a responsibility to 
enforce laws for the good governance of the country 
and particularly for safety and security of life and 
property, that this administration had decided to 
apply the laws as they are and as they relate to the 
use of radio and television stations and broadcasting.
In the present circumstances and to further prevent 
any continued illegal use of radio and television 
stations for the purpose of incitement, to violence 
and crime, I Audu Ogbe, Minister of  
Communications, by the powers conferred upon me 
by the wireless telegraphy, Act No.31 of 1961 sections 
36 and 41 of the constitutions, do hereby warn that 
any broadcasting station whether Federal or State- 
owned that shall be used for the promotion of 
violence and disruption of the peace, shall have its
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licence revoked and be closed down immediately by 
law enforcement agencies.
Your operations are being closely watched and 
monitored for this purpose.
Please, ensure strict compliance with the terms of 
your licence, to avoid loss of same1'.
We noticed that the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) 
behaved in the same manner of favouring the NPN in its news dissemination and 
programmes production in all the 19 states of the federation.
In point of fact, the national network news of the FRCN at 7.00
a.m., 1.00 p.m., 4.00 p.m. and 10.00 p.m. were usually hooked up to by all the 
states with FRCN stations thus disseminating more information on the NPN  
campaigns, activities and party programmes to the people.
The State FRCN stations were also highly partisan in their local 
programmes to the grass roots. They were nothing more than political 
propaganda machinery for the NPN and the party’s local politicians left no stone 
unturned in making use of the stations for political speech-making and incessant 
campaigns.
All these tend to show the influence of ownership of the FRCN by 
the NPN Federal government on the use of the station for political 
communication in the 1983 general elections.
It follows that the FRCN because of its ownership was bound to tell 
only partial truths on the elections; whereas the Corporation was being maintained 
by public funds which ought to have made it mandatory for the radio station to
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give equal opportunities of coverage, access and programme exposure to all 
political parties.
8.4 The Nigerian Television Authority (NTA)
In 1983, the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) was owned and 
controlled by the NPN controlled Federal government. As a matter of fact, the 
NPN appointed one of its members, an historian who knew little or nothing about 
television journalism and broadcasting as the Director-general of the NTA. This 
appointment provoked some criticisms from the public. And to justify the 
appointment, the NPN used the FRCN and the NTA to react to the public 
criticisms. On 10/1/83, the following news story was carried by the FRCN and the 
NTA:
"The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) says President 
Shehu Shagari has a constitutional right to make 
appointments to political offices to ensure the smooth 
running of the government.
The National Publicity Secretary of the Party, Mr. 
Simon Shango, stated this while addressing a News 
Conference in Lagos today - (10/1/83).
He was reacting to recent criticisms of the President 
on the appointment of Professor Walter Ofonagoro 
as the Director-General of the Nigerian Television 
Authority (NTA) and Alhaji Suleman Takuma as 
Presidential Adviser on Political Affairs".
To make the matter worse, the NTA branch of the NUJ issued an 
official statement in support of the appointment of Ofonagoro in an open display
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of partisanship. The supportive news story was carried by both the NTA and the 
FRCN. An illustration will suffice:
"The NTA headquarters chapel of the NUJ has 
congratulated President Shehu Shagari for the recent 
changes in the management of the Nigerian 
Television Authority.
The Union in a statement by its Chairman and 
Secretary, explained that the action would make the 
authority more responsive to public opinion and 
attuned to the mood of the nation.
It urged the new Director-General Professor Walter 
Ofonagoro to strive and restore the lost image of the 
corporation". ( 10/ 1/8 3 )
It is pertinent at this juncture, to mention that our research on the 
NTA focuses mainly on the Network News carried by the Corporation between 
January and December 1983. It is equally pertinent to point out that all the NTA  
stations in state capitals hooked up to the Network news at 9.00 p.m. and 11.00
p.m. as a policy. The state-owned television stations controlled by the NPN in
simultaneously.
1983 also hooked to the Network News /  This explains why the state-
owned television stations of Anambra and Oyo States started to hook up to the 
Network news of the NTA immediately the states were taken over by the NPN  
after the results of the gubernatorial elections.
Between January and December, 1983, the NTA Network News 
carried a total of 6,908 Network news stories. Out of this, 4,646 were on 
elections. We found that the NPN was favoured throughout the period in the 
coverage of events, party programmes and activities, while other parties were
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given little attention or totally blacked out in news coverage. The NTA political 
programme of ‘Verdict 83* was no exception.
The following table shows the number of election stories carried 
during the period under review and the percentages of news stories carried on 
each of the competing political parties in the 1983 elections.
8.5 The Broadcasting Corporation of Ovo State (BCOS)
In unequivocal terms, the Oyo State Edict No. 10 of 1977, which 
established the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State (otherwise known as Radio 
O-Y-O) repealed its predecessor, the Western Nigeria Government Law No.48 
of 1959 which established the then Western Nigeria Government Broadcasting 
Corporation.
The Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State was one of the three 
radio stations that sprang from the radio service of the defunct Western Nigeria 
Government Broadcasting Corporation (WNGBC). The other two are Ogun 
Radio and Ondo Radio. This development followed the take-over of all television 
stations by the Federal Government and the creation of more states in the country 
resulting in the splitting of the former Western State into three states, Ogun, 
Ondo and Oyo, states and the eventual replication of WNBS.
The three radio stations ran a network schedule, each contributing 
staff and programme materials in the first instance. The arrangement worked 
smoothly until 9' December, 1977 when the Ogun State Broadcasting 
Corporation went on air, and withdrew from the Network arrangement thereby
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leaving Oyo and Ondo State Radio Services to run the Network programmes until 
31: March, 1978.
On the 1 April, 1978 the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State
began independent programming with the ‘on air’ name Radio O-Y-O for all 
broadcast hours.
Prior to the 1983 general elections, the BCOS was under the UPN
government which had come to power in 1979.7 As it will be seen from the news
bulletins o f ' the Corporation content-analyzed as documented in the
documentation unit of the News and Current Affairs Division of the Corporation,
the BCOS was all out to serve the UPN in the political communication processes
of the 1983 general elections as the party’s propaganda machinery.
The BCOS also assisted immensely in covering the UPN activities
at the National level. All UPN campaign rallies were profusely covered and used
while ‘live political programmes and interviews were arranged for UPN stalwarts.
Some Current Affairs programmes such as ‘Governors to-be’, Guest of the month,
meeting point, highlight,(Ela loro, Bi Ijoba ba bo sowo wa, E da soro H»Jdi oro 
(English and Yoruba discussion and interview programmes;, 
and a host of others featured the UPN members prominently while members of
other parties were seldom used for the programmes.
The UPN government of Oyo State set up a Directorate of
Information under the leadership o f . Mr. Yemi Farounbi, a former General
Manager of the NTA Ibadan who was also the Oyo State Special Adviser on
Information and broadcasting matters to the then Governor of Oyo State, Chief
Bola Ige.
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The directorate was saddled with the responsibility of using the 
BCOS for campaign purposes of the UPN in the 1983 elections. It was also to 
ensure that the image of the UPN was projected in all the news items of media 
houses in and outside the state.
In fact, as a result of the directives from ‘the top’, the then Acting 
Director o f the News and Current Affairs division of the BCOS issued a guideline 
that would dictate/determine the types of news to be carried on elections by
editors of the Corporation. (Source: As a Senior Editor at the B.C.O.S at
^orcier^! * Was meetin9 held to give the
In the guideline, it was stated that in every news item, the highest
percentage must be allotted to the UPN, followed by the Oyo State Government, 
the personalities and officials of the UPN throughout the federation, followed by 
the activities of the other UPN controlled states, the federal government and news 
from other parts of the country, the African continent and the world in that order.
All the UPN campaigns for the 1983 elections were covered "live" 
by the BCOS using the outside broadcast van and crew (OB).
The BCOS carried a total of 32,208 news stories out of which 17,155 
were election stories between January and December, 1983. These consists of
06.00 a.m., 08.00 a.m., 09,00 a.m., 10.00 a.m., 11.00 a.m., 12.00 p.m., 13.00 p.m.,
15.00 p.m., 16.00 p.m., 17.00 p.m., 18.00 p.m., 21.00 p.m., 23.00 p.m., 04.00 p.m. 
and 00.55 hours news bulletins. That is, news on the hour, National News, World 
News, Oyo State News, News at 5.00, provincial news, Newscope and News 
summary with their Yoruba translations.
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All UPN campaigns and election stories were made headlines while 
the NPN stories were either not carried or when carried at all belatedly as stale 
news. Such news were only to damage the image of the party.
As a matter of fact, former Governor Bola Ige was furious with the 
BCOS for favourably using an NPN story as^headline. H e ordered that the News 
Division should be revamped and resuscitated under a new leadership. The 
editor on duty that day was also to be sacked. After all pleas from high quarters, 
Chief Ige later posted one Mr. Peter Ajayi from the Sketch to the BCOfffor 
three months to oversee, direct, coordinate, plan and supervise whatever news 
bulletins were being produced before they were to be broadcast.
Our research discovered that Chief Ige made use o f BCOS for 
campaign purposes in 1983 general elections. And before the election results 
were released, Governor Ige made^series of live broadcasts for consecutive days, 
saying that should the results to be declared fail to favour him and the UPN, 
people should reject such results in the belief that the peoples votes must have 
been stolen. In fact, BCOS carried and announced its own election results without 
the approval of FEDECO. And true to the broadcast, there were riots, 
demonstrations, civil disobedience, spontaneous and sporadic uprising in many 
parts of Oyo State after the elections.
Places like Iwo, Ibadan, Ilesha, Oshogbo, Ikirun, to mention just a 
few, recorded gigantic losses of lives and properties. They also witnessed arson, 
murder and vandalism of the highest and worst order.
Many jingles were produced and profusely used by the BCOS to 
campaign for the UPN on its political programmes. Examples of such jingles are:
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"Free education, in Oyo State, Education is free, take 
advantage, send your child to school".
"Eko ofe, ni ipinle Oyo, eko ti di ofe, je anfani eko 
nfe "uic. _ (Yoruba translation of the above jingle).
Going through the news stories carried by the BCOS during the 
elections and after, one would readily see the influence of media ownership on 
political communication. When the UPN was still in power, the BCOS recorded 
the highest percentage of election stories for the UPN, followed by ‘party friends’ 
of the UPN, factions of the GNPP, PRP and NPP which together formed the 
Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA). The Corporation was an open and avowed 
antagonist of the NPN in the coverage of election campaign activities.
But as soon as NPN took over the government of Oyo State after 
the gubernatorial elections, the BCOS changed its ‘gear’ and started to give the 
highest number of stories and maximum coverage to the NPN - thus buttressing 
the influence of media ownership on political communication.
The NPN itself exercised this almighty power of ownership, the 
party under Governor Omololu Olunloyo appointed a Sole Administrator for the 
BCOS (Radio and Television Services) of Oyo State.
The Sole Administrator Alhaji Oyedeji, who was a strong member 
of the NPN, took over total control of the station. The former campaign Manager 
and Director of Publicity for Governor Olunloyo during the gubernatorial 
campaign period, Mr. Lanre Yusuf, was also appointed Manager of News and 
Acting Director of News and Current Affairs of the BCOS.
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Later, Governor Olunloyo appointed Mr. Bode Alalade, a 
senior official of the NTA Headquarters, Victoria Island, Lagos, as the General 
Manager of BCOS (Radio and Television stations). From then on, the BCOS 
became the propaganda machinery of the NPN while the UPN had passed into 
the oblivion..
It is pertinent at this juncture to give some live illustrations of the 
news stories carried by the BCOS when the UPN government was its owner and 
how this subsequently influenced political communication in the 1983 general 
elections.
The first strategy of the BCOS, like the FRCN did for the NPN, was 
to sell out the UPN as the only party in the country capable of solving the people 
and the country’s social, economic and political problems.
On 26/1/83 before the UPN launched its campaign activities on 
29/1/83, the BCOS had started its own political communication campaign for the 
UPN:
26/1/83 - 06.30 hours
"The masses of this country have accepted the Unity 
Party of Nigeria (UPN) as the only party capable of 
solving Nigeria’s economic problems.
This remark was made in Ibadan yesterday by the 
Ogun State Deputy Governor chief Sesan Soluade 
while answering questions on a TSOS Current Affairs 
programme "View Point".
H e attributed the financial problem of the party to 
the uneven distribution of the National Revenue 
emanating from the mismanagement by the 
government at the centre.
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On the achievements of the UPN controlled Ogun 
State government, the Deputy Governor pointed out 
that his government had provided social amenities 
such as water, electricity, construction of roads apart 
from the free education and free health programmes 
of the party.
Chief Soluade emphasised the need for free and fair 
election so as to avoid the problems arising from 
election rigging".
UPN election stories were carried by the BCOS usually weeks to the 
actual event of the party activities. Whereas, news stories on other parties were 
either carried belatedly or not carried at all.
Some ‘live illustrations’ will suffice here:
06.30 hours 25/1/83
"The UPN will launch its 1983 electioneering 
campaigns at a rally to be held at the Tafawa Balewa 
Square in Lagos on Saturday (29/1/83).
According to a statement by the party, the National 
President and Presidential candidate, Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo and leaders of the party from the nineteen 
states of the federation would address the rally.
A  one-day meeting of the National Executive Council 
of the party to be held on Thursday in Lagos will 
precede the rally, it added.
It said that the NEC would discuss arrangement for 
the launching of the campaigns and also examine 
crucial issues facing the nation.
The Party’s National Director of Organisation, Mr. 
Babatope added that Chief Awolowo would later lead 
the UPN team to Port Harcourt on Sunday.
The UPN leader will campaign in Rivers from 
January thirty first to February six.
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Chief Awolowo will also tour Rivers from February 
eight to thirteen and later move 'to Bendel on 
February sixteen where the team will remain until 
February twenty four".
Another strategy used by the BCOS to campaign for the U PN  in the 
political communication processes in the 1983 general elections was to carry news 
stories capable of damaging the NPN and weakening its chances of electoral 
successes. The following are ‘live examples’ of such stories:
30/7/83 - 13.00 hours
"All Yoruba leaders in the NPN have been called 
upon to quit the party without further delay.
In a release in Ibadan, an NPP senatorial candidate 
in Oyo State, Mr. Solomon Adeoba. said this action 
would save their faces from public disgrace that 
would soon befall the party.
Mr. Adeoba referred to the exit of chiefs M.K.O. 
Abiola, Harold Sodipp. Olu Adebanio and Nivi 
Adeqbenro from the NPN adding that this was an 
evidence that the party had no future".
28/07/83 21.00 hours
"Plans by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) to rig 
this years election have been unveiled by Alhaji Bola 
Avanivi.
Alhaji Avanivi who is a leading member of the UPN  
in Ibadan said in a release today, that the plans were 
in two categories.
In the first category of rigging, he said, ballot papers 
identical in design to the ones to be used by 
FEDECO, had been distributed to NPN candidates 
all over the country.
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He also added that all NPN candidates had 
completed their voting and were ready to hand over 
ballot boxes to FEDECO.
Alhaji Avanivi alerted the nation on plans by the 
NPN to use boxes with special opening and locking 
devices to deceive polling agents and the electorate.
In the second category of rigging, Alhaji Avanivi 
explained that duplicated voters cards - identical in 
number and names had been made for each 
constituency in the country.
He said the NPN plans to hire people, to use the 
eards, to vote very early in the morning, and once 
their cards had been accepted for voting, genuine 
voters cards would be disqualified.
Alhaji Ayaniyi then appealed to the NPN to shelve 
the plan, for the sake of the survival of Nigeria as a 
nation
Even the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) was not left out 
of the attack. Stories were carried in the political communication processes of the 
1983 general elections to discredit the body and portray it as an agent of the NPN. The 
-Following are some ‘live illustrations’:
28/07/83 - 21.00 hours
"The Chairman of the Oyo State Directorate of 
Information, Mr. Yemi Farounbi has criticised the 
figures released by FEDECO in the voters lists.
Mr. Farounbi observed that Plateau State had a 
decrease in voters when compared with the 1979 
figures.
Mr. Farounbi then wondered how a state like Benue, 
which had witnessed an emigration, because of lack 
of job opportunities, and incessant delay in salaries of 
workers could score an increase.
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Mr. Farounbi then said that the sixty-five million 
voters was unrealistic, since it signified that eighty per 
cent (80%) of Nigerians were eighteen and above.
H e said that the sixty-five million figures released are 
probably not human beings".
27/7/83 - 18.00 hours
"The Oyo State Governor, Chief Bola Ige has called 
for the immediate removal of the administrative 
secretary of the Federal Electoral Commission 
(FEDECO) in the state, Mr. Stephen Aiibade.
According to the Governor, "there can be no peaceful 
elections in the state with Ajibade around".
Chief Ige made the remark in Ibadan today while 
receiving the new Federal electoral commissioner in 
the state, Alhaji Liman Umaru.
The Governor said the FEDECO Secretary has 
become a controversial character "by marriage, place 
of birth, and inclination".
Chief Ige said the new FEDECO Commissioner will 
be running a great risk if he retained Mr. Ajibade as 
his administrative Secretary.
Speaking on the readiness of the Federal Electoral 
Commission for the August sixth elections, Chief Ige 
expressed doubts if any elections can take place in 
Oyo State this year because of the shoddiness of 
FEDECO.
Earlier, the new FEDECO Commissioner Alhaji 
Liman had sought the assistance of the government 
and all political parties in ensuring hitch-free 
elections."
Whenever the BCOS carried the NPN activities at all, such coverage 
was usually calculated at blackmailing the party. The following is a ‘live 
illustration’:
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24/1/83 - 13.00 hours World News
"The National Party of Nigeria campaign launched in 
Gboko in Benue State over the weekend witnessed a 
drama following a demonstration staged by teachers 
in the state who have not been paid since October 
last year.
The teachers who carried placards and thronged the 
venue of the meeting called for the immediate 
payment of their salaries.
They were reported to have arrived there early so 
that they could catch the attention of President 
Shagari.
Some of the placards carried by the teachers read 
"fringe benefits are a mirage to school teachers in 
Benue State".
The Chairman of the Benue State Union of Teachers 
Mr. John Gbande later told newsmen that the 
teachers staged the demonstration to express their 
dissatisfaction at the non-challant attitude of the state 
government on the matter".
In the following tabular illustration of the BCOS coverage of party 
campaigns and production of election stories, it is seen that the BCOS 
concentrated on the UPN, and members of the PPA viz: the factions of the 
GNPP, PRP and NPP, in its dissemination of election news stories until 
September 1983 when the NPN took over Oyo State after the gubernatorial 
election results. The BCOS changed immediately from giving the highest 
percentage of party coverage to the UPN and shifted its concentration on the 
NPN.
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Allied Electronic Media
By Allied Electronic Media, reference is made to radio and 
television stations owned by respective state governments and how such stations 
were influenced by their ownership in the coverage of political communication 
processes in the 1983 Nigerian general elections.
Before the 1983 elections, the UPN was controlling Oyo, Ogun, 
Ondo, Bendel and Lagos States and each of these states had its own television 
and radio stations. From our analysis of the media behaviour of the FRCN, 
NTA and BCOS, one would see that there was no difference in the way the media 
of these "LOOBO states" as they were called, that is, the UPN controlled states 
in the South, performed their functions of informing, educating and entertaining 
the electorate. These media of the UPN controlled governments were all out to 
sell the U PN programmes to the masses and to destroy the NPN and also absorb 
other parties in the PPA.
Also the NPP which controlled Anambra, Imo and Plateau States 
used the electronic media of these states to project the image of the party, attack 
the NPN and work in collaboration with the other parties to ensure an electoral 
victory in favour of the party.
In the same vein, electronic media of the GNPP - controlled states 
of Borno and Gongola as well as those of the PRP controlled states of Kano and 
Kaduna used such media for the projection of the image of their parties and 
members of the PPA. It was during this time that the "nine progressive 
governors" and later "twelve progressive governors" had field days holding 
meetings which were covered live by the media of the state governments at the
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meetings. The NAP which controlled no state, no television and no radio station 
was thus left at the mercy of the media in the country.
All these support the thesis that media ownership influenced 
political communication in the 1983 general elections. The media only danced to 
the music/tune of their owners at the time following the thesis that ‘He
who pays the piper dictates the tune’.
In analyzing the electronic media in their coverage of the campaigns 
that led to the'1983 general elections in Nigeria, a content-analysis of 60,584 news 
stories were carried out as broadcast by the FRCN; BCOS and NTA radio and 
television stations. The period of analysis was between January and December, 
1983. The following tables show the amount and percentage of election stories 
carried by the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN); the Nigerian 
Television Authority (NTA) and the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State 
(BCOS) on each of the six competing political parties, GNPP, NAP, NPN, NPP, 
PRP and UPN, in the 1983 Nigerian general elections - the last phase of the 
Second Republic.
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TABLE 19
SHOWING THE NUMBER OF ELECTION STORIES CARRIED BY THE F. R. C. N.  BETWEEN JANUARY AND DECEMBER 1983
AND THE PERCENTAGE OF ELECTION STORIES CARRIED ON THE COMPETING PARTIES
JANUARY
ELECTION
STORIES GNPP % NAP % NPN % NPP % PRP % UPN %
739 43 5.81 27 3.65 452 61.16 96 12.99 20 2.70 101 13.66
FEBRUARY 1098 70 6.37 67 6.10 564 51.41 124 11.29 53 4.82 220 20.03
MARCH 1097 103 9.38 109 9.93 503 48.85 142 12.94 90 8.19 150 13.67
APRIL 1320 133 10.07 137 10.37 570 43.18 154 11.66 109 8.25 217 16.43
MAY 1476 148 10.02 170 11.51 592 40.10 173 11.72 122 8.26 271 18.36
JUNE 1371 147 10.72 168 12.25 506 36.90 198 14.44 129 9.40 223 16.26
JULY 1531 172 11.23 171 11.16 558 36.44 204 13.32 149 9.73 277 18.09
AUGUST 1765 204 11.55 270 15.29 592 33.54 223 12.63 191 10.82 285 16.14
SEPTEMBER 373 20 5.36 17 4.55 204 56.03 45 12.06 14 3.75 73 19.57
OCTOBER 347 18 5.18 19 5.47 200 57.63 33 9.51 11 3.17 66 19.02
NOVEMBER 197 12 6.09 14 7.10 101 51.26 21 10.65 09 4.56 40 20.30
DECEMBER 151 09 5.96 07 4.63 87 57.61 20 13.24 04 2.64 24 15.89
SOURCE: NEWS INFORMATION OFFICE, F.R.C.N. IKOYI LAGOS
- 3 4 6 -
TABLE 20
ELECTION STORIES CARRIED BY THE N. T. A.  NETWORK NEWS AND THE PERCENTAGE PER COMPETING PARTIES
JANUARY
TOTAL
ELECTION
STORIES
GNPP % NAP % NPN % NPP % PRP % UPN %
297 10 3.36 21 7.07 118 39.73 62 20.87 18 6.06 68 22.89
FEBRUARY 360 18 5.00 31 8.61 145 40.27 69 19.16 21 5.83 76 21.11
MARCH 468 19 4.05 35 7.47 239 51.06 67 14.31 37 7.90 71 15.17
APRIL 468 15 3.20 39 8.33 246 52.56 67 14.31 41 8.76 60 12.82
MAY 468 17 3.63 37 7.90 253 54.05 61 13.03 45 9.61 55 11.75
JUNE 520 29 5.57 38 7.30 277 43.65 72 13.84 43 8.26 61 11.73
JULY 520 27 5.19 35 6.73 292 56.15 68 13.07 41 7.88 57 10.96
AUGUST 520 23 4.42 31 5.96 318 61.15 61 11.73 37 7.11 50 9.61
SEPTEMBER 468 25 5.34 29 6.19 286 61.11 47 10.04 41 8.76 40 8.54
OCTOBER 297 05 1.68 11 3.70 193 64.98 42 14.14 08 2.69 38 12.79
NOVEMBER 130 03 2.30 07 5.38 101 77.69 04 3.07 05 3.84 10 7.60
DECEMBER 130 07 5.38 11 8.46 88 67.69 07 5.38 05 3.84 12 19.23
SOURCE: NEWS LIBRARY, N.T.A. VICTORIA ISLAND, LAGOS
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TABLE 21
ELECTION STORIES CARRIED BY THE B. C. O. S .  AND THE PERCENTAGE PER COMPETING PARTIES
JANUARY
TOTAL
ELECTION
STORIES
GNPP % NAP % NPN % NPP % PRP % UPN %
924 82 8.87 30 3.24 18 1.94 6:2- 6.70 84 9.09 648 70.12
FEBRUARY 1205 104 8.63 48 3.98 28 2.32 78 6.47 108 8.96 839 69.62
MARCH 1468 140 9.53 57 3.88 32 2.17 93 6.33 142 9.67 1004 68.39
APRIL 1606 131 8.15 48 2.98 32 1.99 107 6.66 130 8.09 1158 72.10
MAY 1968 130 6.60 41 2.08 19 0.96 92 4.67 136 6.91 1550 78.76
JUNE 2005 93 4.63 30 1.49 15 0.74 87 4.33 101 5.03 1679 83.74
JULY 2047 95 4.64 34 1.66 17 0.83 88 4.29 104 5.08 1709 83.48
AUGUST 2099 87 4.14 33 1.57 27 1.28 59 2.81 87 4.14 1806 86.04
SEPTEMBER 2109 52 2.46 69 3.27 1730 82.02 107 5.07 67 3.17 84 3.98
OCTOBER 1101 10 0.90 10 0.90 1009 91.64 41 3.72 10 0.90 21 1.90
NOVEMBER 421 17 4.03 19 4.51 311 73.87 38 9.02 21 4.98 15 3.56
DECEMBER 202 10 4.95 10 4.95 140 69.30 20 9.90 10 4.95 12 5.94
SOURCE: DOCUMENTATION UNIT/LIBRARY B.C.O.S. ORITA BASORUN, IBADAN.
-348-
TABLE 22
RADIO STATIONS IN NIGERIA AS AT 1991
Name of Radio Place of 
Operation
Owner Audience Reach
F.R.C.N. Lagos Federal Govt. The whole country 
ESP at Network News 
Times
II Ibadan II  II II
I f Abeokuta I t  II II
I t Akure II  II II
II Benin II  I t I t
Enugu I t  II II
II Owerri II  II I t
II Calabar I t  II II
I I Akw^ Ibom I I  II II
I I Port-
Harcourt
II  II II
I t Kaduna II I t II
11 Kano I t  11 II
I t Katsina II  i t II
I t Sokoto II i t I t
I t Bauchi 11 11 I t
I t Yola I I  i t I t
I t Minna I I  I t II
11 Abuj a II  II II
II Jos II  II 11
t l Maiduguri I I  II I t
I t Ilorin II II I t
Radio Lagos Ikej a Lagos State 
Govt.
B.C.O.S. 
(Radio O-Y-O)
Ibadan Oyo State Govt. Oyo State Areas 
Lagos State Areas, 
Ogun State Areas, 
some parts of Ondo 
and Bendel States, 
Kwara State Areas
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TABLE 22 (C o n tin u e d 1)
RADIO STATIONS IN NIGERIA AS AT 1991
Name of Radio Place of 
Operation
Owner Audience Reach
Ogun Radio Abeokuta Ogun State Govt. Ogun State Areas 
Oyo State Areas 
Lagos State Areas 
Benin Republic
Ondo Radio Akure Ondo State Govt. Ondo State Areas, 
some parts of Ondo
Radio Bendel Benin Bendel State 
Govt.
Bendel State Areas, 
some parts of Ondo
Rima Radio Sokoto Sokoto State 
Govt.
Sokoto State Areas
Borno Radio Maiduguri Borno State 
Govt.
Borno State Areas
Radio Kwara Ilorin Kwara State 
Govt.
Kwara State Areas
Anambra Radio Enugu Anambra State 
Govt.
Anambra State Areas
Imo Radio Owerri Imo State Govt. Imo State Areas
Calabar Radio Calabar Cross River 
State Govt.
Rivers State Areas
Kaduna Radio Kaduna Kaduna State 
Govt.
Kaduna State Areas, 
many parts of 
Nigeria
Kano Radio Kano Kano State Govt. Kano State Areas
Bauchi Radio Bauchi Bauchi State 
Govt.
Bauchi State Areas
Gongola Radio Yola Gongola State 
Govt.
Gongola State Areas
Niger Radio Minna Niger State 
Govt.
Niger State Areas
Radio Plateau Jos Plateau State 
Govt.
Plateau State Areas
Radio Benue Markurdi Benue State 
Govt.
Benue State Areas
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TABLE 23
TELEVISION STATIONS IN NIGERIA AS AT 1991
Name of 
Television
Place of 
Operation
Owner Audience Reach
N.T.A.
(Channel 10)
Lagos,
Victoria
Island
Federal Govt. The whole country 
esp. at Network News 
and Programmes
N.T.A.
(Channel 7)
Ikeja Federal Govt. Lagos, Oyo and Ogun 
States Areas
N.T.A.
(Channel 5)
Lagos Federal Govt. Lagos State Area
N.T.A. Ibadan Federal Govt. Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, 
Kwara, Lagos States 
Areas
ff Abeokuta Federal Govt. Ogun, Oyo, Lagos 
States
If Akure Federal Govt. Ondo, Bendel, Oyo 
States
f l Akwa Ibom Federal Govt. Akwa Ibom, Cross 
River States
If Benin Federal Govt. Bendel, Ondo States
If Enugu Federal Govt. Anambra, Imo States
II Sokoto Federal Govt. Sokoto, Niger States
If Kaduna Federal Govt. Kaduna, Kats ina, 
Kwara States
II Calabar Federal Govt. Cross River, Akwa 
Ibom States
If Aba Federal Govt. Imo, Anambra States
If Port-
Harcourt
Federal Govt. Rivers, Cross River 
States
I t Kano Federal Govt. Kano, Kaduna, 
Katsina States
I f Bauchi Federal Govt. Bauchi State Areas
II Minna Federal Govt. Niger, Sokoto States
I t Yola Federal Govt. Gongola State Areas
IV Jos Federal Govt. Plateau, Benue 
States
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TABLE 23
TELEVISION STATIONS IN NIGERIA AS AT 1991
Name of 
Television
Place of 
Operation
Owner Audience Reach
N.T.A. Maiduguri Federal Govt. Borno State Areas
Vf Abuja Federal Govt. Kwara, Oyo States
11 Owerri Federal Govt. Benue, Plateau 
States
L.T.V. Ikeja Lagos State Lagos State Areas, 
some parts of Ogun, 
Oyo States and Benin 
Republic
T.S.O.S. 
(B.C.O.S.)
Ibadan Oyo State Oyo, Ogun, Kwara 
States Areas
O.G.T.V. Abeokuta Ogun State Ogun, Lagos, Oyo 
State Areas
O.D.T.V. Akure Ondo State Ondo and Bendel 
States areas
B . T'. V . Ekpoma Bendel State Bendel State
P.T.V. Jos Plateau State Plateau State Areas
A.T.V. Enugu Anambra State Anambra State Areas
K.T.V. Kano Kano State Kano State Areas
I.T.V. Owerri Imo State Imo State Areas
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the political affiliation o f media 
ownership determined, to a large extent, the editorial direction of Nigerian mass 
media in their coverage of political parties and the campaigns that led to the 1983 
general elections, the last phase of Nigeria’s Second Republic. I have shown how 
the various types of media - state and federal governments types, political party 
and politicians’ varieties and the so-called private press, were influenced by their 
ownership factors in the stories they carried. From the sequence of news, total 
number of news, relative percentage, quality and quantity of news, relative 
closeness to peak hours, actuality utilisation, headline casting, to frequency of 
coverage of the party programmes and campaigns, respective political parties 
and/or governments which owned the media during the elections were favoured. 
This resulted in many problems including the production of ‘biased’ election 
stories, the prevention of the media from performing properly and in a neutral 
manner the functions of informing and educating the electorate on the elections 
as well as the hampering of the media upholding their professional, journalistic 
ethics of impartiality and balancing.
.. A democratic society largely relies on the mass 
communication network to inform the electorate adequately and on equal terms 
on the programmes and policies of different political parties and office 
contenders. Professor Blumler regards election campaigns as processes that live 
or die, gather momentum or falter, via the heavy and insistent streams of 
messages that are prepared for delivery during them to all quarters of the body 
politic. As he puts it:
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"It is through campaign communication that impulses 
to participate are energized, issues are defined, and 
choices for voting decisions are conveyed"16
In the same vein, John Carey argues that:
"An election campaign exists in the public 
consciousness largely the way it exists in mass media 
presentation of campaign events".17
The history of Nigerian political communications particularly during 
the electioneering campaigns has shown that the pattern of media ownership and 
behaviour has remainedyjhe same since the country’s independence 30 years ago. 
A  communiquefcsued by some state governors of political parties opposed to the 
NPN in March 1981 captures the trend vividly:
"The governors considered what might have been the 
motive of the NPN Federal Government in wanting 
to monopolise the control of radio, television and 
newspapers. They recalled that in 1965, when 
elections were held into the then Western House of 
Assembly, the NNDP Government of the day 
announced false results and compelled all the mass 
media to carry false results...This led to a violent 
reaction by the people and to the collapse of the first 
republic. The governors noted that the authors of 
that incident are now in the leadership of the NPN. 
There is no doubt that if they gain control of all the 
mass media, they will repeat their trick of 1965 in 
1983, by announcing false results, declaring 
themselves winners fraudulently and then proceeding 
to form the next government. The governors decided 
that the public must be alerted to the dangers 
inherent in the steps being taken by the Federal 
Government to monopolise the mass media so that 
public opinion may be mobilised to stop the NPN
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from plunging this great nation into another period of 
darkness."18
It is pertinent to mention that the federal mass media under the 
government controlled by the NPN then were not the only ones guilty o f misuse 
of media ownership in political communications. All other media under the 
governments controlled by other parties were also guilty of the evil effect of 
ownership, monopoly and control for which they accused the NPN of. To be sure, 
ownership is not the only factor in this media bias coverage but it is the most 
important factor in the Nigerian context. Other factors explaining the anatomy 
of mass media bias in Nigerian political communications are examined in the 
concluding section of this thesis.
- 3 5 5 -
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER EIGHT
1. The Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA) was made up o f the NPP, UPN, 
PRP and GNPP. The major objective was to present a common front 
against the NPN, the party at the centre, with the assumption that a 
merger of some sort or at least a common candidature at the elections 
could defeat the NPN in the 1983 general elections. However, the alliance 
died shortly because the leaders of the parties could not agree on the 
sharing of political offices and party portfolios assuming they won the 
elections. Some members of the alliance sought registration as the 
Progressive Peoples Party (PPP) but they were turned down by FEDECO.
2. See Gaskiva ta Fi kwabo, 26th September 1980.
3. Nigerian Tribune. May 13, 1980.
4. Nigerian Herald. July 7, 1980.
5. Nigerian Tribune. April 28, 1980.
6. National Concord. July 14, 1980.
7. Ibid.. July 11, 1980.
8. Ibid.. January 19, 1983.
9. "Will Awo be another Mitterand?" National Concord. March 9, 1983.
10. Olatunde Akande, "Influence of Publisher’s Political Orientation on the 
Coverage of National Issues" Unpublished research project for the M.Sc. 
thesis, University of Lagos, 1984.
11. National Concord. March 22, 1983.
12. "Shagari’s cheap shots." National Concord. April 27.
13. Daily Sketch and Nigerian Tribune. April 13, 1983.
14. As noted earlier, the campaign race for the 1983 general elections was 
opened by the NPN in Gboko, Benue State, on Saturday, 22 January, 1983. 
It was followed by the GNPP in Sokoto on the 23rd of January, the U PN  
in Lagos on 29th of January, the NPP in Kano and NAP in Bauchi on 26th 
February and the PRP was the last Party to launch its election bid in 
Kaduna, Kaduna State, on 27th February 1983.
15. The election year came against a background of deepening rifts within the 
PRP and the GNPP which led to the State Governors Crossing to the NPP,
- 3 5 6 -
or the UPN and joining the Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA) and the 
‘Progressive Governors*.
16. Blumler, Jay G. (ed.), Communicating to Voters: Television in the First 
European Parliamentary Elections (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 
1983). Also, see Blumler, Jay G., ‘Communication in the European 
Elections: The Case of British Broadcasting’, Government and Opposition 
14(4): 1979 PP. 508-30.
17. John Carey, "Setting the Political Agenda: How Media Shape Campaigns". 
Journal of Communication 26 (Spring 1976). PP. 50-57.
18. See West Africa. April 6th, 1981.
-357-
CONCLUSION: THE ANATOMY OF MASS MEDIA BIAS IN 
NIGERIAN POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS
1. Introduction
This thesis began with a set of research questions relating basically 
to the structure, behaviour, coloration and operation of political communications 
in the unique socio-economic and political context of Nigeria. In historical, 
constitutional, legal, qualitative, quantitative, theoretical, methodological and 
practical terms, this study has sought to provide answers to these questions about 
the Nigerian political communications, the patterns of mass media ownership, the 
role of the Nigerian mass media in the coverage of national issues and the 
implications of all these for national integration and/or disintegration, political 
stability and/or instability in the country. The major concern of this study has 
been the examination of the Nigerian political communications and the 
explanation of a wide range of issues through the analysis of mass media 
ownership. The thesis has analyzed the impact of media ownership on the 
development of political communications in Nigeria from the colonial period, to 
the first republic, the first and last phases of the second republic and the military 
interregna.
In addition to the analysis of the problem of media ownership, this 
dissertation has also sought to highlight a host of other problems which Nigerian 
political communications have posed and continue to pose - class, elitism, 
ethnicity, religion, tribalism, literacy, constitutionalism, legal limitations, military 
interventionism, economic chaos, poverty, inequality, linguistic fragmentation and
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political instability. What was (and is still) distinctive about \ Nigerian Political 
Communications - has been the central quest of this inquiry.
Nigeria today stands at cross roads. Is there a truly national press 
in Nigerian society today that is supportive of the standards and ethics of 
journalism and as well as capable of contributing to the evolution o f a stable, 
dynamic and united socio-political entity? What values, cultures and ideals do the 
media promote in Nigeria today and how do these affect national integration and 
political stability? In the expectations and words of a Nigerian Head o f State; he 
said:
"I expect the Nigerian media to promote national 
stability and national identity, I expect the Nigerian 
media to espouse those causes which promote and 
reinforce the collective will of our people. I expect 
you to promote the need for national survival."1
Since independence in 1960, successive governments have been  
seeking ways to forge a national identity for Nigerians. The goal of national 
integration has been a conscious priority of all national development plans 
implemented since political leadership fell into Nigerian hands. The use of 
slogans2, such as "To keep Nigeria One Is A  Task That Must Be Done," "Go On 
With One Nigeria," and "One Nation, One Destiny," illustrates the prominence of 
the national unity objective on the federal government’s development agenda.
The media have been a major vehicle through which Nigeria’s 
federal government hopes to achieve national integration. According to Tony 
Momoh, Nigeria’s Minister of Information and Culture:
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as the national interest overrides any other interest, 
the press (which was defined to include newspapers, 
magazines, radio and television) has a duty to win, 
maintain, and perpetuate support for the nation as 
the apex of the collective vested interests o f the 
operators within the pyramid.3
Further evidence showing the relationship between mass media and 
national integration has been provided by a host of scholars including Abraham 
Bass4 and Elihu Katz5.
However, attempts to use the mass media to achieve national unity 
in Nigeria have been frustrating. Although media campaigns have led to minor 
successes in areas such as the promotion of inter-ethnic economic relations, 
literacy, urbanization and social well-being, it is clearly apparent, after thirty years 
of independence, that Nigeria has not evolved from tribal communities into a 
’modern’ state of nationhood.6 The structure o f ethnic divisions which existed in 
the colonial era has continued to remain and is still being preserved today, making 
a pre-civil war US News and World Reports statement that ’Nigeria, like its 
neighbours, is turning out to be more of a nation on paper than it is in fact’7 truer 
today than it has ever been.
The Nigerian political communication experience, as it has been 
demonstrated in this thesis, gives credence to the belief that who pays the piper 
dictates the tune. Ethnic, regional, state and tribal antagonisms have been fuelled 
(and are still being fuelled) by the Nigerian mass media as a result o f the patterns 
of ownership. Whether a mass medium is managed by a board of directors 
appointed by private owners or by a public corporation established by the 
government, the medium has a policy set down by the board or corporation to
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which it must adhere. Apart from policies defining day-to-day and long-term 
operations, media owners control the media through their decisions to invest or 
not to invest more funds, decisions which often determine the health and growth 
or the illness and atrophy of the media.
A  common theme that one easily discerns from this study is the 
trend towards ’a market cum state model’ of political communications in which 
there are mixed party and non-party media ownerships, government monopoly 
and control, political party and politician as well as private independent press 
ownerships with their concomitant peculiarly distinctive media philosophy.
Perhaps, the way modern mass communication systems evolved in 
Nigeria hampered their neutrality in mass politics and constructive criticism of the 
\  political system. This was largely due to parochial interests and tribal loyalties as 
the media championed the cause of their tribesmen. Also, the British colonial 
administrators and their policies were the main targets of opposition by the early 
Nigerian press. ’ When the British left, after Nigeria’s
independence the media had to look for someone or something to oppose because 
the style had been geared towards insulting^ ludicrous and unsubstantiated 
accusations and sensationalism!
The evolution of the modern mass media systems leads to an 
inescapable conclusion that the media originated from the political structure of 
the country; hence their integration with the politics and interests of the various 
ethnic constituencies within the nation. The media were not neutral during the 
various national debates, census, elections, and the Nigerian Civil War. They 
actively supported the government of their geographical locations. They also
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acted as the leading organs of the regional and state governments in the 
articulation of the interests and needs of their constituencies in the federation.
It must be pointed out though, that the difficulty associated with the 
use of mass media for political communications in Nigeria especially for the 
accomplishment of national integration, is not restricted to media ownership. 
Other factors such as ethnicity, economic position, religion, literacy, legal 
limitations, and linguistic pluralism, have worked in collaboration with media 
ownership to make the development of a ’socially responsible’ press in Nigerian 
political communications an enormously difficult problem in the country. As I 
have argued in this thesis, the criterion of ownership is not only the key factor 
which determines how the mass media are used for moulding the citizen’s 
perception of political reality in Nigeria, but it is also a more precise means of 
understanding and investigating the role of the Nigerian press in political 
communication and national integration. It is also a potent yardstick for the 
critical appraisal of the structures and performance of the Nigerian mass media 
and their relationships with the nation’s political, economic, ethnic, tribal, 
religious, and cultural structures.
Roston and Breed have found not only that control does go with 
ownership, but they have also shown how the wishes of the owner and top 
management, even when not directly expressed as orders, are still reflected in the 
performance of the enterprise.8
However, it is pertinent to assert that the evidence of the 
consequences of different ownership patterns is highly fragmentary. [Levin, 1960; 
Rarick and Hartman, 1966; Litwin and Wroth, 1969; Toogood, 1969; Wedell,
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1969; Brown, 1970; Grotta, 1970; Wolf, 1971; Anderson, 1971; 1972]. There are 
those who believe that ownership of the press does not^affect meaia coverage of 
national issues while there are others who argue that ownership has an adverse 
effect on the performance and competence of the press. For instance, Wagenberd 
and Soderlung, investigating the influence of chain ownership on the coverage of 
certain key-issues on editorial pages of Canadian newspapers, have found no 
effect of concentration on the coverage of those issues.9
Perhaps one of the earliest and most notable work done in the area 
of the effect of ownership is that of Karl Marx (1848), who contends that the 
ownership and control of the means of production determine the relations of 
production:
"In all stages of human life, the ownership of the 
forms or conditions of production determine the 
structure of society. Thus "the handmill gives you 
society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society 
with the industrial capitalist". "The structure of 
society will in turn breed attitudes, actions, and 
civilisations. Therefore, "all the social political and 
intellectual relations, all religious and legal systems, 
all the theoretical outlooks which emerge in the 
course of history, are derived from the ownership of 
the material conditions of life".10
Karl Marx also relates the concept of ownership to how a state is 
administered. He believes that the dominant class which owns and controls the 
state uses the power of ownership to oppress the governed:
"As soon as mankind emerges from the primitive 
communist state, it is seen that at every stage of
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society a particular class gets control and exploits the 
rest. "The class which exercises ownership o f the 
means of production will dominate the rest. When, 
for instance, the most important factor in the forces 
of production is agricultural, land-owners will be the 
ruling class. The dominant class alone has freedom, 
and to preserve this must act the part of oppressors. 
They therefore, create an executive and repressive 
instrument by the use of which they hope to maintain 
their position and which is called the state. 
"Ownership or control by force is, then, the raison 
d’etre of the state, repression its characteristic".11
The Commission on Freedom of the press also comments on how 
media ownership affects media contents "protection against government is not now 
enough to guarantee that a man who has something to say shall have a chance to 
say it. The owners and managers of the press determine which persons, which 
facts, which versions of these facts, shall reach the public".12
Crosland, Hall and Garnham buttress the marxist position on the 
impact of ownership and control. Crosland contends that ownership and 
particularly institutional ownership is sufficiently concentrated to ensure control; 
that owner-control is reinforced by an elaborate system of interlocking 
directorates, and that even managers who exercise control do so in the interests 
of the owning class.13 For Hall, media production is always and everywhere 
subject to control,14 while Garnham laments:
"There is no such thing as unmanipulated writing, 
filming or broadcasting; the question is, therefore, not 
whether the media are manipulated but who 
manipulates them".15
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William Robson seems to disagree by laying down a number of 
objectives that constitute the purpose of government/public ownership in his book  
- Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership. The objectives are: (1) providing 
the best possible service at the least real cost to the community; (2) improving the 
wages and conditions of employment for the workers; (3) attaining a higher 
degree of equality; (4) ensuring increased public control over the economic 
system; (5) maintaining full and stable employment and (6) increasing industrial 
democracy by'means of greater opportunities for joint consultation.16
In brief, our position is that research evidences abound generally 
showing that when the ownership of a country’s media of communication is vested 
in government, political party or concentrated in the hands of a group or a coterie 
of a few individuals, the media tend to become mere megaphones of those in 
control. Instead of performing the functions of surveying the environment, 
correlating parts of that environment and transmitting culture, which Lasswell17 
says are the basic tasks of the media, or providing entertainment, according to 
Wright,18 the media are turned into ’indispensable tools’ for retaining power by 
those controlling them.19 In developing countries they even tend to shirk their 
responsibility of serving as agents of modernisation.20 Jose has also talked about 
how most media in Africa have ’petered into slavish and almost sycophantic 
government megaphones.21
In Nigeria, ownership and control structures of the media are 
dictated by the political, economic, social, cultural and historical settings of the 
country. Nigeria is an heterogeneous country with a diversity of ethnicity, culture, 
language, ideological orientation, political and religious beliefs.
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The country operates a federal system of government and a mixed economy.
There are various types of media in operation but the most common
are the print media, the electronic media, the political party press, the private
<< >>
’independent’ press, traditional media or oramedia, the ministries of information, 
the government media and the News Agency of Nigeria. These media operate in 
all the 21 states of the Federation. However, no one individual has an electronic 
medium in private control. Although the constitution makes provision for 
anybody who wishes to own an electronic medium to apply and be considered for 
a licence by the President, no such licence has to date been granted.
Ethnic and Religious Factors of press bias in Nigerian political 
communications:
Another factor that can be employed to explain the anatomy of 
press bias in Nigerian political communications : \ &  ethnicity and religion. Many 
Nigerian rulers are aware of the damage these canker-worms could do to the 
political existence of the nation and have warned people times without number 
in their political speechifying to guard against the menace o f ethnicity and religion. 
In his opening address to members of the Constitution Drafting Committee 
(C.D.C.) on 18 October, 1975, the then head of the Federal Military Government 
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, declared:
"It is important that we avoid a reopening of the 
deep splits which caused trauma in the country."22
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The splits he was referring to are ethnic, regional and religious in
nature.
In the same vein, Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo, who succeeded 
General Muhammed and handed over power to civilians of the Second Republic, 
warned against the evils of ethnicity in his New Year message to the nation, on 
January 1, 1979. H e said:
"One major cause of failure of civil administration in 
this country was that our leaders then concentrated 
on the part and ignored the whole, hence 
regionalism, tribalism, sectionalism and ethnicity 
became the order of the day." Let us now correct 
that which has failed us. Let our political aspirants 
look upon the whole not the part; let us remember 
the past and look forward hopefully to the future; let 
us march forward in solidarity and unity of purpose 
and together build a nation ever more united, greater 
and stronger."23
Both President Shehu Shagari and former First Military head of 
State General Ironsi also attributed the demise of the First Republic to ethnicity. 
According to General Ironsi, his military administration would be committed to 
creating a nation where "all Nigerians everywhere in Nigeria would regard one 
another not as strangers but as Nigerians with common nationality irrespective of 
their tribe or place of origin".24 In his own assessment, President Shagari 
declared:
"The first six years of post-independence rule, and 
even more so, the last six years of pre-independence 
rule, were characterised by ignorance and 
unfamiliarity, and therefore, fear and mistrust, among
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the various ethnic groups - or, to be more accurate, 
the nationalities - which inhabit Nigeria."25
In relation to political communications, there is abundant evidence 
to suggest that the ethnic and religious factors are major forces shaping press 
behaviours generally and particularly when faced with competition for political 
power, that political competition follows ethnic lines and exacerbates ethnic 
conflicts, and that media houses and/or personnel tend to be representatives of 
specific ethnic groups which make use of media houses they own and/or control 
or in which they work to enhance their ethnic groups’ interest in the competition 
for resources, acquisition, distribution, sharing and shaping of power.
In fact, this idea of ethnic politics and ethnicity of political 
communications in Nigeria is empirically supported not only by our findings, but 
also by the election results and researches of other writers on Nigeria. In his 
Communication policies in Nigeria. Ugboaja opines that:
"ownership may not be as strong as geographical 
location in moulding newspaper opinion and 
reportage in the Nigerian circumstance ... the 
newspapers’ attitude is usually a function of 
geographical location more than ownership and 
certainly guided by the ethnic constituencies the 
papers serve".27
Writing on the 1979 elections, Labanji Bolaji observes that just as 
the voting trend in the elections took on a "strong ethnic coloration", much of the 
country’s press reflected the same pigmentation in their reports and comments.27 
Idang has also noted that:
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"press partisanship is not even confined to editorial 
opinion, the newspaper editors are ‘often tribalistic 
and narrow-minded, while the press itself is not 
innocent of the evils of corruption, nepotism and 
tribalism which continue to plague all aspects of 
Nigerian society."^
Also, Adamu Ciroma, one time editor o f the New Nigerian, 
identifies the ethnic factor in Nigerian press freedom when he writes:
"the press is free in Nigeria in spite of the fact that 
they are owned by various governments and in spite 
of the ethnic factor which filters and beclouds its 
objectivity ... the press owned by one ethnic group 
could expose wrong doings by others from a different 
ethnic unit."29
Each ethnic group in the media protects its ethnic group interests 
by carrying news in favour of its own ethnic group and against other ethnic 
groups. During the First Republic, for example, when rumours had it that the 
Yoruba would form a new cultural organisation and then a political party to the 
detriment of the NCNC, The Nigerian Post commanded: ’Leave them alone’,
T h e  Yorubas, after all, constitute one of the smallest 
groups in the Republic, their coming together cannot 
constitute an obstacle to the forward march of the 
nation ... if there are those who believe that the 
Yorubas, acting together, can force any change in the 
balance of political power in the country, then let 
them admit also that such a change will be to the 
extent which it is ordained and inescapable for the 
good of all’.30
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As pointed out earlier, The Outlook of the Eastern Nigeria carried 
stereotypes of the North, particularly in the Editor-in-Chief Ajuluchuku’s ’Saturday 
Catechism’. H e spoke o f the NPC leaders* ’childishness and amateurishness’ by 
which they showed ’they are not seasoned rulers of the North’. H e added:
"The North cannot afford a break-up of the Republic. 
They have nothing up there to eat. They have little 
education. Their art of government is primitive. 
They have no access to the sea.31
When Chief Awolowo criticised the Pilot for its emphasis on 
publicising Ibos, he was talking as much about class as ethnicity:
The Ibos in particular were given inordinate publicity 
on the pages of the paper. Perhaps this was as it 
should be. The Ibo had never had a share in 
newspaper publicity before the advent of the PILOT. 
But equally so, no Yoruba man of the class of the 
Ibos publicised in the PILOT every day had a share 
in any paper either. In those days one had to be an 
outstanding politician, a big shot in society, or a well- 
connected person for one’s name to appear in the 
N IG E R IA N  D A IL Y  TIM ES, N IG E R IA N  
TELEGRAPH and LAGOS DAILY NEWS.32
Explaining the reasons behind the establishment of newspapers by 
various governments, political parties, politicians and private owners and their use 
for tribal attacks and ethnic wars especially between the Northern and Southern 
media, a former editor o f the New Nigerian said:
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The orientation of the North was rather different 
from that o f the South. The Nofth believed in 
controlled modernisation and emphasised the need 
for the changing society to adopt modern methods 
without destroying its own qualities. The South 
believed in an unthinking gallop towards everything 
European and Western, without considering its 
relevance or its dangers to the community. In this 
caution ... o f Western methods, notably education, lay 
a source of danger to the Northern region, because 
the North became educationally backward, and thus 
was likely to suffer in the distribution of national jobs. 
The then Northern Government was subjected to 
pressure by the Northern elite not to let the North 
suffer. The North therefore had to have a voice to 
put across. It was a society with an old history and 
revered administrative and legal traditions, which the 
South (and the colonialists) neither understood nor 
liked. But in the new Nigeria, where paper 
qualifications were the primary criteria in the 
distribution of jobs, the North was at a great 
disadvantage. So a government paper, the New  
Nigerian, was necessary to (i) get across the views of 
the Northern elite and mobilise them in order to 
achieve its goals; (ii) fight the Northern case in all 
disputes at the centre.33
Nigeria is an extremely diverse nation. With approximately 250 
ethnic groups speaking a multiplicity of languages, she is perhaps the most diverse 
nation in the world. . '
The origin of ethnic diversity lies in Nigeria’s historical past. Prior 
to British colonization, there was no geopolitical entity known as Nigeria. The area 
now called Nigeria occupied many ’nationalities,’ each entity having its own 
politics, culture, language and religion, and maintaining only limited contact with 
other nationalities.34
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Britain created Nigeria in the 1900’s. But, the colonial 
administration did not attempt to weld the peoples of the various nationalities into 
a single, if artificial, political unit. According to The Economist:
Nigeria was patched together in 1900 for the convenience o f its 
foreign administrators, not of its own people, and was governed for 60 years on 
the principle of ’indirect rule’, which did not do much for national unity.35
This policy of indirect rule did not do much for national unity 
because rather than forge an integrated society, it aided the intensification of 
existing cultural divisions.36 As the cultural divisions deepened, a political climate 
characterized by ethnic distrust and rivalries developed, and it is against this 
backdrop of ethnic protection that the media have embarked on the futile task of 
arousing nationalism.
Ethnic diversity has been the greatest challenge to using the media 
for achieving Nigerian unity. Due to the dictates of ethnic diversity, federal and 
state newspapers radio and television stations have not been able to mobilize the 
nation towards a monolithic national goal. Hence, while federal stations attempt 
to promote a sense of nationhood among Nigerians, state stations are used ’as 
powerful political instruments for regional integration,cultivation of regional loyalty 
and awareness to the detriment of national integration.37 As Osabuohien Amienyi 
explains:
Television [and radio] have continued to play the role 
of the devil’s advocate in the Nigerian society. From 
independence (or is it dependence?) till now, 
television [and radio have] continued to contribute 
significantly to the disintegration of Nigeria.
Television [and radio] managers use the media to 
promote the Nigerian society’s weaker linkages: tribe, 
ethnicity and religion. They tend to emphasize
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alienation and polarization rather than unity through 
the telecast o f tribal and religious programmes.38
Thus, ethnic diversity has continued to stymie the federal 
government’s objective of using^to create an institutional base for national unity 
in Nigeria. And this has happened so much that not even the federal 
government’s takeover of all television stations and the restriction of all radio 
stations, except the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, Ofl medium-wave have 
salvaged the effort.39
In a discussion of the ethnic nature of newspaper partisanship in 
Nigeria, Brynin argues that ’just as the press in developed countries might reflect 
the class structure of these societies, the press in Nigeria reflected the country’s 
ethnic foundations’.40 Under the single term of ’tribalism’, he labelled the ethnic 
contents of the Nigerian newspaper and split them up according to degrees into 
’tribalism’, ’discussion of regions’, ’unity-regionalism’ and ’unity’.41* The following 
figures in average daily column inches illustrate the categories vividly.42
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Table 24 - Tribalist Content in Individual Newspapers (in col, inches) 
1930— 1964
Tribalism Discussion  
of Regions
U nity-
Regionalism
U nity Independ
ence
Pilot ’50 2.3 10.4 1.7 4.0 58.6
Tribune ’50 12.5 19.6 1.6 4.1 23.6
Outlook ’54 0.3 1.5 1.3 3.7 -
Tribune ’58 43.4 4.7 7.1 9.5 2.9
Outlook ’59 3.8 20.0 0.7 13.7 11.7
Tribune ’59 11.3 61.3 0.7 1.6 -
Service ’59 21.2 16.9 8.3 8.1 2.3
Telegraph
’59 27.8 4.5 13.7 7.0
Citizen ’59 4.9 1.9 0.7 1.2 2.3
Outlook ’64 57.7 22.5 41.3 0.3
Citizen ’64 37.3 21.9 6.6 16.8 -
Sketch ’64 104.0 - - 17.8 -
TOTAL 326.5 162.7 64.9 128.8 101.7
Table 25: Tribalist Content in the Citizen (in col inches)
Tribalism Northern
-isation
Discussion  
of Reeions
U nitv-
Reeional
-isation
U nitv Indenend-
ence
1959 4.6 14.1 1.9 0.7 1.2 2.3
1964 37.3 7.6 21.9 6.6 16.8 -
The C itizen’s rabid support o f  the Northernisation programme significantly added to the 
tribalist-nature o f the paper.
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Table 26: Average Tribalist Content in the Press (in col, inches)
T ribalism / 
Discussion o f 
Regions
U n ity-
Regionalism
U n ity /
Independence
19502 22.4 1.6 45.6
1954/83 24.9 4.2 8.0
19594 37.5 4.8 9.6
19645 76.2 9.7 25.4
Notes
1. Including Northernisation
2. Two newspapers
3. Two newspapers
4. F ive newspapers
5. Three newspapers
19 5 0 — 6 4
Table 27: Tribalist Content in Three Newspapers over time fin col, inches)
Tribalism 1/  
Discussion of 
Regions
U nity-
Regionalism
U n ity /
Independence
Tribune
1950 32.1 1.6 27.7
1958 48.1 7.1 12.4
1959 72.6 0.7 1.6
Outlook
1954 1.8 1.3 3.7
1959 23.8 0.7 25.4
1961 0.3 - 3.4
1964 57.7 22.5 41.6
Citizen
1959 20.9 0.7 3.5
1964 66.8 0.6 16.8
Notes:
1. Including Northernisation in the C itizen.
At this juncture, some ’live’ illustrations of ethnic contents in some 
of the Nigerian newspapers are pertinent. In an editorial published on 20-9-1950, 
the Nigerian Tribune said:
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"The West will not rest until the Yorubas under the 
Northern yoke are emancipated and grouped with 
their kith and kin in the West for administrative 
purposes, even if it is necessary to do so on the dead 
bodies of the Northern people."43
For instance, in an editorial in Western Nigeria’s Tribune of 1958 
headed Tbo-Imperialism’, concerning evidence given to the Minorities 
Commission, the paper stated that the evidence from people
"vehemently protesting against being left in the same 
camp with the Ibos, goes to prove that the NCNC is 
simply an Ibo cult, aiming, with the help of a handful 
of misguided, disgruntled or food-seeking quislings 
from other tribes, to achieve the complete 
domination of this country."44
Sometimes the oppressors were Ibos, sometimes the Hausa and 
Fulani. A  certain degree of artifice in these journalistic attacks is apparent.
Most communal demands and complaints in the Nigerian Citizen 
were ethnic and anti-Ibo, and they were often concerned with jobs (usually elite 
jobs), as in the following front-page editorial, which complained that the federal 
government’s Nigerian National Press Ltd. had only ten northeners in a staff of 
300. The editorial claimed that "Northern Nigeria had been cheated. The Region 
has paid an expensive price for Nigerian unity." It criticised the "neglect and 
ineptitude"45 of the federal government under Sir Abubakar as if he, belonging to 
the NPC, had a primary duty to help Northerners acquire federal jobs! In the 
same issue the ‘political correspondent’ in the half-page article head-lined 
"Scandalous! Treacherous!! Wicked!!! North’s infinitesimal Rolej a dangerous
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abnormality," complained that there were only six Northerners in the 433 senior 
staff of the Nigerian Railway Corporation, and no more than 50 out o f the 4,000 
permanent junior staff. H e also claimed (untruthfully) that the North contributed 
over 70% of federal revenues, but got back less than 35% in development 
spending.46
Ethnic antagonism was also reflected in the letter columns. One, 
for instance, from a clerk in a building firm, demanded that only Northerners 
should be staff managers in private firms.
"Unless this is done, the Ibos will be conspiring with 
and dictating to the foreigners who have given their 
whole hearts to the Ibos and who are enslaving the 
Northerners to the Ibos. I can say I am doing my 
utmost best to the company, but still I am regarded 
as inferior to my Southern counterparts."47
Southerners accused the British of favouring the North politically. 
Northerners accused the British of favouring Southerners for employment. Both 
were right. The tone of the above letter expresses well the fear felt by
Northerners of Southern competition for employment. While such feeling was 
widespread, and itself encouraged the Northern government’s racial propaganda, 
this does not mean everyone accepted this propaganda.
The Nigerian O uttook in a political commentary stated:
"Where are all of you Ibo people?... You may not 
know it but you are ‘wanted persons’. Wanted by 
intensely pathological and incurable tribalists, namely 
the NPC and (more so) the NNDP."48
i
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This justification of tribalism achieved religious sanctity in a political 
commentary in the Daily Sketch
"Self-love is not a sin. It is, in fact, according to the 
gospels, the yardstick by which one’s affections for his 
brother must be measured. °ftiou  shalt love thy 
neighbour as thyself^ writes St. Matthew. It is a 
sacred duty, for individuals no less than for the 
groups to which they belong, to fight for self- 
preservation which is said to be the first law even in 
heaven. This is the spiritual basis for tribalism as a 
'pragmatic instrument of national unity’...49
Just as in the North, the core of tribalism was the concern for jobs, 
especially elite jobs. One article, for instance, claimed that:
"Barely nine months since the Management of the 
Nigerian Railway Corporation rocked Nigeria with 
shocking and glaring acts of nepotism and Ibo 
preferential treatment in making appointments into 
the top cadre of the Railway Service, darker and 
more frightening scandals have now been exposed in
the Nigerian Railways the Nigerian Railway
Corporation is the seat of Ibo tribalism in Nigeria".
The article lists the management and other posts apparently held 
by Ibos and then quotes the Ibo chairman of the Railway Board as saying "This 
is my kingdom and I rule it as I like."50 This concern for elite jobs was also 
associated with a concern for elite education; thus an NNDP leader claimed in the 
paper that 400 out o f 700 recent federal government scholarships had gone to the 
Ibos, "leaving 300 to the rest of the country."51
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The anti-Ibo propaganda of the paper achieved an intensity 
comparable to the savage anti-Ibo behaviour of the Northern legislators. The 
onslaught was master-minded by Akintola- "the great apostle of Yoruba family 
unity"52- who warned the Yoruba against trusting the Ibo:
"Immediately the unsuspecting Yorubas gave them  
the support, the Ibo would come out in their true 
w olfs clothing devouring the Yorubas and getting 
every good thing for themselves."53
The paper called for the unity of the Yoruba against the Ibo.
"For how long will the Yorubas vegetate in the 
cesspool of internecine squabbles and perennial 
stagnation?.... The NNDP is a party for the Yorubas
and other suppressed peoples Today the Yoruba
man needs unity and reconstruction more than 
anything else"54
for, according to an NNDP member quoted in the paper, "the NCNC had no 
other plan but the total annihilation of the Yoruba West."55 Student supporters 
of the NNDP spoke of "Iboism, Ibocracy, and Ibophism".56
The most extreme anti-Ibo statements came n o£  from outside 
sources but from one of the paper’s regular columnists, Ejon’gboro, who had an 
effective, if rather repulsive, style.
"Them Ibo boys’ve been talking They ain’t got no
fight with Yoruba people How come 300 jobs open
in the New Railways and them non-fighting, non- 
tribalist Ibo-boys just manage to corner 259?"57
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In another article, in which he refers to members of the U PG A as "Ibo-jerks" the 
same writer brings in religion again.
"The Lord God, He likes to build.... All God’s 
children they like to build. But them UPG A fellows, 
like Satan.... they like to SACK....All they know is 
SackJ Evict, oust, dislodge, dispossess.... (Oh my, 
where is my lexicon? ah, here are some more UPG A  
favourites) displace, kick downstairs.... fire, blast, can, 
break, bust.... They do the real thing. They fight. 
This means fists and cudgels. And machetes, guns, 
and dynamite. And pistols, shot-guns and pine­
apples. The more dead the better. Like they used to 
say in them story-books, dead men don’t tell no tales. 
Simple dead candidates don’t win no flipping 
elections."58
To be sure, critics of the ethnic factor in Nigerian political 
communications have argued that some of the things referred to as ‘ethnic’ are 
‘geographic’ and not ethnic and that much of the theorising on this issue has itself 
been informed by a large dose of ethnicity. In other words, the theory of ethnic 
factor in Nigerian political communications is a function of the ‘ethnicity of 
theory’. They argue, for example, that developments in ethnic theorising since the 
seminal work by Barth and others59 have pointed to the non-immutability of 
ethnic boundaries, calling to question earlier attempts to treat ethnic groups as 
immutable ascriptive givens.
It is now suggested that:
"the genesis and persistence of ethnic boundaries, the 
incorporation of ethnic populations, and the 
organisation of inter-ethnic relations are generally
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related to factors affecting the competition for 
environmental resources"....60
Competition for resources is thus the focus for ethnic studies which 
look on such competition as the determining variable in the genesis and form of 
the ethnic group.61
Given the tendency for ethnic group boundaries to change, 
contemporary ethnic studies now talk of varying degrees of ethnicity instead of 
ethnic groups,'with a switch from the ethnic group as a social category to ethnicity 
as a process.62 A  process, of course, results from and is indicative of other factors 
and it can play a causal role only to the extent that contributory factors germane 
to its own genesis and enhancement allow. In fact, the tendency of ethnic 
boundaries to change proves that ethnicity is not the primordial force that earlier 
perspectives indicated.63
Ethnicity has tended to perform an instrumentalist role as a mask 
for class privilege and as a mechanism through which members of the ruling class 
struggle for power, obtain power, control power and maintain themselves in 
power.64 Obviously, then, ethnicity as a mechanism for achieving power becomes 
an active agent only to the extent that its manipulators so wish. In the words of 
Magubane,65 ‘an emphasis on ethnicity beclouds serious analysis of African 
societies because such an emphasis ignores the ownership of the material 
production forces, the material basis of society and the nature of the social 
system’. However, Tatarian insists that:
"many young states are still too fragile, too deficient 
in literacy and established institutions, and their
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people more loyal to racial, religious or tribal
communities than to the new concept of statehood".66
Religious affiliation has also been a very serious problem for communication 
and politics in Nigeria. In fact, religion has often been made to serve as an 
effective vehicle for both the communication and realisation of political ambitions. 
Issues that affect Muslims - the Shariah, the Organisation of Islamic Conferences 
(OIC), the holy pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina (Hajj) and the question of 
Muslim rights in the Constitution - were/are often treated with levity, derision and 
contempt by the media, most of which are dominated by Christians. In the same 
vein, one or two Nigerian media which have Muslims on their editorial boards do
Y "
retaliate by being critical of anything Christian. Religious crises wee becoming so 
rampant in the country that Federal Government had to set up a Religious 
Advisory Council. If not handled carefully, religious controversy could once again 
present a major difficulty during the proposed return to civilian rule in 1992.
Nigeria’s Muslims easily constitute the largest Muslim community 
in sub-Saharan Africa. In Nigeria itself, in many of the 21 states, including the 
out-going capital - Lagos and the new capital territory - Abuja, Muslims are in a 
majority.
Considered from the perspective of the Muslims, the situation in 
Nigeria probably looks something like this. Although they are in a majority the 
country since independence has been governed by its rulers, Muslim as well as 
non-Muslim, and its intellectual and business elite, as if it were a non-Muslim 
country. The symbols and trappings of state, the style of diplomacy, the direction 
of foreign policy, the political, legal, economic and education systems, the
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structures of the working week, are all seen to be based on a western, secular, 
albeit once Christian, model.
At these and other levels Muslims observe a clear continuity 
between the old colonial state and the ‘new’ Nigeria in which they, the largest 
group in the country, are supposed to actively participate and do so without 
attempting to change or restructure it along Islamic lines. And it has to be said 
that rumour, rhetoric and misinformation apart, there is nothing in the Muslim 
demands which support the more alarmist, non-Muslim interpretation of them, 
nor is there anything any Muslim-led Nigerian administration has done to date 
that would lend credence to such interpretation.67 As mentioned earlier, 
Mohammed Haruna, managing director of the Federal Government owned New  
Nigerian Newspapers Limited, spent a night in June 1987 with security agents for 
authorising the publication in the New Nigerian of an advertisement by the 
Council of Ulamaa which enjoined Muslims to take steps to protect themselves 
saying that the government and the security agents, including the armed forces, 
had failed to protect them as citizens of Nigeria.
Religion is a very critical factor which hampers media efforts at 
achieving national unity. In the northern part of the country, practically everyone 
is Hausa and of the Muslim religion except in the middle-belt. In the south-east, 
where the Ibo people are predominant, the religion is primarily Catholic. In the 
south-west where the majority of the people are Yoruba, there is a mixture of 
mosques and churches and followers of various African Ethnic Religions. For 
instance, religious diversity has led to a misinterpretation of the concept of local 
programming in broadcasting. As a result of religious diversity, broadcasters have
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misinterpreted the concept of local programming to mean the presentation of 
programmes to the taste of the predominant ethnic group in the area of coverage. 
This misinterpretation has meant that programmes which adulate a religion and 
others in vernacular constitute more than 60% of local programmes on television 
today. Whereas, in a setting where taste is cosmopolitan (especially where such 
cosmopolitan Jsfljresults from ethnic diversity), the media should endeavour to find 
a common denominator so as to accommodate all. Since religious diversity has 
been an important consideration in deciding media objectives, the challenge that 
religious diversity poses to the use of the media for the creation of integration is 
clearly apparent and quite ominous.
Nigerian politicians also do employ religion as a campaign strategy. 
Chief Awolowo, in an attempt to get himself accepted by the Northern Muslims 
boasted during his campaign tours that his government established the First 
Pilgrims Welfare Board in Nigeria, the Western Nigeria Pilgrims Welfare Board, 
and that it was he who sent his sister, Alhaja Awofeso on the holy pilgrimage to 
Mecca adding that all these point to his love for Islam and Muslims. There are 
over 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria. As for religions, see the following Table 28.
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Table 28: Population by Religion and Sex 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 
Total
Religion
TOTAL
Population %
MALES
Population %
FEMALES
Population %
Moslems 26,276,496 47.2 13,397,054 47.7 12,879,442 46.7
Christians 19,207,144 34.5 10,077,436 35.8 9,129,708 33.1
Others 10,186,415 18.3 4,637,362 16.5 5,549,053 20.2
TOTAL 55,670,055 100 28,111,852 100 27,558,203 100
Urban
Religion
TOTAL
Population %
MALES
Populatio
n
%
FEMALES
Population %
Moslems 4,488,043 50.0 2,330,614 48.6 2,157,429 51.7
Christians 3,985,157 44.4 2,235,093 46.6 1,750,064 41.9
Others 498,264 5.6 231,644 4.8 266,620 6.4
TOTAL 8,971 464 100 4,797,351 100 4,174,113 100
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RURAL
Religion
TOTAL
Population %
MALES
Population %
FEMALES
Population
%
Moslems 21,788,453 46.7 11,066,440 47.5 10,722,013 45.9
Christians 15,221,987 32.6 7,842,343 33.6 7,379,644 31.5
Others 9,688,151 20.7 4,405,718 18.9 5,282,433 22.6
TOTAL 46,698,591 100 23,314,501 100 23,384,090 100
S o u r c e :  P o p u l a t i o n  C e n s u s  o f  N i g e r i a ,  1 9 6 3  F e d e r a l  R e p u b l i c  o f  N i g e r i a ,  C o m b i n e d  
N a t i o n a l  F i g u r e s ,  V o l .  I l l  ( L a g o s ;  F e d e r a l  O f f i c e  o f  S t a t i s t i c s ,  J u l y  1 9 6 8 ) .
Regimes both civilian and military have failed woefully in their 
efforts to revamp the economy. Selfishness, excessive materialism, poor 
management, weak leadership, bad planning and lack of patriotism have been  
partly responsible for the abysmal failure. In fact, corruption and bribery have 
become the order of the day as a result of economic problems to the extent that 
these evils are still found today:
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"in hospitals where nurses require a fee from every 
in-patient before the prescribed medicine is given, 
and even the ward servants must have their ‘dash* 
before bringing the bed-pan; it is known to be rife in 
the police Motor Traffic Unit, which has unrivalled 
opportunities on account of the common practice of 
over-loading vehicles; pay clerks make a deduction 
from wages of daily paid staff; produce examiners 
exact a fee from the produce buyer for every bag that 
is graded and sealed; domestic servants pay a 
proportion of their wages to the senior of them, 
besides often having paid a lump sum to buy the 
job”.68
These are the sad but stark realities of the Nigerian situation 
today. The soldiers use the power of gun to amass wealth and commit all kinds 
of atrocities, and go with such atrocities unpunished. Uniformed men - the men 
and women of Customs and Excise Department, the police and other government 
officials aid and abet smuggling, armed robbery, corruption, bribery in order to 
accumulate wealth.
These economic problems are very vital to an understanding of 
political communication in Nigeria. They affect all aspects of it, including the 
remuneration of those engaged in the business, their careers and the input and 
output of the media. As a result of these and a host of other problems - 
uncertainties in emolument, retrenchment, job insecurity, lack of promotion 
opportunities - the more you can spend for the press, the more you are likely to 
be ‘advertised’ or ‘sold’ and the more your image and issues are focused. In the 
Second Republic, some press personnel were on the secret pay-roll of some 
political parties while others were accused of being on sale for taking ‘brown’ 
envelopes before carrying a news item.
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Under the economic factor which also affects newspaper 
management as well as Radio and Television Management is the country’s wage 
structure, unemployment as well as industrial disputes by workers.
The wage structure tells who will purchase the newspapers steadily 
and regularly. The constant buyer of the dailies, weeklies and monthlies is an 
important element in building readership. The average reader does not exist, he 
has to be created and sustained. But to sustaiiy^vill haVe to depend on his income 
and education; another variable in economic factor affecting management of the 
media.
In Nigeria, wage structure is unsteady and unemployment has 
increased since the oil boom was over, and Nigeria was having its worst economic 
depression since the end of the second World War. Many people were 
compulsorily retired from work at both government, public and private services. 
This meant loss of income, and consequently loss of patronage for the newspaper 
industries. Television sets were costly to purchase, and the cost of radio sets was 
exorbitantly high and not within the reach of low income segment of the society. 
This meant a drastic reduction in listenership and viewership.
Nigeria practises both laissez-faire economy and state ownership of 
some basic means of production. However, the state is richer than any private 
sector. It is therefore not surprising to find the government-owned media thriving 
whilst privately-owned media are dying, resulting from economic hardship. When 
shortage of newsprint occurred some years ago, while the government-owned 
newspapers hardly felt it, some privately-owned newspapers reduced the number 
of pages they normally produced to the barest minimum so as to survive. Also,
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before the establishment of newsprint manufacturing in the country the private 
media owners used to pay heavy custom duties to import newsprint from abroad.
Problems of Freedom and Legal Limitations
The Nigerian mass media and their practitioners are also confronted 
with the problem of freedom, restrictive regulations, legal limitations, decrees and 
a host of other ‘modus operandi’ of gagging the media.
From the colonial era, to the independence period, military 
interregna and successive civilian republics, the Nigerian political system has 
employed various measures to curb the political communication activities of the 
media. These include subsidies to favourite publishers, favouritism in the 
allocation of tightly controlled papers stocks and newsprint, manipulation of access 
to news, limitation to what may be published or broadcast, threats of incarceration 
and proscription, the frequent use of treason and sedition laws to control media 
output, the shielding of sensitive governmental proceedings, and the protection of 
what are regarded as individual reputations and privacy.
About 25 such enactments have been identified which severely 
constrain communication in Nigerian politics. For instance, we have sedition laws, 
an Official Secrets Act, the Criminal Codes, decrees 2, 4 and 11, and laws of 
obscenity, defamation and a host of other extra-legal and non-legal restrictive 
laws to media freedom, including emergency regulations. Details of these 
limitations have been given in the earlier sections of this thesis.
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Literacv and Linguistic Barriers in Information Dissemination and Political 
Communications:
Literacy and linguistic barriers affect Nigerian political 
communications. Literacy is defined as the ability to read, write and understand 
a short statement. The inability to read in English Language alienates majority 
of the Nigerian people from the newspaper press especially the rural dwellers. 
According to UNESCO Statistics, in 1985 one in four adults were illiterate, 95 per 
cent of those were in the developing world. While Asia has the largest aggregate 
number of illiterates, in proportion to the population, Africa leads the global 
league table. Nigeria alone accounts for 27 million illiterates, and follows India, 
China, Pakistan and Bangladesh, with the fifth worst illiteracy total in the world. 
In Nigeria in 1985, 58 per cent of men were illiterate, and 67 per cent of women. 
UNESCO says "illiteracy is not a disease, to be eradicated like yellow fever, but 
rather a complex cultural condition linked to expectations and circumstances 
rooted in the environment".69
These factors affect the circulation of newspapers and audience 
reach of the electronic media.
There are also problems of a lack of low cost and rapid transportation, prohibitive 
costs of purchasing and maintaining vehicles as well as abject poverty all of which 
affect distribution. As a result, the media have remained largely urban in 
orientation, thus excluding rural dwellers, who form the majority, from political 
communication. Issues frequently highlighted on communication and politics are 
those that concern the interests of the elites, thus rendering the media as 
megaphones of the elite, by the elite for the elite.
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In fact, lack of literacy is a big problem militating against 
communication and politics in Nigeria. Literacy was and is still unevenly 
distributed in the country. The effect of high levels of illiteracy is obvious, but this 
problem is exacerbated by language fragmentation. A  large rural population also 
inhibits the spread of newspapers. Low per capita income restricts the purchase 
of papers by the public, and also limits advertising revenue.
Also, the importance of language as a medium of communication 
cannot be over-emphasized. Most of the mass media carry out their educative 
and informative enterprises through the English language, which is still the official 
language of communication, government, business and commerce in Nigeria today. 
The three Nigerian languages officially recognised - Hausa, I b o  and Yoruba - are 
still in the process of being developed for political communication by the media.
The questions then are: how many can read, write and understand 
English to be able to appreciate the media’s role in communication and politics? 
How many Nigerian languages can be used for information dissemination?
The actual number of languages that exist presently in Nigeria is 
uncertain. Some estimates 70 put the number of languages at 178, some believe 
that there are as many languages as there are ethnic groups in Nigeria - 250,71 and 
others argue that there may be as many as 300 languages. Despite the 
disagreement between various estimates, it is evident that linguistic pluralism is 
a Nigerian reality, that is presenting a very serious challenge to the cultivation of 
national unity through the media.
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Describing the underlying challenge that broadcasting faces, Nnamdi 
Azikiwe, the first president of Nigeria noted: T h e central problem of federalism 
in Nigeria is how to coexist in harmony/72 Asking ‘how can people who speak 
diverse tongues and have inherited different cultural traditions cultivate national 
spirit of oneness?,73 Azikiwe implied that linguistic pluralism must be overcome 
if Nigeria’s desires for nationhood are to materialize.
Though English is Nigeria’s official lingua franca, radio and 
television stations cannot broadcast exclusively in English.
Only a tiny number of Nigerian elite, mostly foreign educated 
lawyers, civil servants, academics and business people, use English for everyday 
purposes in their homes. As a result, broadcast stations have had no choice but 
to program in vernacular languages, even though programming in vernacular 
languages has led more than anything else to the growing divisions among the 
many cultures of Nigeria, which English is supposed to unite.
Presently, the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria broadcasts in 
45 vernacular languages about forty per cent of the time. The state and regional 
stations use local languages and dialects ninety per cent of the time. The federal 
stations, perhaps in following patterns established by the federal government, use 
the criteria of population to decide which local language to use in broadcasts and 
which to ignore. Thus, Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba are the most widely used local 
languages. However, the emphasis placed on the language of these so-called 
majority ethnic groups has led to protests by ‘minority’ groups for equal 
recognition.
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Bode Alalade recalls the enormous criticisms he received when he 
tried to create an educational programm that focused on words and concepts 
derived from the languages of three so-called ‘major’ ethnic groups. H e writes:
"I have tried many gimmicks to make this programme 
more generally acceptable but I appear to have 
drawn a blank. The viewing public, rather than being 
sympathetic, is hostile. I have personally been at the 
receiving end of vitriolics from even enlightened 
members of the public who asserted that I must be 
Sick in the head to think that Ibo, Hausa and Yoruba 
were the three main languages in the country. As far 
as they were concerned, the dialects spoken in their 
little villages had more complete orthography than 
my so-called three main Nigerian languages."74
From this excerpt, it is clear that local language broadcasts, 
especially those focusing on a limited number of languages, will manifest ethnic 
antagonisms. Such efforts, as Patrick Connolly observes, will surely make people 
who do not understand English or Hausa or Yoruba or Ibo or the other languages 
used, request avenues through which to communicate for their gratification.75
Our findings show, first of all, that Nigerian political communications have 
operated within a very unique historical context. To begin with, the Nigerian 
political communications developed from circumstances different from those of 
the developed societies. Also, the philosophical assumptions underlying the media 
systems in Nigeria (as I argued in Chapter 4), are different from those of the 
Western world although some similarities may be found. Equally important are 
the functions the media perform in developing and developed societies. While the
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media in Nigeria, for instance, are expected to perform the task of unifying and 
integrating the different segments of the heterogenous society, the media of the 
developed world do not have to play that role to the same extent. The impact of 
mass media ownership on the coverage of national issues and the problems o f a 
host o f other factors of media bias in Nigerian political communications as 
explained, are not as acute in the developed societies.
Based on the key factor of mass media ownership communication 
and politics have always been closely inter-connected in Nigeria, although the 
nature of their relationship has changed with time. Depending on the issues, 
personalities, ethnic groups, and media institutions involved, political 
communication has contributed at one time or another to integration and 
disintegration, unity and disunity, internal rioting, arson, vandalism, assassination, 
exacerbated ethnic distrust, antagonism, coups and counter-coups, abortive coups, 
rumours of coups, demand for coups, general violent, political disagreement, civil 
war, national reconciliation, reconstruction, rehabilitation, social mobilization and 
peace, national integration or disintegration. As I explained in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7 and 8, communication and politics will continue to play either mutually 
functional, complementary and supplementary roles, or mutually dysfunctional, 
antagonistic, diametrically opposed and counter-productive roles in Nigeria’s socio- 
politico-economic development.
The findings from the empirical examination and content-analysis 
of various types of federal and state governments media, political party and 
private newspapers tend to confirm the research problem investigated namely that
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ownership pattern of the media affects the way they are used for political 
communications in Nigeria (see Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 above).
A  critical assessment of the dimension. of the political 
importance and role of the mass media shows that although research has 
undergone many stages on this issue, it is, nevertheless, still inconclusive. Despite 
this inconclusiveness and in spite of the fact that mass media determine voting 
behaviour of people in collaboration with many other intervening variables, yet, 
political communication researchers seem to agree that all functions performed 
in the political systems are by means of communication; that political stories in the 
mass media are very significant in furnishing raw materials for the formation of 
political images; that there are functional (positive and/or negative) relationships 
between communication and politics; and that campaign communications energize 
impulses to participate, define issues and convey choices for voting decisions.
In this thesis, we have attempted contributions to knowledge in the 
areas of the theory, practice and methodology of political communications. 
Theoretically, we attempted a description and critique of the theories and models 
of the press and communications systems, (political communications) found them  
inadequate for the situation in developing societies, especially those o f Africa, and 
suggested an alternative model for explaining the political communications 
behaviour and the anatomy of press bias in the election campaigns and coverage 
of national issues in the developing countries especially those o f Africa with 
Nigeria as a case study. Methodologically, we sought a fruitful marriage between 
qualitative and quantitative tools in political communication analysis and used in 
a major way, content analysis of the newspapers and other mass media to
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demonstrate the quantity or amount of coverage for the different political parties, 
state, regional, federal governments and ethnic groups, the nature of the news 
stories about them - whether they are favourable, unfavourable or neutral and the 
importance accorded the news stories in terms of positioning. Practically, we 
attempted a contribution to empirical knowledge on the political implications of 
the contents and contexts of mass media of communications in an African socio­
political formation, the Nigerian political communication example, from 1900 to 
the present period and with explanations and predictions for post-1992 political 
communications order; these are periods that no study has yet fully covered and 
in which no study in Nigerian political communications has looked at the influence 
of media ownership on media contents.
We have seen how the ‘mixed party and non-party’ media were used 
by their owners in the coverage of sensitive national issues in Nigeria - census 
controversy, election campaigns, ethnic conflicts, religious issues and regional 
interests, (see Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 above). In addition to the various 
media laws and their use by government agencies, the governments in Nigeria 
applied a host of other means to control the media on political communications 
in Nigeria - excessive secrecy>bribery, subtle influence, licensing, postal and tariff 
restrictions, censorship, open and implied threats, bannings, seizures, prohibitions 
and restrictions, expulsions, arrests and imprisonments. In particular^ military 
coup d’etats and subsequent military rules have had tremendous impacts on the 
structure, administration and contents of the Nigerian mass media. In most 
instances the military impacts on the mass media have been overwhelmingly 
negative. For instance, there was not any occasion when, during any civilian
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administration, a Nigerian newspaper was forcibly closed down. But under the 
military regimes, such incidents became a common occurrence (see Chapter 6 
above). All the Nigerian military governments have always preferred a fawning 
press to a critical press. They have always been reluctant to allow free flow of 
information, they were interested in controlling the media both print and 
electronic and they would even want to exclude private involvement in the print 
media because of their (the military governments) dislike for the truth.
In the same vein, the civilian governments have used the media to 
favour themselves especially during election campaigns in Nigeria. Ordinarily, 
elections serve as instruments through which the masses pass their verdict on the 
governments or incumbent elites. Quite naturally the governments because they 
have been guilty of poor and incompetent leadership have always suspected the 
verdict the people will pass on them hence they therefore, quickly move in to 
manipulate that verdict and this is one idea behind the use of the media to 
influence people’s perception of political candidate’s image, party programmes 
and constant rigging of elections and announcement of false election results.
It is true that while each government - state, regional and/or federal, 
operates a form of censorship over the media it owns and controls, such 
censorship does not necessarily block the free flow of information. What one 
newspaper will not print another paper may be very happy to publish; what one 
state radio may silence may well be carried by another. A politician denied access 
to one television studio might find another welcoming him very readily. And the 
audience of a state radio station is not entirely limited to that state.
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But as Nigeria approaches a third attempt at democratic rule in 
socio-economic conditions which are less propitious than on the past occasions, 
it will be all the more important for the Nigerian press to operate in a way which 
contributes to political stability and national integration rather than undermines 
attempts at national unity and federal survival. We have exactly attempted a 
contribution to this lofty objective. We suggest that if the Nigerian press behaves 
more responsibly and tries to understand, appreciate the history, politics, 
economy, cultures and contradictions of the Nigerian society and strives hard to 
harmonize these diversities in a positive manner, without exacerbating ethnic, 
religious or tribal differences in its coverage of events, national integration, unity 
and stability may be achieved. In the words of Jose, Momoh and Kirk-Greene at 
different places:
"... Nigeria today stands dangerously on the brink of 
the precipice of disaster. The geographical, economic 
and political entity which the British and Nigerians 
have built over the years is cracking so badly that 
there are now grave signs that it will sooner or later - 
perhaps sooner than later - collapse and shatter to 
pieces".76
"A duty is imposed on the press to ensure that the 
political objectives of Nigeria are achieved in 
accordance with its motto which is ‘Unity and Faith, 
peace and progress’.77 "Patriotism must in the end 
take precedence over parochialism and particularism. 
The whole must remain greater than the parts; to 
reverse the priority was the fatal flaw of Nigeria’s 
First Republic".78
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Whatever the pattern of media ownership, the Nigerian media 
practitioners should strive to maintain the continued existence o f Nigeria as a 
federation in the way they cover events, issues and activities of politicians in the 
Nigerian political communications 1992 and beyond. Scholars who have studied 
federations that have failed, have come to the conclusion that what is important 
is that:
".... the leaders and their followers, must ‘feel federal’; 
they must be moved to think of themselves as one 
people, with one common self-interest capable, where 
necessary, of over-riding most other considerations of 
small group interest. It is not enough that the units 
of a potential federation have the same idea of ‘the 
G ood’ but that ‘the Good’ for any one must be 
consciously subordinate to or compatible with ‘the 
Good’ for all. This, then, is tantamount to an 
ideological commitment not to federation only as a 
means such as, for example, a means to gain 
independence or financial stability, to utilize 
secondary and tertiary factors, but to federation as an 
end, as good for its own sake, for the sake of 
"answering the summons of history".79
And this type of commitment can only be generated if the right type 
of leadership emerges - the type of leadership which, according to Pierre Trudeau, 
is dedicated to creating a national Image which would make any image of a 
separatist group unattractive - a leadership must make all citizens ‘feel that it is 
only within the framework of the federal state that their language, culture, 
institutions, sacred traditions and standard of living can be protected from external 
attack and internal strife’.80
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There is a need to regulate media practice in Nigerian political 
communications by establishing a Communication Media Advisory Council, as an 
arm of the National Electoral Commission or of a National Communication 
Commission with responsibility for monitoring press responsibility in political 
communications and for setting the media agenda of the coverage of national
issues. The Commission should have powers to enforce its authority#
There is also a need to re-organize the structure of mass media 
ownership and control in Nigeria with a view to ensure private ownership of 
electronic media and diffusion and to regulate against monopoly in order to 
prevent the misuse of the media by a few rich, powerful individual owners, groups 
of Nigerians or governments, with its attendant undesirable consequences.
Nigerian governments should also encourage direct public and 
private investment in community based media in the rural areas. And finally, the 
Nigerian mass media should at all times remain consistent with the national ideals 
of realising:
a united, strong and self-reliant nation; 
a great and dynamic economy; 
a just and egalitarian society;
a land of bright and equal opportunities for all citizens; 
a free and democratic society;
social justice, economic recovery and self-reliance and uphold the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy - political, 
economic, social, educational and foreign policy objectives of Nigeria.
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Journal of Communication 
Journal of Modern History 
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F\ MISCELLANEOUS SOURCES:
Research work and field trip in Nigeria, 1986-1989.
Interview with Presidential Candidates of the Second Republic, Reporters, 
Electorate and Top Media Executives, including Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, Alhaji 
(Dr.) I. Babatunde Jose and Alhaji Aliko Muhammed to mention a few.
Materials from Libraries, Archives, and Documentation Offices, in the U .K ., 
U .S ., Nigerian Mediam Houses among a host of other sources.
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a i m m i n d i x 1
N I G E R I A N  P R E S S  O R G A N I S A T I O N
CODE OF C O N D U C T
PR EA MB LE
1. Abuse  of the r ights of the Press are punishable  by law. Indeed,  the  Law of 
Libel, civil as well as cr iminal  and the Law of Con t emp t ,  deal adequa t e ly  wi th  
such abuse.
2. Any  abuse  of the rights of  the Press, therefore ,  c ann o t  be the object ive of  d ec ­
larat ion.
3. But  expe r i ence has shown man y  lapses in the pract ice of  the prof ess ion and it 
has for long become apparen t  tna t  a code  of c o n du c t  mus t  be establ i shed as 
among  pract is ing journal i s ts  themselves,  if they mus t  fulfil thei r  t r ue  func t ions  
and  if a s tandard  be low which  journal ists  may  not  be expect ed  to  fall, m a y  be 
laid down.
It is in pu rsuance  of these object ives tha t  we hereby so l emn ly  declare:
1. That  the  publ ic is ent i t led to t he  t r u th  and that  only cor r ec t  i n fo rma t io n  can
form the  basis for sound journal i sm and ensure the con f idence  of  the people .
2. Thar  it is the moral  du ty  of  every journal ist  to have respect  for t he  t r u th  and  to
publ i sh or  prepare  for publ i ca t i on  only  the t r u th  and to the bes t  of his k n o w ­
ledge.
3. Tha t  it is the  du ty  of the journal ist  to publ i sh only facts; never to suppress  su ch
facts as he knows;  nevor to falsify ei ther  to suit his own  purposes ,  or  any o ther
purposes .
4. Tha t  it is the d u ty  of t he  journal ist  to refuse any r eward for publ i sh ing  or 
suppressing news or  commen t s ,  o ther  than salary and al l owances  legi t imately 
earned in the discharge of his professional  duties.
5. T h a t  t he  journal ist  shall emp lo y  all legi t imate moans in the col l ec t i on  o f  news 
and he shall defend at all t imes the right to free access,  providod t ha t  due  
regard is paid to the privacy of individuals,
6. Tha t  once  in format ion  has been col lected and publ i shed  the journal i s t  shall 
observe  the universally a ccep t ed  principle of secrecy and  shall n o t  disclose the 
source  of  i n fo rma t ion  ob t a ined  in conf idence .
7. T h a t  it is t he  d u t y  of the journal i s t  to regard plagiarism as unethi ca l .
8. Tha t  it is the  du ty  of every journal i s t  to  cor r ec t  any  publ i shed  i n fo rm a t ion  
found  to be incorrect
CHIEF  C HRI S  OKOLIE  
ALHAJI  LAT EEF  JAKANDE President. (NGE)
President, (NPAN)  ") „.-7
a -
CHIEF MICHAEL ASAJU 
°res iden t,  (NUJ)
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APPENDIX H f  LIVE ILLUSTRATION OF ELECTION NEWS STORIES
Daily Times, January 20, 1979 - Front Page Headline:
AWOLOWO SHOWS HIS PLAN TO NEWSMEN
Story
"The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) Presidential 
Candidate, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, on Wednesday 
turned a press conference in Maiduguri into what 
looked like a sound tutorial class.
It all began when a journalist asked Chief Awolowo 
how his party could accomplish its political 
programmes in view of the present financial 
constraint of the country.
The UPN leader summoned one of his aides around 
for his box containing documents.
Chief Awolowo filled conference table with prepared 
documents on various commitments, the costing of 
such projects, projections, and methods of 
implementation and time schedule".
Daily Times. March 29. 1979 - Front Page Headline: 
NO SPECIAL TAX FOR UPE - AWO
Story
"A Government of the Unity Party of Nigeria will not 
levy any tax on the citizens to raise funds for its free 
education-at-all-levels scheme.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo said in Lagos yesterday that 
his party sincerely desired to alleviate the sufferings 
of the people."
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Daily Times. Wednesday 11th April. 1979 - Front Page Headline :
GNPP SCHOOL IS A JOKE - SHAGARI 
Wonders why people shout Awo
Story:
Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN) Presidential Candidate, has described the 
Great Nigeria Peoples’ Party’s (GNPP) School for 
ideological studies at Gembu as a "huge joke".
He told a rally at Numan, Gongola State, that he did 
not believe the school existed as such.
"I was in Gembu a few days ago. I was shown some 
buildings which I was told were the school premises, 
but I saw only about 30 cows roaming the premises, 
and no people. ..."
A  few people shouted ‘Awo’ when the entourage 
entered Numan, Alhaji Shagari wondered why 
anybody should bother about someone who had been  
deserted even by his ablest and most trusted 
lieutenants".
Daily Times, May 22, 1979 - Front Page Headline: 
UPN TO LIFT BAN ON GOODS - AWO 
Story:
"Chief Obafemi Awolowo said yesterday that the law 
banning importation of goods and controlling prices 
had done more harm to many people than the good 
it did to a few."
"In the circumstances, the Unity Party of Nigeria, 
(UPN) on assumption of power, will have no 
hesitation at all, in lifting all the bans on imports", he 
said.
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Daily Times, Tuesday May 1. 1979 - Back Page Headline: 
OUR GOAL, BY AWO
Story:
"There is no social justice in Nigeria the Presidential 
Candidate of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo said yesterday.
Addressing a rally near Isolo fly-over, Mushin, Lagos 
State, on the second leg of his campaign tour, Chief 
Awolowo said if there was any social justice at all, the 
few rich in our midst would not be spending their 
wealth recklessly while a majority of our people lived 
in penury".
Daily Times, May 12. 1979 - Back Page Headline
WHY I AM NOT IN UPN 
Shagari talks with students
Story:
"Alhaji Shehu Shagari has spoken about why he is not 
in the same political camp with Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo. He told a group of University students 
that he was not in the UPN because he did not take 
part in its formation."
Daily Times, May 14. 1979 - Front Page Headline: 
UPN WONT CONTROL BIRTH - AWO 
Story:
"A UPN government will encourage families to bear 
and rear children as much as they wish, the party’s 
touch-bearer, Chief Obafemi Awolowo has said.
Chief Awolowo, addressing a rally at Iware, near 
Ibadan, Oyo State, said: "It is the policy of our party 
that you should continue to bear and rear children."
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Daily Times. May 28. 1979 - Front Page Headline
LET YOUR WIVES VOTE - NPN CHIEF 
Shagari on importance of women
Story:
"All married men in Jega, Sokoto State, have been  
advised to allow their wives to vote during the coming 
elections.
The Presidential Candidate of the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN), Alhaji Shehu Shagari, told a rally in 
the town that women are vital to the elections 
because they constitute the bulk of voters."
Daily Times, Thursday May 31, 1979 - Back Page Headline:
NO COUP, NO WAR IF I WIN 
Awo allays fears
Story:
"Chief Obafemi Awolowo yesterday predicted a coup- 
free Nigeria under his rule.
There will also be no civil war, he promised his 
supporters in Uromi, Bendel State.
Chief Awolowo, on a 45-day country-wide tour, his 
second round-the-nation trip since October last year, 
said he had heard of fears that there would be 
confusion after the elections".
Daily Times, .Tune 1, 1979 - Back Page Headline 
SOCIALISM DOESN’T MEAN POVERTY - AWO 
Story:
"The Presidential Candidate of the Unity Party of 
Nigeria (UPN) Chief Obafemi Awolowo, on 
Wednesday turned a political rally into a lecture on 
socialism.
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It was at Auchi, Bendel State, during his 43-day 
campaign tour of the country. He told the people 
that socialism did not mean poverty.
After quoting references on socialism in Russia and 
China, the UPN leader said "socialism means having 
equal access to all the good things of life".
Daily Times, .Tune 4, 1979 - Back Page Headline 
SHAGARI WARNS PROPHETS OF DOOM
Story:
Alhaji Shehu Shagari campaigning for the presidency 
in Kano State, has lashed out at people he called 
crisis dreamers.
H e said he had been told of one of them boasting 
that "the world will crumble" unless a particular 
presidential candidate wins.
Alhaji Shehu Shagari the National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN) Presidential Candidate said such people were 
bent on causing trouble because events do not seem  
to favour them".
Daily Times, .Tune 12, 1979 - Back Page Headline 
NPN EXISTS TO UNITE NIGERIANS says Shagari 
Story:
Alhaji Shehu Shagari in Abeokuta campaigning for 
the presidency, said his party was formed mainly to 
unite Nigerians.
The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) Presidential 
candidate said the country’s problems stemmed from 
disunity among her different peoples.
Alhaji Shehu said the NPN could unite Nigerians 
because it had done it in its own house.
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Daily Times. .Tune 16, 1979 - Back Page Headline 
A UPN GOVERNMENT WILL DO WONDERS - AWO 
Story:
"Chief Obafemi Awolowo has said that the Unity 
Party of Nigeria would perform a feat should it be 
voted into power in October.
The U PN Presidential Candidate, addressing a huge 
rally at BMkuru, near Jos, mentioned free education 
at all levels as part of the party’s "package" for the 
nation."
Daily Times, Wednesday July 4. 1979 - Front Paee Headline
PM YOURS, TRY ME ...
AWO rounds off rally in Lagos
Story:
"Chief Obafemi Awolowo, rounded off his 43-day 
tour of the country yesterday with an appeal to the 
electorate to vote solidly for the Unity Party of 
Nigeria, (UPN).
He said he was familiar with their "sufferings and 
privation" and it was only the UPN that could bring 
them salvation."
Daily Times. July 3. 1979 - Front Page Headline 
NPN PLEDGES HONEST SERVICE
Story:
"The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) yesterday 
offered its service, to the nation ‘on a solid and 
honest platform of peace, unity and stability’.
It also promised a social, political and economic 
programme aimed at building a prosperous, 
progressive, dynamic and contented society based on 
equal opportunity, fairness and justice.
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Announcing ‘the NPN framework for a new Nigeria’ 
in Lagos yesterday, its presidential aspirant, Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari called for massive support for the 
party".
Daily Times. January 10. 1979 - Headline 
UPN WILL MODERNISE RAIL SYSTEM - AWO 
Story:
"Chief Obafemi Awolowo has said that the Unity 
Party of Nigeria (UPN) would modernise our railway 
system if voted into power.
A  UPN government will construct a double track rail 
line from Lagos to Kano, Kaduna to Enugu and 
Benin, he told thousands of his party supporters in 
Kano.
The UPN leader, in continuation of his nationwide 
campaign tour, also told the people about the party’s 
four cardinal programmes - free education at all 
levels, rural development, free medical care and 
employment for all".
NPN TO FOSTER NATIONAL UNITY
Story:
"The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) will ensure 
that north and south dichotomy is removed from 
Nigerian politics. Alhaji Shehu Shagari has said.
The NPN Presidential candidate said in Enugu that 
the most important issue in the country today was 
national unity".
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Daily Times, January 1, 1979 
AWO IN ILISHAN
Story:
"The Presidential Candidate of the UPN, Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo (arrowed) speaks to the people of 
Ilishan in Remo Division of Ogun Sate in one of his 
end-of-the-year campaigns".
SHAGARI CALLS FOR CLEAN POLITICS 
Story:
"Alhaji Shehu Shagari has appealed to his party’s 
supporters to respect the pledge made by the leaders 
of the country’s political parties to ensure a free and 
fair election next year.
The Presidential candidate for the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN), believed the excesses and over­
zealousness of party supporters could wreck any good 
intentions of political leaders."
WHAT MAY BRING BACK THE ARMY - BY WAZIRI 
Story:
"Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim has said that he would be 
inviting the military back to power if a wrong party 
was elected.
The GNPP leader told a political rally in Michika 
Local Government area of Gongola State that the 
First Republic could not have collapsed but for 
tribalism, nepotism, religious differences and 
intolerance". H e said the GNPP ‘is a common man’s 
party’.
The Presidential candidate said that, ‘politics without 
bitterness was the watchword of the GNPP adding 
that with bitterness the party would not achieve 
anything".
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APPENDIX Ills L I S T  O F  T H O S E  I N T E R V I E W E D
(A) P O L I T C I A N S  A N D  S O L D I E R S .
1) Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, Presidential Candidate of the GNPP in the 
Senond Republic general elections and a former Minister in the First 
Republic.
2) Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Presidential Candidate of the NPP in the 1979 
and 1983 general elections and one time President of Nigeria in the 
First Republic.
3) Alhaji Shehu Shagari, President of Nigeria during the Second Republic 
and an active participant the politics of the First Republic.
4) Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Peesidential Candidate of the UPN in the Second 
Republic elections and Leader of Opposition in the First Republic.
3) Alhaji Mallam Aminu Kano, Presidential Candidate of the PRP in the
Second Republic and a one time Federal Minister.
6) Chief A.M.A. Akinloye, National Chai\£man of the defunct NPN.
7) Chief Bola Ige, former UPN Governor of Oyo State.
8) Professor Ambrose Alii, former UPN Governor of Bendel State.
9) Chief Adekunle Ajasin, former UPN Governor of Ondo State.
10) Alhaji Lateef Jakande, former UPN Governor of Lagos State.
11) Alhaji Aba Musa Rimi, former PRP Governor of Kaduna State.
12) Dr. Garba Nadama, fprmer NPN Governor of Sokoto State.
13) Alhaji Mohammed Goni, former GNPP Governor of Borno State.
14) Chief Senator C. Adebayo, former UPN Governor of Kwara State.
15) Chief Mrs. Janet Akinrinade, former NPP Minister of the Second Republic
16) Alhaji Olatunji Muhammed, former NPN Minority Leader and Deputy 
Governor of Oyo State.
17) Chief T. Akinyele, former Director of Budget.
18) Dr. Yakubu Gowon, former Military Head of State.
19) Dr. Samuel Ogbemudia, former military and later NPN Governor of Bendel 
State.
20) Alhaji Umaru Omolowo, former Commissioner of Police in Oyo State.
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(B) M A S S  M E D I A  P R A C T I T I O N E R S
1) Alhaji Chief Dr. Babatunde Jose, former Chairman and Manging Director
of the Daily Times of Nigeria.
2) Alhaji Aliko Muhammed, also a former Chairman of the Daily Times.
3) Mr. S.L Labanji Bolaji, former General Manager of the Sketch, Tribune ,
and former Managing Director of the Punch, and Editorial Member of 
the Concord .
4) Mr. Felix Adenaike, Managing Director of the Tribune and former General
Manager of the Sketch.
3) Mallam Muhammed Ibrahim, former Managing Director of the New Nigerian.
6) Chief Areoye Oyebola, forme Editor of the Daily Times.
7) Mr. Shola Oyegbemi, Managing Director of the Sketch.
8) Mr. Bola Aragbaiye, Editor of the Sunday Sketch.
9) Alhaji Lateef Jakande, Publisher of the Lagos News, and former President 
of the International Press Institute.
10) Mr. G. Izobo, former President of the Nigerian Union of Journalists-
11) Prince Bayo Sanda, General Manager of the Nigerian Television Authority 
Ibadan.
12) Prince Tony Momoh, former Minister for Information.
In addition to those listed, I also interviewed 30 Journalists, politicians, 
academicians who served under both military and civilian regimes, media
academicians, military men, voters, election officials and a host of other 
relevant people who do not wish to be named. I have thetjfefore, used . 
information of such anonymous interviewees as part of my unattributable 
sources.
